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INTRODUCTION
To many in the United States and elsewhere, Israel is a bastion of
democracy, a stalwart outpost of liberal political ideals stranded among
a number of politically and religiously volatile Arab nations whose pri-
mary intent is, or at least has been, to destroy the Jewish state and, with
it, the West's only secure foothold in the Middle East. Iran, on the other
hand, is commonly demonized as the fundamentalist Islamic theocracy
that took the United States hostage in 1979 and currently threatens not
only the Middle Eastern peace process, but the security of the entire re-
gion as it attempts to export revolutionary Islam to other nations. The
two countries are seen not only as sworn enemies in a Middle Eastern
Cold War, but also as diametrically opposed, religiously, culturally, and
politically. o
The truth, however, is that the two nations are not as different as
they and others would like to believe. Both choose to define themselves
primarily by their majority religion, and both incorporate traditional
religious principles in the law of the State to a high degree. By doing so,
both have come under pressure from international human rights watch
groups as well as their own citizens on the question of whether the
State's integration of law and religion violates the rights of citizens
and/or increases the potential for violence within and between nations.
While both countries have experienced religiously based violence and
are the target of claims that certain groups' rights are not being re-
spected, few legal studies have attempted to analyze how and whether
these two events are related to each other or to the amount of religio-
legal integration within the society in question.
The absence of any inquiry into the relationship between violence
and infringements of religious rights may be due to the international
community's historical emphasis on civil and political rights over other
sorts of rights.' Although religious rights can be said to exist within the
right to liberty, a first-generation civil right, they have also been catego-
rized as a type of natural right.! Whatever their classification, the
1. See R.J. Vincent, The Idea of Rights in International Ethics, in TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 250, 255, 262 (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992).
2. See Christine Loh, The Vienna Process and the Importance of Universal Standards
in Asia, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 145, 152 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995) (stating religious rights are first-
generation civil rights); see also Vincent, supra note 1, at 254 (discussing natural rights);
infra notes 398-472 and accompanying text (describing various types of religious rights).
But cf. ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE 139 (1993) (stating
freedom of religion is not a traditional natural right); Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in
THE MARX-ENGELS READER 26, 41 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (expressing the view
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international community has seldom focused on the problems raised by
religious rights, perhaps due to the common conviction that religious
conflict is a thing of the past or an assumption that matters of religion
are of only domestic or regional concern.
If, however, the international community abdicates its role in over-
seeing the enforcement of religious rights, there is little to prevent
potential abuse on the part of the State Because most States myopically
see their own religio-legal regimes as being unobjectionable ,4 the likeli
hood that even the most tolerant nation will perpetrate or permit
infringements of various religious rights is high. Outside monitoring is
especially critical in situations where States may act maliciously toward
minority religions.
The problem does not end with mere infringements, however;
equally troubling is the possibility that violations of religious rights may
lead to violence.5 As the use of international peacekeeping forces rises,
outbreaks of domestic violence become less a problem of national secu-
rity and more a matter of global concern. Threats to international peace
and security also occur if advocates of religiously inspired violence seek
to expand their activities beyond a single nation's borders. Because acts
of religious violence cannot be considered a purely domestic issue, the
international community needs to investigate ways to minimize violence
before it occurs and should focus particularly on the link between vio-
lence and the infringement of religious rights.
that civil and political rights are only those that revolve around participation in the political
community of the State); Yu Haocheng, On Human Rights and Their Guarantee By Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra, at 93, 104 (discussing Marx's views on civil
and political rights).
3. See CLAPHAM, supra note 2, at 107 (arguing that certain international bodies may
remind States of their duties toward individuals, but that the primary responsibility for rec-
ognizing and protecting human rights falls on States).
4. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195,
207 (1992).
5. History suggests that the infringement of religious rights can and will lead to do-
mestic violence and international war. For example, religiously based violence has not only
been used by States against dissident minorities, as was the case with the Spanish Inquisi-
tion, but also against nations that profess a different faith, as was the case with the Crusades.
In addition, religious repression has led to many violent internal uprisings by beleaguered
minorities. See Murray Forsyth, The Tradition of International Law, in TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS, supra note 1, at 23, 24-25. Although these constitute the classic
examples of violence inspired by religion, such acts are not relegated to the ancient past; in
fact, some commentators believe religio-legal violence is on the rise as religious nationalism
becomes commonplace in the developing world. See MARK JUERGENSMEYER, THE NEW
COLD WAR? RELIGIOUS NATIONALISM CONFRONTS THE SECULAR STATE 153 (1993); Steven
Erlanger, U.S. Assails China Over Suppression of Religious Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1997,
at Al (noting U.S. government's concern that "conflicts based on religion ... are of in-
creasing importance").
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One way to approach this problem is to study the ability of different
religio-legal regimes to protect religious rights and minimize violence
through a comparative constitutional analysis. By looking at several dif-
ferent systems, practitioners and politicians can decide what methods
are most successful and what elements can be successfully incorporated
into their national laws.6
A comparative study is most useful when the countries compared
are similar in all respects except for the variable being compared. For
the most part, differences in history, politics, law, and culture make it
impossible to find a perfect match in the real world, but value can be
found in an imperfect comparison between two countries so long as the
extent of other variables is known.
When approached from this perspective, Israel and Iran provide fas-
cinating examples for study. First, both have experienced or are
experiencing certain levels of internal violence based on claims that
citizens' religious rights have been infringed. Second, both have been
involved in international conflict (either formal, i.e., declared war, or
informal, i.e., terrorism) based, at least in part, on religious concerns.
Third, both nations incorporate a variety of religious principles into both
the substantive law and the institutional structure of the State based on
the claim that it is necessary in order to fully respect and accommodate
the religious obligations binding on the party in power. Yet despite these
similarities, the international community still considers the two nations
as radically different, holding up one nation, Israel, as a model for other
Middle Eastern states while citing the other, Iran, as the example of
what might occur if the situation in the Middle East were to deteriorate.
It is an interesting dynamic, not only for Middle Eastern scholars, but
for anyone concerned with how States' treatment of religious rights af-
fects peace and security.
7
6. The inherent value of the comparative legal method is discussed in John H. Lang-
bein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 545,
545, 554 (1995).
7. Although this topic has always been considered important to scholars specializing in
Islamic law because of the common perception that Islamic states are prone to religious vio-
lence, it is also becoming more important in the United States because of the rise of
religiously based domestic terrorism. See Faye Ginsburg, Saving America's Souls: Operation
Rescue's Crusade Against Abortion, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE: REMAKING
POLITms, ECONOMIES, AND MILrANCE 557, 558 (Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby eds.,
1993) (noting that Operation Rescue, which has committed terrorist acts against abortion
clinics, consists of religious Christians practicing "biblical obedience"). In fact, some schol-
ars believe that the rise of pluralism causes an increase in the infringement of minority
religious rights and, therefore, violence. See, e.g., Steve Bruce, Fundamentalism, Ethnicity,
and Enclave, in FuNDAMENTAUSMS AND THE STATE, supra, at 50, 65 (discussing funda-
mentalism in Northern Ireland). Others argue that religious pluralism often leads to States'
[VIol. 19:109
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Because law and religion are by themselves complex cultural and
historical issues, any study of the interaction between the two will be at
least as complicated. If one is to understand both a State's current re-
ligio-legal regime and what reform measures are most likely to succeed
there,8 it is necessary to understand at least a little of the nation's history
and majority religion.9 Therefore, Part I of this article provides a brief
sketch of the principles of the two majority religions at issue in this dis-
cussion and an overview of the history of both Israel and Iran. It
explains why each nation has chosen to structure itself as it has and why
the imposition of U.S.-style secularism would be an inappropriate
method of dealing with the religio-legal conflict in the two societies.
Part II compares the fundamental or constitutional laws of the two
nations by analyzing the provisions, policies, and practices most influ-
enced by religion.'° The first area of discussion is the structure of each
government system. This analysis not only sets the legal framework for
later analysis, but demonstrates how both Israel and Iran have brought
religion into the very fabric of their legal institutions.
The second area of analysis in Part II focuses on the principles of
sovereignty and constitutional interpretation utilized by each State. Fa-
miliarity with these concepts is necessary in order to learn which
religious principles, if any, are incorporated into each nation's general
legal environment. These principles, which are implicitly understood by
members of the society, are often unstated in judicial opinions or legis-
lative enactments and can confuse outside analysts who fail to
understand the framework in which laws are created and interpreted by
the State.
The third area of study involves personal rights. This section dis-
cusses what is often called "family law" and includes issues concerning
privatizing religion and religious issues, see Robert E. Rodes, Jr., Pluralist Establishment:
Reflections on the English Experience, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 867, 878 (1991), which is en-
couraging to those who believe that secularized states are less likely to experience religiously
inspired violence, but daunting to those who believe that the process of secularization can
increase violence in some regions.
8. Because of differences in history and culture, the wholesale importation of another
country's legal system should never be attempted. However, selective incorporation of vari-
ous principles or procedures can be very useful if care is taken to identify those concepts that
are most likely to fit into existing belief and behavior patterns in the adopting state.
9. See JEAN-MARIE GutHENNO, THE END OF THE NATION-STATE 4 (Victoria Elliott
trans., 1995).
10. Because Israel does not have a written constitution, this article will focus on a num-
ber of its foundational documents, including its Basic Laws, which are "fundamental in some
ill-defined sense:' MARTIN EDELMAN, COURTS, POLxriCS, AND CULTURE IN ISRAEL 30
(1994), despite their lack of true constitutional status or clear superiority to other domestic
legislation. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (discussing status of Basic Laws
in Israeli law).
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marriage, divorce, abortion, and the rights of women, children, and ho-
mosexuals. The use of the term "personal rights" is conscious and is
meant to convey the idea that many of the legal questions that fall under
the "family law" rubric often have little to do with familial relationships
per se and more to do with individual life choices. However, as shall be
seen, the group rights approach to law currently utilized in both Israel
and Iran may tend to negate the emphasis on individual rights and
choice that is prevalent in the West.
The fourth area of consideration in Part II concerns education, an
area vital to both the State and parents. Because both parents and the
State see education as highly important, conflicts over the structure and
form of education can become quite heated and can be among the most
difficult to resolve.
After identifying and analyzing the laws themselves in Part II, this
article discusses in Part III the extent to which Israeli and Iranian laws
comply with international human rights conventions concerning relig-
ious rights. Since both Israel and Iran follow a group rights approach to
law, Part III also considers whether Israel and Iran's religio-legal re-
gimes can be legitimated by reliance on group rights theory. After
identifying whether and to what extent the two States have infringed
upon their citizens' religious rights, Part III addresses the question of
whether these infringements tend to increase or decrease the potential
for violence within and between societies.
The article concludes by discussing where each nation is heading in
terms of religion and law and by offering suggestions as to what each
nation, and indeed any nation, should do to create an optimal religious
rights framework.
I. HISTORY AND RELIGION: DEFINING THE MODERN STATE
A. Israel
1. Principles of Judaism
The ancient religion known as Judaism originated early in the first
millennium B.C.," and, through constant evolution, has developed into a
very personal religion in which each individual constantly challenges
11. See NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE SACRED CHAIN: THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS 19
(1994).
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his or her faith.' Contrary to popular conceptions, pluralism is both ac-
cepted and encouraged in Judaism, at least within certain broad
confines, and there is no single set of orthodox principles that all Jews
must follow. 3 Nevertheless, there are some general parameters that de-
fine what it is to be a Jew.
The Jewish God, who is the only source of moral law, has provided
the Jews with a unique value system that distinguishes between virtues
and vices.'4 Within this moral framework, Jews are free to choose their
life path; unlike Christianity, which teaches that the desire to sin is in-
herent, Judaism holds that sinning is a matter of choice.'5 The choices
made during a person's life, however, affect his or her personal salvation
since Judaism teaches that actions are the means by which a person is
redeemed. 6
The law governing these actions is called the Halacha, meaning
"path" or "way."' 7 The Halacha covers commercial and civil matters as
well as religious matters, and formed the basis of the Jewish system of
self-government during the time of the diaspora (exile from Israel).
Even today, there are Jews who live by the precepts of the Halacha in
Israel and elsewhere.' 9
12. See HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS: OUR GREAT WISDOM TRADITIONS
300, 312 (1991) (noting that Judaism is less orthodoxy than orthopraxis); see also Maimon
Schwarzschild, Religion and Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or
Sometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola? 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903, 907-10 (1993).
13. See DAVID S. ARIEL, WHAT DO JEWS BELIEVE? THE SPIRITUAL FOUNDATIONS OF
JUDAISM 4 (1995); SMrH, supra note 12, at 312.
14. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 18, 60, 62.
15. See id. at 85.
16. See id. at 159. Religious salvation cannot be achieved through just any act; the
highly specific actions that lead to redemption are called mitzvot, and are based on God's
commandments and on various practices designed to implement God's will. See id. This
approach is different than that found in Christian theology, which teaches that salvation
comes through faith. See id.; WALTER H. CAPPS, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT: PIETY, PATRIOTISM,
AND POLrIcs 214 (1994).
17. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 161 (describing types of activities governed by the
Halacha); see also Saul Lubetski, Note, Religion and State: Does the State of Israel Provide
the Forum for the Revival of the Jewish Legal System? 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 331,
336-37 (1994) (stating that the Halacha is a "philosophy encompassing all phases of Jewish
life").
18. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 162; Menachem Elon, The Legal System of Jewish Law,
17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221, 224, 228-32 (1985).
19. See Ehud Sprinzak, Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fun-
damentalism in Israel, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra note 7, at 462, 463-64.
During the last two centuries, however, when assimilation into European society required
religion to become a private matter, most Jews stopped incorporating all aspects of the Ha-
lacha into their lives and began departmentalizing their religion into the private sphere of
life. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 171.
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One of the many responsibilities required of the Jewish people un-
der the Halacha is the duty to seek justice and create a lawful society,2
which has led traditional Judaism to reject any separation between re-
ligion and government."' However, because diaspora Jews have
historically lived under secular, non-Jewish rule, they have been forced
to accept a de facto separation of temporal and religious authority and
have created religiously acceptable ways of recognizing the authority of
the State in which they live.2
Another key aspect of Judaism is the belief that the people of Israel
are a chosen people.3 This covenant is not between God and individuals,
as it is in the Christian faith; it is between God and the collective Jewish
people. This emphasis on the collectivity is also evident in the Jewish
belief that no single Jew will be resurrected until the Messiah arrives on
earth, at which time all Jews will be collectively redeemed.'
In Jewish theology, the Messiah will be both a spiritual and a politi-
cal redeemer who will create a better world for Jews and restore the true
worship of God.26 'The rabbinic literature contains an elaborate set of
theories about the messianic era, the most important of which concerns
the in-gathering of the diaspora in the reconstituted State of Israel.2
The practice of Judaism does not require a clergy or religious hier-
archy for daily religious life." However, there is a strong tradition of
20. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 286.
21. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 338. Islam also promotes a unified approach to faith
and politics, while Christianity at least initially advocated its separation. See SMrrH, supra
note 12, at 249; PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRiSTiANrrY 99, 126 (1976) (discussing
integration of religion and state in Roman Empire); Mark 12:17 ("Jesus said unto them,
'Give unto the emperor the things that are the emperor's, and to God the things that are
God's.' ").
22. See Chaim Povarsky, Jewish Law v. the Law of the State: Theories of Accommoda-
tion, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 941, 943-45 (1991); see also Elon, supra note 18, at 223 (citing
the doctrine of dina de-malkhuta dina, under which "the [civil] law of the land (the govern-
ment under whose reign Jews lived) is valid law"). However, although secular laws are to be
followed whenever possible, they are considered invalid if they conflict with Jewish ritual
law. See id. (citing R. SIMEON DURAN, RESPONSA (TASHBEZ) 1:158).
23. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 307. Although this belief could invoke feelings of su-
periority or exclusivity that would lead to discrimination against non-Jews, Judaism requires
tolerance of other religions. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 109-10. According to Jewish be-
lief, a Jew and a gentile (non-Jew) have the same status in God's eyes if the gentile
renounces idolatry and observes the "seven commandments of the sons of Noah" Id. at 128
(listing the seven universal commandments).
24. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 113.
25. See id. at 228-29; ROY A. ROSENBERG, THE CONCISE GUIDE TO JUDAISM 236-38
(1990).
26. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 297.
27. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 223.
28. See id. at 126.
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learned scholars or rabbis who interpret and explain the law as laid
down by God.! The basic written instrument of the Jewish religion is
the Torah, which is considered the written expression of God's message
to the Jewish people ° The Hebrew Bible also contains a number of pro-
phetic books (Nevi'im) and additional books called the Writings
(Ketuvim).3 The oral law (Talmud) supplements God's written message
to Israel 2 Only the Torah is divine in origin."
Like most major religions, Judaism encompasses a number of dif-
ferent denominations. The three major branches of Judaism are
Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform.' Orthodox Jews base their beliefs
on the strict rabbinic tradition, while the other major denominations al-
low more relaxed definitions of what it means to be a Jew. Other
Jewish belief systems include Zionism and several types of ultra-
Orthodoxy. 6
29. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 210-22.
30. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 134. The Torah consists of the five books of Moses:
Genesis, Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy. See id.
31. See id. at 134-35.
32. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 334. The Talmud has two parts, the Mishnah, which
is the oral code of law up until approximately 200 A.D., and the Gemara, which is a written
record of the commentaries and questions surrounding the Mishnah. See id. at 334-35.
33. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 135.
34. See id. at 44.
35. See id. at 44-46, 175. For example, Conservative Jews often try to find a middle
ground between relativism (the belief that all truth is relative) and fundamentalism. See id. at
156, 173. Reform Judaism often focuses on social reform and calls on Jews to solve the in-
justices of modem society. See id. at 119.
36. One ultra-Orthodox group is the Hasidim. See id. at 175. The most mystical sect of
Judaism, the hasidim believe that union with God is possible through prayer. See id. at 42,
175; see also CANTOR, supra note 11, at 218 (noting origins and impetus of Hasidism). An-
other ultra-Orthodox sect is the Haredim, who are considered Jewish fundamentalists and
comprise a small but highly vocal minority in Israel. See Sprinzak, supra note 19, at 463; see
also ARIEL, supra note 13, at 175. Both the Hasidim and the Haredim are isolationists who
reject the secular world. See id. They also share an interpretation of Judaism that requires
strict observation of all aspects of Jewish law and rejection of Zionism. See Sprinzak, supra
note 19, at 464.
One critical aspect of the haredi belief system is the idea that the Jews are still in exile
and that Zionism and the existence of the political state of Israel are "meaningless at best and
terrible sins at worst." Id. Although some Haredim have grown to accept the State of Israel,
others actively oppose it as a profanation of God's will. See id. The Haredim focus on the
traditional conception of the Jewish people as a collective and believe that the existence of
even a minority of sinners will forestall heavenly redemption. See id. at 465. Furthermore,
the Haredim require strict uniformity among members of the group and will undertake vari-
ous acts, including violent ones, in order to enforce community norms. See id. (outlining
some of the methods used to ensure religious and societal conformity within the haredi
community).
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Political Zionism, which is a secular movement related to Judaism,
is responsible for the creation and existence of the State of Israel. 7 The
Zionist movement arose in the late 1880s as a response to the Jews' per-
ceived failure to assimilate in Europe." Although there is a strong
secular element present in Zionism, there are a number of Jewish relig-
ious traditions within Zionism as well.39 For example, religious Zionists
believe that redemption can be achieved by a return to the Jewish
homeland (Zion) and the creation of an autonomous Jewish state.' Al-
though traditional Jewish theology also states that a return to Zion is
part of the process of redemption, many Jews, especially the Orthodox,
believe that the faithful must wait patiently for God to decide when Jews
are to return to Zion.' Zionism, in direct opposition to traditional Juda-
ism, encourages Jews to take the initiative and regain their homeland.42
2. Growth of Judaism
The modern State of Israel is only the most recent manifestation of
the secular Jewish nation that was born in the eastern littoral of the
Mediterranean in the first millennium B.C.43 Although the Jewish nation
has been subject to a wide range of political vicissitudes over the inter-
vening centuries, the Jewish religion has managed to survive despite the
lack of a firm political base."
In 586 B.C., after the invasion of Israel by the armies of Babylon,
the Jews were expelled from their homeland into Babylonia.4' Their
numbers grew in exile so that by the time of the birth of Jesus there
were nearly six million Jews living in the Roman Empire." Two hundred
37. Cultural Zionism, which arose at approximately the same time as political Zionism,
did not find the existence of a Jewish state an absolute necessity but did advocate the rebirth
of Jewish culture both within that state (if it should come into existence) and within the dias-
pora. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 122.
38. See DANIEL J. ELAZAR & JANET AVIAD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL: THE
INTERPLAY OF JUDAISM AND ZIONISM 6 (1981); see also CANTOR, supra note 11, at 235, 288
(discussing importance of Zionism in history of Judaism).
39. See ELAZAR & AVIAD, supra note 38, at 6-7.
40. See id.; see also CANTOR, supra note 11, at 292-99 (discussing rise and ideology of
Zionism).
41. See Sprinzak, supra note 19, at 464.
42. See ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 199; ARIEL, supra note 13, at 244.
43. See generally Lubetski, supra note 17, at 338-45 (outlining history of the Jewish
people).
44. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 310-11 (crediting rabbis for survival of the faith).
45. See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 62, 79.
46. Judaism was, however, for the most part tolerated by the State. See id. at 61, 65; see
also JOHNSON, supra note 21, at 6-7, 9, 11, 70 (discussing status of Jews in the Roman Em-
pire); ALAN WATSON, THE STATE, LAW AND RELIGION: PAGAN ROME 62 (1992) (discussing
the legal problems associated with Judaism in the Roman state).
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years later, Christianity had established itself as Judaism's bitter rival,
and the conversion of the Roman emperor to Christianity in the early
fourth century A.D. assured the continuation of Christianity in the
Mediterranean world and the religio-political persecution of Jews by
Christian states.4 From that time on, the Jewish population began to de-
cline in numbers as well as in social and economic status.4
Over the course of the next sixteen hundred years, the Jewish people
existed in various communities throughout the world. Because persecu-
tion and discrimination were often legally enforceable, 49 Jews attempted
to assimilate into the culture of the nations in which they lived in order
to escape discriminatory treatment.0 This assimilation often required
Jews to reject traditional ways of life, including public indications of
faith such as distinctive dress and deportment." In many cases, efforts to
assimilate failed, forcing Jews to flee in order to avoid violent anti-
Semitism." However, the need to live in a hostile secular world while
simultaneously retaining their own belief system led to a rich legal
heritage that has influenced not only the lives of individual Jews but
also the structure of Israel itself.53
3. Birth and Growth of the Modem Nation
Although various Zionist groups began calling for the formation of
a Jewish homeland early in the twentieth century, it was not until No-
vember 29, 1947, that their dream acquired political legitimacy through
47. See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 80.
48. See id. at 80-81. Periodically throughout history, individual Jews and Jews as a
group have been held in high esteem for their talents as soldiers, scientists, artists, and law-
yers. See id. at 121, 174. However, recognition of Jewish merit often lasts only as long as
society prospers or has need of Jews' special talents; once austerity sets in, Jews are often
seen as the cause of the problems and persecuted accordingly. See id. at 174-75; see also
J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313, 2330 (1997) (discussing how
tolerance wanes in times of economic hardship).
49. See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 109-10. Most of this persecution came at Christian
hands; Jews under Muslim rule often flourished. See id. at 124 (noting two centuries under
Muslim political dominance seen as a Jewish "golden era"). But cf. id. at 125 (noting modern
Arab nationalism has created tension between Jews and Muslims).
50. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 171.
51. See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 247-48, 355. But cf. Elon, supra note 18, at 231-32
(claiming that medieval conceptions of statehood did not require total assimilation and thus
allowed for Jewish judicial autonomy and creation of vast body of Jewish law).
52. See CANTOR, supra note 11, at 189, 232.
53. See generally Povarsky, supra note 22 (noting conflict between Jewish and secular
law and the subsequent rise of various legal doctrines to address the tension between the two
systems of law).
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a resolution of the United Nations. ' The nation itself was established on
May 14, 1948."5 Although it seems natural to think that the concept of a
sovereign state would receive universal support from a people who
faced rampant persecution and discrimination around the world, a num-
ber of religious Jews vigorously resisted the creation of a secular state
throughout the 1910s, 1920s, and 1930s." As discussed above, this op-
position was due to the Orthodox belief that actively working toward
establishing a Jewish homeland would be to work against God's will and
God's time." Therefore, some Jews not only objected to the creation of
Israel but affirmatively worked against the Zionists to forestall the crea-
tion of any secular state.58 Other Jews, although uncomfortable with the
thought of a modem Jewish state, were willing to immigrate to Israel,
but only if the new nation was ruled by Jewish religious law. 9
During this period of internal conflict and indecision, more and
more Jewish settlers emigrated from Europe to Palestine, bringing with
them more moderate religious views and helping to bridge the gap be-
tween the secular Zionists and the Orthodox Jews who resided in
Palestine.' In addition, the genocide committed in Europe during World
War II helped convince a number of rabbis of the need for a Jewish
state.6' The Orthodox leaders were still concerned about what rights and
protections would be given to religious Jews in a secular state, however,
and forced the Zionists to set forth certain protections that would never
be changed. The letter containing these promises is called the Status
Quo Agreement since it continued certain compromises that had existed
during, and in some cases prior to, British rule.62 In addition, the Provi-
54. See G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 131 (1947) (calling for the simultaneous
creation of two sovereign nations, one Jewish and one Palestinian; notably, the latter never
came into being); ELAZAR & AVIAD, supra note 38, at 7-8; see also YEHOSHUA
FREUDENHEIM, GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL 1 (1967).
55. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 7.
56. See ELAZAR & AV1AD, supra note 38, at 8-9.
57. See id.
58. To the Orthodox, the Zionists were not only blaspheming the word of God by acting
against God's instructions to wait patiently for the Messiah's appearance, but were delaying
the redemption of all Jews. See Sprinzak, supra note 19, at 464.
59. See ELAZAR & AvIAD, supra note 38, at 8-11.
60. See id. at 10; see also Basheva E. Genut, Note, Competing Visions of the Jewish
State: Promoting and Protecting Freedom of Religion in Israel, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
2120, 2131 & n.89 (1996) (discussing demographics of various waves of Jewish immigrants
to Palestine).
61. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 314.
62. See CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLIrICS IN
ISRAEL 31-32 (1984) [hereinafter LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS];
Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346. From 1914 to 1948, Palestine was governed by Great Britain
pursuant to the mandatory scheme created by the League of Nations. See Genut, supra note
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sional Council of State that was responsible for the transition from
British to Israeli sovereignty announced that "the law in force on the
day of the British withdrawal would continue in force in the State of
Israel as long as it was not inconsistent with 'the establishment of the
State and its authorities.' ,
63
Although the founders of the State of Israel intended to draft a con-
stitution immediately, fundamental political difficulties arose con-
cerning the proper balance between Israel's religious and democratic
nature." When it became apparent that the immediate adoption of a con-
stitution would cause extreme divisiveness during a time when the threat
to national security was high, the Constituent Assembly charged with
the task of drafting and implementing a constitution decided to suspend
its work, change its name to the Knesset, and establish itself as the leg-
islative body of Israel.5 A year later, the Knesset adopted the Harari
60, at 2131 n.83 (citing CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
42-135 (1988) (discussing British Mandate in Palestine from 1914-48)). Essentially, the
Status Quo Agreement required that (i) Saturday be set aside as the national day of rest; (ii)
dietary restrictions (kashrut) be observed in all government-controlled kitchens; (iii) relig-
ious courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and divorce; and (iv) the existing
religious education systems be recognized by the new nation. See LIEBMAN & DoN-YEHIYA,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra, at 32. In the fifty years since Israel was created, the State has
generally upheld the principles contained in the Status Quo Agreement, although some unof-
ficial exceptions have been made. See Timothy J. McNulty, Israelis Focus on Religious
Laws: Observant Jews Ready to Flex Political Muscle, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 1996, § 1, at I
(noting that although the Status Quo Agreement is not binding law, its principles are reaf-
firmed by every new Knesset, since it would be akin to political suicide to attempt to
override the agreement). For example, restrictions on doing business during the Saturday
Sabbath at first required the State to halt all public transportation on that day and forbid
restaurants or movie theaters from operating from sundown on Friday to sundown on Satur-
day. See id. Now, movie theaters in Tel Aviv are open on the Sabbath and buses run regularly
in the more secularized cities along the Mediterranean coast, although Jerusalem still main-
tains a ban on public transportation on Saturday. See id.
63. Andrew Treitel, Conflicting Traditions: Muslim Shari'a Courts and Marriage Age
Regulations in Israel, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 403, 418 (1995) (quoting Law and
Administration Ordinance, 1948, sect. 11, 1 L.S.I. 7, 9 (1948)).
64. See FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 31-37; Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended
Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform: Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM.
J. COMP. L. 585, 588 (1996); Amos Shapira, Why Israel Has No Constitution, 37 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 283 passim (1993). The other major problem facing the drafters was the tension be-
tween the desire to create a constitution that protected human rights and the need to invoke
certain emergency powers in light of the imminent threat posed by neighboring Arab states
to Israel's national security. See Daphne Barak-Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Con-
stitution: The Israeli Challenge in American Perspective, 26 CoLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
309, 314 (1995). Nevertheless, there was a considerable amount of work put into a draft
constitution in the late 1940s, see generally FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 8-37
(discussing draft constitution and decision not to implement a single document), and not
everyone has given up hope. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 25-26 (noting that in 1987,
scholars at Tel Aviv University Law School created a draft constitution sua sponte).
65. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 588 (citing Transition Law, 1949, 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949)).
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Resolution, which stated that the Israeli Constitution would be drafted
gradually in the form of a number of "Basic Laws" that would eventu-
ally comprise the various segments of the final constitution.'
Unfortunately, the problems that prevented the adoption of a constitu-
tion at the time Israel was founded, namely the ideological debate
between religious and secular forces and the threat to national security,
have continued unabated to the present day."
Politically and ideologically, Israel continues to shift back and forth
between its secular-Zionist and its religious heritage. Given the disparity
of viewpoints concerning the proper relationship between religion and
state that has existed since Israel's birth, this is not surprising. Some in
Israel see their country as a secular state, while others see it as some-
thing very close to a Jewish theocracy. As in the United States, a major
question in these conflicts between state and religion is which issues are
public and which issues are private." A second but equally compelling
question is the extent to which religious institutions should be granted
autonomy. The religious parties in Israel have long expressed views on
these issues, but have recently found their voices are increasingly heard
in the Israeli political realm71 because the major parties' need to court
the religious parties' support in order to form coalition governments. As
a result of this political necessity, the religious parties have been able to
push through much legislation in their favor.7 It remains to be seen
66. See 5 D.K. (Knesset Records) (1950) 1743, cited in Genut, supra note 60, at 2142;
Hofnung, supra note 64, at 588.
67. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 314.
68. See Storer H. Rowley, Religious and Secular Visions of Israel Clash: Cultural Battle
Over Street Pits Jew vs. Jew, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1996, § 1, at 4; Christopher Walker, Cabi-
net Minister Vows to Challenge Rabbis'Marriage Blacklist in Court, TIMES (London), Dec.
23, 1994, at 7 (quoting leading Israeli columnist as stating "Israel bills itself as the only
democracy in the Middle East, but in matters of personal status it is a theocracy, pure and
simple").
69. See Charles S. Liebman, Jewish Fundamentalism and the Israeli Polity, in FUNDA-
MENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra note 7, at 68, 75.
70. See Genut, supra note 60, at 2154; see also John Quigley, Apartheid Outside Africa:
The Case of Israel, 2 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 221, 231-39 (1991) (discussing extent to
which the State has abdicated its power to religious institutions).
71. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 81; see
also Liebman, supra note 69, at 68. Some commentators argue that the recent increases in
the ability and willingness of the civil courts to exercise their power of limited judicial re-
view have led to the limitation of the power of the religious parties, since the parties realize
that legislation is not immune from court review. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 602. Others
disagree, seeing the religious parties as continuing to push for whatever political gains they
can get. See Judy Dempsey, Challenge to Nature of Israeli State, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 5-6, 1997,
at 4.
72. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 321-22 (claiming major parties have caved in to
religious parties' demands, including those that were considered illegitimate in light of con-
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whether the secular elements in Israeli society, which have been forced
to accept a large number of political disappointments at the hands of
religious parties, will be able to recoup or whether the religious ele-
ments will continue to control the Knesset and the nation at large.
B. Iran
1. Principles of Islam
Like Judaism, Islam is an ancient religion originating in the Middle
East. The founder of the faith and model of proper Muslim behavior,
Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, was born in Mecca in or about 570 A.D.,
and he is considered by Muslims to be the last of the series of prophets
sent from God to the children of Adam.73
Theologically, Islam is based on the "five pillars" of faith, a social
and ideological program that was created during the early days of the
religion and continues to the present day.74 The Quran, which is consid-
ered by Muslims to be the sacred, literal, and inerrant word of God,
contains additional injunctions concerning proper behavior for believ-
ers.75 For example, sexual conduct is strictly regulated, although
polygamy is accepted for men.76 The role of women is also strictly
regulated In addition, the faithful must adhere to certain dietary rules,
similar to those in Judaism.
Many of these religious precepts are found in the Shari'a, or sacred
law of Islam.7 The Shari'a, which governs all aspects of a believer's
life, consists not only of the Quran, but also the sunna, or customary
siderations of public fairness and the clear will of the public, in order to retain religious par-
ties' political support); Bernard Susser, Toward a Constitution for Israel, 37 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 939, 941 (1993).
73. See HENRY MUNSON, JR., ISLAM AND REVOLUTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 8-9
(1988); MALISE RUTHVEN, ISLAM IN THE WORLD 59 (1984); SMrrH, supra note 12, at 223.
The other Islamic prophets were Noah, Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. See id.
74. See DILIP HiRo, HOLY WARS: THE RISE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM 9-10
(1989). The five pillars of faith are the profession of faith, prayer, obligatory charity, the fast
of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca. See id.
75. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 84. Muslims consider the sacred scriptures of Ju-
daism and Christianity to be incomplete versions of God's message to the early prophets. See
MUNSON, supra note 73, at 8.
76. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 84-87. Although polygamy has been justified as a
means of maximizing human procreation in a difficult physical environment, it also objecti-
fies women as merely reproductive objects. See id. at 87. However, modern scholars read the
Quran as advocating monogamy as the ideal. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 252.
77. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 84-87.
78. See id. at 84-85.
79. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 24.
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practice of Muhammad and his companions.- Islamic fundamentalists
often claim that the Shari'a can be used as the cornerstone constitu-
tional document of a modern nation-state,' but only one-tenth of the
Quran actually deals with legal obligations, and the majority of those
verses deal with religious matters. 2 Of the remaining eighty or so verses
that can be classified as "legal," most concern women, marriage, and the
laws of inheritance. 3
However, Islam is more than a mere set of religious rules. Its main
focus is on the creation of a "good society,""U with the classical formula-
tion of the faith condoning any means to achieve that end, including
holy war (jihad) and assassination." Many model the idea of the "good
society" on the community founded by Muhammad in Medina in 622
A.D., after he fled Mecca in the face of religious persecution.86
80. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 9; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 152, 385; see also
Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Islam and the State, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1015, 1022-23 (1991)
[hereinafter Mayer, Islam and the State] (noting Shari'a consists of Quran and the examples
of Muhammad). The sunna consists of various hadiths, or reports, concerning the words and
deeds of Muhammad. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 8-9.
81. See ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL
LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 95 (1990). An-Na'im also discusses
the Shari'a as a constitutional model and suggests alternate approaches to Islamic constitu-
tionalism. See id. at 75-100; see also Said Amir Arjomand, Shi'ite Jurisprudence and
Constitution Making in Iran, in FUNDAMENTAuSMS AND THE STATE, supra note 7, at 88,
102-03 (discussing constitution making in Iran); Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80,
at 1054-56 (discussing An-Na'im's influence on future Islamic political thinking).
82. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 148.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 98. It is this continual call to improve the world that has led to cyclical pat-
terns of fundamentalist reform in Islamic nations. See id. at 29-30, 98; see also MUNSON,
supra note 73, at 14; Hamid Algar, Social Justice in the Ideology and Legislation of the Is-
lamic Revolution ofIran, in SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST, 64
INST. OF INT'L STUD. RES. SERIES 17, 22 (Laurence 0. Michalak & Jeswald W. Salacuse
eds., 1986). Notably, the creation of a good society does not require the conversion of unbe-
lievers, but does require their adherence to the Muslim code of behavior. All Muslims do not
adhere to an activist interpretation of Islam that requires creation of a good or Muslim soci-
ety; there is also a passivist interpretation of Islam, similar to that in Judaism, that requires
the patient acceptance of adversity and imperfection in the world as part of God's will. See
MUNSON, supra note 73, at 14.
85. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 63-64. Although fundamentalist Muslims support a
literal interpretation of the Quran, thus requiring them to aspire to the creation of a world-
wide Islamic state, see MUNSON, supra note 73, at 15, 37 (noting weakness of
fundamentalist polemic), there are many Muslims who do not support the classical method of
expansion of the Muslim world by force. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 81, at 9.
86. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 11. This is commonly called the golden age of Is-
lam, when justice, equality, and virtue flourished. See id. But see RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at
96 (noting that the Medina period was also one of the most bloody and contentious eras in
Islamic history).
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Initially, clergy were not an integral part of Muslim life, since the
nature of the Quran lent itself to use by laypersons Because Islam in-
volves no priestly mediation between God and humans, each individual
must earn his or her own salvation, primarily by working to create an
ideal Islamic society.88
Despite the fact that clerics are not a required part of Muslim relig-
ious life, they became more necessary over time as the science of
religious jurisprudence, or fiqh (understanding), arose. 9 Islamic fiqh
expands upon the Shari'a by explaining and interpreting the rules and
teachings of Muhammad, and is comprised of four elements: the Quran,
the sunna, the consensus of the community, and analogous reasoning.90
Eventually, the consensus of the community was transformed into the
consensus of the ulama (religious scholars who had become the official
interpreters of the Quran). 9 However, even though consensus of the
ulama can be a powerful indicator of accepted theological beliefs, plu-
ralism is accepted in Islam.92
There are two major denominations within Islam. Sunni Muslims
far outnumber Shi'a Muslims in the Islamic world, although Iran is pre-
dominantly Shi' a.93 The primary theological difference between the two
groups is that Sunnis consider Muhammad's first four successors to be
the "rightly guided caliphs" and follow all four as teachers and inter-
preters of Islamic law and behavior.94 Shi'as, on the other hand, follow
only 'Ali, the fourth caliph.95 Most Muslims in Iran belong to the
"Twelver" branch of Shi'a Islam, in which a line of twelve pure and
87. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 105; see also MUNSON, supra note 73, at 29 (noting
lack of clergy in Islam).
88. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 98; SMrrH, supra note 12, at 238, 240-41.
89. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 144. Classical scholars believe that the fiqh found
in the Shari'a is immutable once it has been ratified through consensus. See Mark Cammack
et al., Legislating Social Change in an Islamic Society-Indonesia's Marriage Law, 44 AM.
J. COMP. L. 45, 48-49 (1996). Modernists believe that some types of change infiqh are pos-
sible; however, this approach has not been universally accepted within the Muslim
community. See id. at 49.
90. See RUTHvEN, supra note 73, at 154.
91. The power and prestige of the ulama varies within the different branches of Islam.
See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 29. However, within the ulama there is no single, universally
recognized religious hierarchy. See SANDRA MACKEY, THE IRANIANS: PERSIA, ISLAM AND
THE SOUL OF A NATION 115-17 (1996).
92. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 157.
93. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 16; see also MACKEY, supra note 91, at 85 (noting
that Iran became ninety-five percent Shi'a in the eighteenth century). Other countries with
Shi'a majorities are Iraq and Bahrain. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 16.
94. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 17; HIRo, supra note 74, at 18 (discussing doctrinal
differences between Sunnis and Shi'as).
95. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 17-19.
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sinless spiritual leaders, or imams, figure largely.96 The first imam was
the fourth Sunni caliph, 'Ali.9' Twelver theology dictates that the
twelfth, or "hidden," imam has not yet arrived on earth, but will appear
during the end times.9'
Other differences between the two denominations include Sunnis'
detailed observance of law and ritual, which has been compared to the
legalism found in Orthodox Judaism, and the general absence of clerical
mediation between God and humans.99 Shi'as, on the other hand,
strongly emphasize the role of the ulama in their religious practices. m
Midway through the eighteenth century, a number of Iranian ulama sup-
ported the idea that all Shi'as should be led by a religious scholar, or
mujtahid (jurist), whose interpretation of Islamic law would be binding
on his followers.'O° During the twentieth century, the mujtahids, who are
believed to be the deputies of the hidden imam, began to be called aya-
tollahs (signs of God) after they had risen to a certain level of esteem
within the religious community.'m Occasionally, a cleric's extraordinary
faith, knowledge of religious law, and character would lead to his being
given the most authoritative religious designation in Shi'a Islam, that of
the marja'-i taqlid, or "source of imitation" for all others.' 3 Notably,
none of these titles are conferred by a religious body. Instead, the
masses acknowledge a cleric's authority and begin to call him by the
new title; if a sufficient (but undesignated) number of leading clerics
accept the popular acclaim as merited, the new title becomes fact.'"
In addition to its reliance on the ulama, Shi'a Islam is marked by a
world view that is distinctly different than that held by Sunnis. The
Shi'a perspective, which has greatly influenced modem Iranian politics,
96. See id. at 16.
97. See id. at 17-19.
98. See id. at 16. The belief that the return of the twelfth imam is imminent has given
rise to many radical religious movements. See id. at 26.
99. See RUrHVEN, supra note 73, at 188; see also MUNSON, supra note 73, at 35
(stating that the contrast between Sunni and Shi'a Islam is analogous to the contrast between
Protestantism and Catholicism). Popular Sunni Islam, however, emphasizes a larger role for
clerics than the orthodox view does. See id.
100. See RuTHVEN, supra note 73, at 202.
101. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 31. Mujtahids were vested with more than just
spiritual authority; they also exercised social, economic, and political power. See RUTHVEN,
supra note 73, at 225; see also MACKEY, supra note 91, at 110 (stating that since the seven-
teenth century, the leading Shi'a scholar has been considered the leader of Iranian society).
Many mujtahids exist simultaneously in Iranian society, and each one's opinion is as theo-
logically valid as another's; however, a mujtahid's opinion is often valued according to
where he stands in a complex and unspoken religious hierarchy. See id. at 116.
102. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 116; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 31.
103. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 116; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 32.
104. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 116.
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views the world primarily in terms of suffering and the presence of
evil.' ° Martyrdom and defeat at the hands of the unjust also figure
largely in popular Shi'a belief.'0°
2. Growth of Islam
Every religion is a product of its time and culture. For example, Ju-
daism first appeared during a time of polytheism and pessimism about
the nature of life, the world, and the hereafter, and responded by estab-
lishing a monotheistic faith that focused on the positive aspects of life."°
In contrast, Islam was born in an atmosphere of political conquest' °8 and
close identification with the State.'O° Because Islam views the early days
of the religion as its "golden era," it continues to aspire toward the re-
creation of the political, religious, and territorial unity that marked that
period." However, although religio-legal unity might be a goal of some
Muslims, it is not a necessary part of Islam, as Islamic political and re-
ligious institutions have retained their own separate identities over the
centuries so that observance of religious law in most Islamic countries is
independent of secular law.'
105. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 188. Because Shi'as, as a minority sect, consider
themselves to be in a position of danger in a corrupt world, Shi'a theology permits believers
to engage in taqiyeh, or "dissimulation of the truth." MACKEY, supra note 91, at 109. Essen-
tially, this doctrine allows Shi'as to deny their faith in a variety of ways, something that is
forbidden in Sunni Islam, which considers any denial of faith to be apostasy. See id.; see
generally Alison E. Graves, Women in Iran: Obstacles in Human Rights and Possible Solu-
tion, 5 AM. U. J. GENDER AND L. 57 (1996). Shi'a acceptance of taqiyeh has led many
foreign governments to suspect that Iranian proclamations regarding a multitude of govern-
ment practices, including the renunciation of international terrorism, are nothing more than
concealment of the truth. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 109.
106. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 188; see also HIRO, supra note 74, at 19 (noting
Shi'a belief that "the true believer should not shy away from challenging the established
order, with arms if necessary, if it has become unjust and oppressive even if the chances of
overthrowing it are slender"); MACKEY, supra note 91, at 55-56 (noting that Shi'as idealize
"the devotion, religious zeal, self-sacrifice, and strict adherence to Islamic principles origi-
nally set by Ali").
107. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 19-20.
108. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 89-90, 289. The medieval wars of conquest for
which Islam is famous were undertaken more for political and economic reasons than relig-
ious ones; in fact, conversion of the conquered peoples was generally discouraged. See id. at
144. Nevertheless, conversion did often occur, although more for economic and social rea-
sons than for religious ones. See id. at 145.
109. This may also be due to the fact that Muhammad held both spiritual and political
roles during the religion's formative years. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 81, at 3; SMrrH, supra
note 12, at 249.
110. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 11, 37-38.
111. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 157-60, 226; see also HIRO, supra note 74, at 9
(regarding relationships of religion and government in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam).
Fall 19971
Michigan Journal of International Law
Based on these facts, it is not surprising that the history of Islam is a
political, as well as religious. After Muhammad's death in 632 A.D., the
Muslim community had to find a successor, or caliph, to carry on the
policies begun by Muhammad.' 2 Although the religious ties of Islam
had created a tenuous peace between the formerly warring tribes of
Arabia, that peace would last only as long as the Islamic empire contin-
ued to turn its attention outward, to the acquisition of territory and
wealth, rather than inward."' However, turmoil arose within the Muslim
world immediately after Muhammad's death on the choice of a leader
for the Muslim community."" A small but vocal group believed that 'Ali,
Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, should lead the nation and the
faith, but he was passed over."5 Although 'Ali did eventually lead the
Islamic community, by then the rift between the two sects had become
irreparable, and the faith split into two distinct denominations."6
Despite the existence of various theological disputes, expansion of
the Muslim sphere of influence continued under Muhammad's succes-
sors until the tenth century A.D."' At its height, Islam's political power
reigned throughout Arabia, the Middle East, northern Africa, Asia, and
part of Europe."'
Even the most successful empires eventually decline, however, and
in the end economic and political problems, in conjunction with the rise
of Christian European powers, finally brought down the empire in the
nineteenth century."9 One factor that helped hasten Islam's political de-
mise was the preeminence of tradition in the Muslim mindset.'2 ° This
curtailed industrialization and the adoption of new technology in Is-
lamic nations, thus allowing Western industrial powers to insinuate
themselves in the region and establish a certain level of economic domi-
nance.' Along with technological know-how, the Europeans brought
Western-style ideas about politics and, through their economic policies,
forced the Muslim world to accept permanent nation-states and monar-
112. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 17.
113. See RUTHvEN, supra note 73, at 92.
114. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 17.
115. See id. at 16-17.
116. See id. at 17.
117. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 230; Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Re-
public of Iran, and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 145, 167 (1992).
118. See SMITH, supra note 12, at 230-31.
119. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 289-92, 298. By 1920, there were only six inde-
pendent Muslim states remaining. See id. at 292.
120. See id. at 290.
121. See &I.
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chies, thereby creating an enduring legacy of tension and conflict be-
tween Western and Islamic ideas."'
The twentieth century has witnessed a revitalization of Islamic re-
ligio-political thought, as States with Muslim majorities have begun to
act on their long-standing animosity toward and suspicion of the West.",
Modernization and secularization have been seen not only as a form of
cultural domination at the hands of Western powers, but as a threat to
the Islamic way of life.2' Muslim activists utilize political revolution
and religious reform as a means of establishing societies that embrace
cherished traditional values.'2 The challenge, of course, is to integrate
traditional values with the needs of twentieth century life. Many Islamic
nations, including Iran, continue to struggle to find a workable ap-
proach. 26
3. Birth and Growth of the Modem Nation
The area now known as Iran was once part of the ancient Persian
empire and retains an enduring allegiance to certain traditions and be-
liefs that originated in that great pre-Islamic civilization. For example,
modem-day alliances between religion and state in Iran mirror similar
relationships between Zoroastrian priests and Persian kings.2' Similarly,
the ancient Persians, like twentieth-century Iranians, often preferred to
pursue a socio-political ideal that preserved justice and a sense of bal-
ance and order rather than a model that established guarantees of
individual freedom.2' Finally, and perhaps most importantly, both cul-
tures relied on religious leaders to instigate calls for radical social
change whenever political powers failed to adequately ensure that jus-
tice was done."
122. See id. at 292; see also Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1026-27
(describing effect of modem nation-states on Islamic ideology).
123. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, The Fundamentalist Impact on Law, Politics, and Con-
stitutions in Iran, Pakistan, and the Sudan, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra
note 7, at 110, 111 [hereinafter Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact].
124. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 118-19.
125. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 286, 353-54.
126. See Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact, supra note 123, at 110-12, 142-44
(discussing fundamentalist movements in three States); see also Mayer, Islam and the State,
supra note 80, at 1030-47 (discussing Pakistan and Algeria); Adrien Katherine Wing, Cus-
tom, Religion and Rights: The Future Legal Status of Palestinian Women, 35 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 149, 150-51 (1994) (discussing efforts to improve the legal status of Palestinian
women).
127. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 29.
128. See id. at 24.
129. See id. at 35.
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In terms of Persian-Iranian history, the advent of Islam is only a re-
cent occurrence, for it was not until 651 A.D. that Muslim forces
conquered the Iranian plateau. 30 The Muslim Arabs brought with them
not only a new religion but a new culture, and although Arabic influ-
ences have intermingled with Persian sensibilities over the last 1350
years, they have never completely conquered the Iranian mindset. 3 ' As a
consequence, battles have continually broken out between the secular-
Persian forces in Iranian culture and Islamic elements. The country has
enjoyed the most stability when neither religion nor secularism has had
absolute control over society, but rather when moderation and balance
between the two elements has prevailed.
3 1
Iran existed as an undifferentiated part of Timur Lang, a Sunni-
dominated empire, until the end of the fourteenth century, when the
death of the reigning shah put the empire into disarray.13 Shah Ismail,
chief of the Safavid tribe, moved into the breach and adopted Shi'a Is-
lam as the state religion, creating for the first time a distinctive Islamic
Iranian nation. "'Shah Ismail brought in ulama from neighboring territo-
ries to educate the people regarding their new religion, and the ulama
and the Safavids fell into a symbiotic relationship wherein the clerics
legitimized the Safavids' expansionist policies while receiving prestige
and wealth in return.'35 Under this arrangement, the shahs wielded both
secular and religious authority while the ulama simultaneously enjoyed
a certain amount of power over secular government, since they could
destabilize the monarchy and bring about its end simply by withdrawing
their support.'36
In fact, the ulama have successfully initiated secular reforms
throughout Iranian history by defying the government whenever it ex-
ceeded its authority.'37 This monitoring function was vital to the proper
functioning of Iranian society, since the absence of any institutionalized
checks on the shah's power meant the ulama were the only ones who
130. See id. at 47.
131. See id. at 49.
132. See HiRO, supra note 74, at 142.
133. Id. at 142.
134. See id. at 142-43.
135. See id. at 143.
136. See id.
137. See id. at 148; MAcKEY, supra note 91, at 118. Some believe that the Iranian tra-
dition of absolute monarchic power, when combined with the high degree of social control
exercised by the ulama, has created a State in which it is difficult for Western-style democ-
racy to flourish. See id. at 93, 100, 102, 106.
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could protect the people from abuse by the government. M That is pre-
cisely what happened in the mid-eighteenth century, when lack of
clerical support helped bring down the Safavid monarchy and bring the
Qajars into power in 1785.' t9 Independent clerical action was also re-
sponsible for the Tobacco Protest of 1891-92, in which the ulama
banded together with intellectuals and nationalists to oppose trade con-
cessions given by the shah to Britain.'" The Tobacco Protest showed the
Iranians how to mount an opposition campaign, and, in 1906, the ulama
were again joined by secular interests in undertaking a constitutional
revolution and demanding that Iran be free of European domination.'4
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was premised, at least in
part, on the ulama's belief that reducing the shah's powers would in-
crease their ability to manipulate the population."" Although the clerics
may have been right, their lack of political acumen led them to accept
the intellectuals' suggestion that the new constitution be based on a
secular model, despite the claim by some ulama that the new govern-
ment should be comprised of mujtahids'4 3 The 1906 Constitution, which
remained in force until 1979, contained various provisions regarding
religion, including Article 1, which declared Twelver Shi'ism to be the
state religion.'"
138. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 138 (noting, however, that in many cases the
ulama were part of the system of government and therefore part of the problem).
139. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 30 (discussing the end of Safavid dynasty);
RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 222-23 (commenting on rise of clerical power after Safavid fall
from power and leading to the beginning of the Qajar reign).
140. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 148; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 41.
141. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 148; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 334-35. In
many senses, the 1906 revolution was as much of a fundamentalist movement as the 1979
revolution. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 148-49; see also Nikki R. Keddie & Farah Monian,
Militancy and Religion in Contemporary Iran, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra
note 7, at 511, 513 (noting similar emphasis on fundamentalist Islamic mores in both revolu-
tions).
142. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 148.
143. See id. at 148-49; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 43-44. One reason the clerics
wanted to institute an Islamic political framework was to limit the power of the people, based
on their belief that sovereignty was passed by God to the hidden imam, and from there to the
mujtahids, bypassing the people altogether. See HIRO, supra note 74, at 149. However, this
was the minority position, and the 1906 Constitution expressly noted that "[s]overeignty is a
trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the People to the person of the King." Id. (translating
Article 35 of the 1906 Constitution). Although the clerics lost the battle over the issue of
sovereignty, they did manage to force through the Supplementary Laws of 1907, which in-
cluded a provision instituting a council of five mujtahids who were to veto all un-Islamic
legislation. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 150-51. However, this provision was never im-
plemented because the constitutionalists refused to grant this much power to the clerics. See
id. at 150. The idea arose again in 1979 and was successfully implemented at that time. See
id. at 292-93.
144. See HmO, supra note 74, at 149.
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The year 1925 saw another change in Iran's political landscape,
when an ambitious and successful military leader named Reza Khan
was made shah by the ulama.'4 5 Interestingly, Reza Khan originally
wanted to create a republic with himself as head but was opposed by the
ulama, who believed that form of government to be too European." The
new shah took the name Pahlavi to demonstrate his allegiance to Iran's
pre-Islamic past and promptly began modernizing the nation. 47 This
program of modernization, which was undertaken with extraordinary
rapidity, led to the alienation of the population, particularly the Shi'a
clerics."'
Shah Reza's reforms included the separation of secular and religious
law; 149 the requirement that judges have law degrees;50 the compulsory
attendance of both males and females in free public schools; 5' and the
banishment of the religious veil, or chador, for women.' It was not
only the substance of Shah Reza's reforms that caused problems; it was
also the speed with which he pursued secularization since he did not
give the public time to become accustomed to new ideas and practices.'
By 1941, Shah Reza was so out of touch with his people that he was
unable to command their allegiance, and was summarily deposed by
British and Russian powers and replaced by his son, Muhammad."'
The new shah, who was only twenty-two when he assumed the
throne, vacillated through the early years of his reign, but by 1962 had
gained sufficient personal resolve to institute the White Revolution,
145. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 166-72; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 46-47;
RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 335.
146. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 46-47.
147. See id. at 47-48; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 335. "Pahlavi" was the name of a
language used in Iran before it became an Islamic state. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 47.
148. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 176-82; MUNSON, supra note 73, at 48-49;
RuTrHvEN, supra note 73, at 335.
149. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 178 (noting shah's institution of a new civil code
that restricted the applicability of the Shari'a in criminal matters and property law and lim-
ited the jurisdiction of low-level clerics to matters concerning marriage, divorce, and
inheritance).
150. See id. at 178-79 (noting the resulting expulsion of most clerics from judiciary).
151. See id. at 179 (noting replacement of all religious and private schools with state
secular schools).
152. See id. at 181; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 335. This decision, which was en-
forced by the military when necessary, was among the most controversial, since it violated
all norms of female decency. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 48 (noting that the Western
equivalent would be to mandate women's appearing topless in public). In addition, the new
shah mandated Western-style hats for men that interfered with prayer. See MACKEY, supra
note 91, at 181; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 335.
153. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 184.
154. See RU'HVEN, supra note 73, at 336.
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which included various agrarian and privatization reforms.' After 1962,
Shah Muhammad continued his father's policy of secularization by,
among other things, granting women various rights, including the right
to vote, and increasing literacy training for both genders.'56 It was at this
time that the cleric Sayyid Ruhallah Khomeini gained national promi-
nence from his opposition to the shah's reforms and his claim that the
mujtahid must become involved in the whole of society, including poli-
tics, in order to emulate the Prophet.'57 Khomeini's activism resulted in
his deportation, first to Turkey and eventually to Iraq, where he contin-
ued his battle against the shah unfettered by censorship laws that would
have hindered his effectiveness had he remained in Iran.'
In retrospect, it seems strange that support for Khomeini crossed all
social, gender, and educational lines, especially since many of his fol-
lowers later came to regret supporting the revolution. However,
Khomeini's calls for reform were assisted greatly during the 1960s and
1970s by the shah's simultaneous alienation of virtually the entire na-
tion through his ineptitude, indecision, and inconsistency.59 Eventually
the shah realized that, like his father, he had become unable to rule his
country, and his departure in January 1979 paved the way for
Khomeini's triumphant return on February 1, 1979.'6 Khomeini imme-
diately began efforts to create an Islamic nation and held a referendum
on March 29 and 30, 1979, to decide whether Iran should be an Islamic
republic.' 6' The referendum passed by an overwhelming majority, and
the Constitution that created the Islamic Republic of Iran was completed
in November and ratified by popular vote on December 2 and 3, 1979. 62
155. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 185, 211-12; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 339.
Opponents to the White Revolution were not afraid to use violence and sparked Iranian re-
formers' belief in the use of violence as a means of overthrowing the government. See
Keddie & Monian, supra note 138, at 516-17.
156. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 261. Among the rights granted to women in the
1960s were the limited right to initiate divorce proceedings; the right to deny their husbands
the ability to marry a second wife; and the right to retain custody of their children. See id.
(citing 1967 Family Protection Act). The shah also banned the Shi'a practice of temporary
marriage and raised the age of marriage for girls from nine to fifteen. See id.
157. See id. at 222-24; RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 339; see also CONSTITUTION OF
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN preamble, reprinted and translated in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992)
[hereinafter IRAN CONSr.].
158. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 55-56; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 340
(describing Khomeini's religio-political theories during his years in exile).
159. See MUNSON, supra note 73, at 95-104, 125-30.
160. See HIRo, supra note 74, at 169.
161. See id.
162. Cf. id. at 169, 173 (suggesting religious coercion and fear played a large role in
passage of referendum).
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In the early post-revolutionary years, the government, led spiritually
as well as politically by Khomeini, mounted a vigorous and violent
campaign to quell any opposition to the Islamicization of Iranian soci-
ety. Khomeini's true political bent came as a surprise to a number of
his supporters, many of whom had believed him to be a more moderate
leader."
Since Khomeini's death in 1989, the nation has struggled to define
itself. His social policies have been carried on by the Islamic Republic's
second supreme religious leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khameni, but a series
of presidents and legislatures have shown a reluctance or inability to
pursue Khomeini's program of socio-religious reform to its logical ex-
treme. ' Some commentators see this as a relaxation of the stringent
Islamic social controls instituted by Khomeini, while others believe that
the revolutionary hardliners still hold considerable power and influence
over the nation.'66 In addition, the unraveling economy has made the
population ready for reform, which might come about at the hands of
the incoming president, a political and religious moderate. 67
163. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 272, 296-302.
164. See id. at 286-87.
165. See Kristin J. Miller, Note, Human Rights of Women in Iran: The Universalist Ap-
proach and the Relativist Response, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 779, 784 (1996). Although
Khameni succeeded Khomeini as religious leader, he was not awarded the title of marja'-i
taqlid, and cannot therefore unite religious and political authority to the same extent
Khomeini did. See Anthony Chase, Legal Guardians: Islamic Law, International Law, Hu-
man Rights Law, and the Salman Rushdie Affair, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 375, 408(1996). Some read this as demonstrating a movement toward separating religious and politi-
cal authority and returning to the more traditional approach where the two powers are
distinct rather than combined. See id. However, over the years Khameni has become more
powerful and outspoken in his attempts to dictate the form of Iranian society and has, at
times, successfully overwhelmed the more moderate President Hashemi Rafsanjani. See
Robin Wright, Silencing Ideas: The Crisis Within Iran's Theocracy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1995, at M2 [hereinafter Wright, Silencing Ideas]. It remains to be seen what the relationship
between Khameni and Mohammad Khatami, who was elected president in 1997, will be.
166. See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1041; see, e.g., Robin Wright,
Islam Rising: Ideology-Muslims Open Up To Modern World, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993,
available in 1993 WL 2331092 [hereinafter Wright, Islam Rising] (describing a 1993 sepa-
ratist reform movement in Iran, and Islam as a whole, similar to the 16th century Christian
Reformation); Wright, Silencing Ideas, supra note 165 (noting move in 1995 back towards
repressive social policies after making headway towards liberalization in some areas).
167. See Robin Wright, In Iran, the Revolution Unravels, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1994, at
Al [hereinafter Wright, Revolution Unravels]; see also John Daniszewski, A Mullah with
Open Mind, Khatami Won By Dint of Character, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at A10 (noting
the new president is moderate and has written extensively on modernization of Islam and the
reconciliation of Islam and democracy).
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED
A. Constitutional Structure
This article's first area of critical analysis focuses on the structure of
government found in both Israel and Iran. Just as the structure of U.S.
government says much about traditional American beliefs, so too does
the structure of other nations' governments say much about their values
and priorities. This is particularly true of Israel and Iran, who have both
created political systems that institutionalize religion and perpetuate the
inclusion of religious values in the State.
1. Israel
As discussed above, Israel is among the few nations in the world
without a written constitution which, of course, makes a constitutional
analysis difficult. However, Israel has passed a number of Basic Laws
that have been given pseudo-constitutional status because they are con-
sidered the preliminary chapters of what will eventually become theS • 168
final constitution. Basic Laws are not superior to any other type of
enactment, however; all can be changed by subsequent legislation. 69
Only if a Basic Law contains an "entrenchment" provision will later
Knessets be limited in their ability to pass acts contrary to that Basic
Law. 170
168. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. Eleven Basic Laws have been enacted:
Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1957-58); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 1960, 14
L.S.I. 48 (1960); Basic Law: The President of the State, 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1963-64); Ba-
sic Law: The Government, 1968, 22 L.S.I. 257 (1967-68); Basic Law: The State Economy,
1975, 29 L.S.I. 273 (1974-75); Basic Law: The Army, 1976, 30 L.S.I. 150 (1975-76); Basic
Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 209 (1979-80); Basic Law: Judicature,
1984, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1983-84); Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 1988, S.H. 1237; Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 1387; and Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
(sometimes called Human Dignity and Freedom), 1992, S.H. 1391. See EDELMAN, supra
note 10, at 11 & 134 n.13 (listing the Basic Laws and their original dates of enactment).
English translations of the Basic Laws are also available in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1988, 1994)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS (ISRAEL)].
169. See Genut, supra note 60, at 2142-43.
170. See H.C. 148/73; Kaniel v. Minister of Justice, 27(1) P.D. 794, cited in Barak-Erez,
supra note 64, at 326; Genut, supra note 60, at 2142-43 (noting that Knesset needs special
majority in order to amend a Basic Law with an entrenched provision); Hofnung, supra note
64, at 594. However, the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, although not entrenched,
contains a balancing test that must be employed whenever the Knesset attempts to infringe
upon a right protected by it through subsequent legislation. It provides: "There shall be no
violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law fitting the values of the State of
Israel, designed for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required." Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, 1992, S.H. 1391, translated in CONSTITUTIONS (ISRAEL),
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In addition to the Basic Laws, several other documents have been
interpreted to have a certain level of fundamental significance.17' Per-
haps the most important of these documents is the Proclamation of
Independence, for although it "does not consist of any constitutional
law," the Israeli Supreme Court held in Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of the
Interior that it is legally binding to the extent that it "expresses the vi-
sion of the people and its faith," which requires the courts to "pay
attention to the matters set forth in it when [they] come to interpret and
give meaning to the laws of the State."'7' The Proclamation of Independ-
ence is therefore considered legally binding, despite its containing
language to the contrary.7 In fact, based on the precedent set in Kol
Ha 'am, Israeli courts have relied upon the Proclamation of Independ-
ence to protect a number of civil and human rights not recognized in
legislation.' 74
According to the Basic Laws, Israel consists of a parliamentary de-
mocracy,75 with legislative power vested in the Knesset, the ruling
parliamentary body.77 The unicameral nature of the Knesset gives the
legislature a high degree of power, especially when combined with the
supra note 168. This provision will limit, to some extent, the ability of future Knessets to
enact legislation contrary to this Basic Law. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 327-28; Hof-
nung, supra note 64, at 595.
171. These include the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1948, 1
L.S.I. 3 (1948) [hereinafter Proclamation of Independence]; Law and Administration Ordi-
nance, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 7 (1948); Transition Law, 1949, 3 L.S.I. 3 (1949); Law of Return, 1950,
4 L.S.I. 114 (1949-50); Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment) Law, 1951, 6
L.S.I. 7 (1951-52); Knesset Members (Immunity, Rights and Duties), 1951, 5 L.S.I. 149
(1950-51); Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51); and World Zionist
Organisation-Jewish Agency (Status) Law, 1952, 7 L.S.I. 3 (1952-53). English translations
of these laws are also available in CONSTrrUTIONS (ISRAEL), supra note 168.
172. H.C. 73/53, 87/53, Kol Ha'am Co. v. Minister of the Interior, 7 PD. 871, 884,
translated in 1 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 90, 105 (1948-1953); see
also Genut, supra note 60, at 2147 (terming Kol Ha 'am as the most important case in Israeli
constitutional law); Treitel, supra note 63, at 406-07 (discussing the case).
173. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 407. But cf. Lubetski, supra note 17, at 347 (arguing
that the Proclamation of Independence is not binding and carries no constitutional weight).
174. See infra note 187.
175. See FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 40-41; Shoshana Netanyahu, The Supreme
Court of Israel: A Safeguard of the Rule of Law, 5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1, 15 (1993). Israel
recently changed its system of government from a classic parliamentary system in which the
prime minister is designated by a parliamentary vote of confidence to a system whereby the
prime minister is elected directly by popular vote. See Basic Law: The Government, 1992,
S.H. 214; Susser, supra note 72, at 939 (discussing the new system).
176. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958, 12 L.S.I. 85 (1957-58); see also
FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 40-41; Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346. Unlike the U.S.
electoral system, Israel's proportional representation system ensures that no vote is wasted
and allows smaller parties to win seats in the Knesset. See Genut, supra note 60, at 2144
n.208 (citing ERVIN BIRNBAUM, THE POLITICS OF COMPROMISE: STATE AND RELIGION IN
ISRAEL 39 (1970)).
[Vol. 19:109
Law and Religion in Israel and Iran
generally limited powers of judicial review given to the courts.'" Al-
though this approach appears decidedly pro-majoritarian, minority
religious parties have wielded most of the power in the Knesset in recent
years due to the major parties' inability to form a government without
them.
78
The second branch of government is the executive and is headed by
the president. The executive branch is considerably weaker than the
legislative branch.9 Elected by the Knesset, the president has little to do
with the actual business of government and is entrusted with mostly
ceremonial duties.IW
The third branch of government, the judiciary, is the most interest-
ing for purposes of this article. This is because the judiciary, unlike the
legislative and executive branches, is not completely secular. On the
secular side there exist several levels of courts, including district courts,
magistrates' courts, military courts, and the Supreme Court.'8 ' The Su-
preme Court sits as an appellate court over the secular trial courts and
the appellate decisions of the district courts, and in this second capacity
acts as a High Court of Justice from which there is no appeal.'8 2 Al-
though the Supreme Court is usually the court of last resort, it has
virtually no power to intervene in matters reserved to the religious
courts or to hear appeals therefrom.' However, the Supreme Court,
when acting as the High Court, has overturned a few judgments of the
177. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 318 (noting the supremacy of Knesset means
that courts can protect civil rights only against infringements of an administrative nature, not
from oppressive legislation); Hofnung, supra note 64, at 589, 596.
178. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 321-22, 347-48; Dempsey, supra note 71; see
also EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 9-10 (discussing exceptionally high prominence of politi-
cal parties in Israeli politics); Stephen Goldstein, Protection of Human Rights by Judges: The
Israeli Experience, 38 ST. LOuis U. L.J. 605, 615 (1994) (noting general lack of counter-
majoritarian checks on Knesset).
179. See Basic Law: The President of the State, 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1963-64);
FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 41.
180. See Basic Law: The President of the State, 1964, 18 L.S.I. 111 (1963-64);
EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 9.
181. See Basic Law: Judicature, 1984, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1983-84), art. 1; see also Treitel,
supra note 63, at 408-11 (discussing jurisdiction of the different courts).
182. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 589; Treitel, supra note 63, at 409-10.
183. See Basic Law: Judicature, 1984, 38 L.S.I. 101 (1983-84), art. 15; LIEBMAN &
DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND PoLITcs, supra note 62, at 38. One exception is when a party
to a religious court proceeding raises a jurisdictional question at the first available opportu-
nity; the Court may then order the religious court to abstain from hearing the case. See
Treitel, supra note 63, at 410.
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religious courts based on its ability to undertake administrative review
of judicial organs.' 4
The Supreme Court is also severely limited in its ability to review
primary legislation passed by the Knesset.'5 However, a high percentage
of the laws in Israel consists not of primary legislation but of secondary
legislation passed by administrative bodies to implement primary en-
actments. 86 These secondary laws are subject to judicial review by the
Supreme Court and have provided the basis for a number of important
precedents.'87 This is not to say that the Knesset cannot or has not subse-
184. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 591. For example, in-one case, the High Court ne-
gated a ruling of the Grand Rabbinical Court that applied Jewish law in a case regarding the
respective rights of a man and a woman to property upon divorce. See id. (discussing H.C.
1000/92, Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(2) P.D. 221). Normally this would be within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the religious courts, but because the rabbinical court did not take
into account the State's law granting women and men equal property rights upon divorce, the
High Court held that the rabbinical court had acted outside its jurisdiction, and used its pow-
ers of administrative review to return the case to the rabbinical court with instructions. See
id.; see also Israeli High Court Favors Women's Rights, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1994, § 1, at 6(discussing Court's holding that "rabbinical courts must incorporate civil law in rulings"). In
this way, the Court interpreted its own previous case law concerning equal property rights as
binding on all other courts in the country. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 591.
A similar case arose in a Muslim religious court in Israel. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at
591 (discussing C.A. 3077/90, Plonit v. Ploni, 49(2) P.D. 578); see also infra note 190 and
accompanying text (explaining the legal basis for Muslim religious courts in Israel). This
case involved an unmarried mother who sued a man for child support, alleging he was the
father of her child. The man argued that because he was not the woman's husband, he could
not be the father of her child, since under Islamic law paternity attaches only in the context
of a legal marriage. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 591. The Muslim court agreed, and the
district court refused to overturn the decision on the grounds that religious courts have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over family law matters. See id. The High Court disagreed with the district
court's interpretation of jurisdiction and distinguished between paternity under religious law
and paternity under civil law. See id. Although the Israeli civil courts cannot declare a man to
be the father of a child under religious law, they can investigate paternity in order to establish
responsibility for child support payments, since the civil law regarding child support is
purely secular and makes no distinctions on the basis of religion. See id. The High Court
therefore ordered the defendant to undergo a tissue examination in order to determine
whether he was in fact the child's father. See id.
Together, these two cases appear to indicate that although the religious courts retain sig-
nificant discretion to rule according to their own religious laws, the State has not absented
itself completely from family law matters. See id. Instead, these cases suggest that individu-
als have some recourse to the civil courts when certain rights are denied to them by their
religious law. See id.
185. See Goldstein, supra note 178, at 610; Hofnung, supra note 64, at 588-89.
186. See Goldstein, supra note 178, at 610.
187. In addition, the courts had found an inherent power to review certain unenumer-
ated civil rights even prior to the implementation of the 1992 amendments to the Basic Law:
Judicature, which slightly expanded the Court's review powers. See Barak-Erez, supra note
64, at 316-17; Genut, supra note 60, at 2146-47; Goldstein, supra note 178, at 605 (noting
human rights in Israel "have been protected almost exclusively by judge-made law"); Netan-
yahu, supra note 175, at 13. Many of these cases were based on the judicial presumption that
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quently enacted primary legislation specifically overruling Supreme
Court decisions; however, many of the principles underlying those deci-
sions still stand and have led the Supreme Court to be considered the
guardian of the rule of law in Israel. 'u
Religious courts in Israel hold considerable power, including exclu-
sive jurisdiction over issues concerning marriage and divorce and
concurrent jurisdiction with the civil courts over other matters of per-
sonal status, including inheritance, legitimation, guardianship, and
maintenance. 9 There are four recognized religions in Israel (Judaism,
Christianity, Muslim, and Druze), and each has its own judiciary and
system of law based on its religious traditions.'0 In Israel, everyone
must have some sort of religious affiliation because without such an af-
filiation, a person cannot marry or divorce.'9 Rabbinical courts exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over all Jews and apply Halachic law, regardless
of whether the persons before them practice or believe in the tenets of
Judaism.92 Similar strictures bind persons of other religions to their re-
spective religious courts. 93
because Israel was founded on democratic values, as illustrated by the Proclamation of Inde-
pendence, the Court should recognize such unwritten rights as freedom of expression,
freedom of demonstration, freedom of movement, freedom of association, freedom of prop-
erty, and procedural due process. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 316-17 (noting rights
recognized by the Court essentially encompass those recognized by the international com-
munity as classic human rights); Genut, supra note 60, at 2146-47 (noting Court's reliance
on H.C. 73/53, 87/53, Kol Ha'am Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Interior, 7 PD. 871, in protecting
unwritten rights). Freedom of religion and conscience are included among these unwritten
rights. See H.C. 262/62, Peretz v. Chairman, Local Council and Inhabitants of Kfar
Shmaryahu, 16 P.D. 2101, 2116, translated in 4 Selected Judgments 191, 207 (1961-62).
These lines of cases are considered to be Israel's unwritten constitution. See Barak-Erez,
supra note 64, at 317.
188. See Goldstein, supra note 178, at 613; Netanyahu, supra note 175, at 2.
189. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 52; Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346.
190. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346; Treitel, supra note 63, at 411-12. This sys-
tem, which is called the millet system, was first implemented during the Ottoman Empire,
when religious minorities, including the Jewish community, were given the right to decide
issues of personal status in accordance with their religious traditions. See Genut, supra note
60, at 2135 (citing Izhak Englard, Law and Religion in Israel, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 185, 196
(1987)).
191. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346-47. As a result of this approach, there is no
such thing as civil marriage in Israel. See id. at 368-70; cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On So-
cial Contract or Principles of Political Right, in ROUSSEAU'S POLMCAL WRITINGS 84, 173
n.8 (Alan Ritter & Julia Conaway Bondanella eds., 1988) (arguing that since marriage is a
civil contract, religion should not hold an exclusive claim on the right to perform marriages).
192. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 346, 348. Because jurisdiction was vested in the
rabbinical and other religious courts by the Knesset, a secular body, religious law is imposed
on Israelis not by virtue of their individual religious leaders, but by the State. See Genut,
supra note 60, at 2151 (citing Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law,
1953, 7 L.S.I. 139(1) (1952-53)).
193. For example, Muslim courts have jurisdiction over matters of personal status for
all Muslims, be they Israeli citizens or foreigners subject to Muslim religious courts in their
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If a question arises as to whether a case falls within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of a religious court, the parties are referred to a special
tribunal consisting of two Supreme Court justices and the president of
the highest court of the relevant religious community.' 94 If an action in-
volves persons of different faiths, the president of the Supreme Court
decides which court system has jurisdiction.'" In cases where consent is
needed in order to apply religious law but consent is not given, the re-
ligious courts apply legislation passed by the Knesset. 96 Judgments
arising out of the religious courts are enforced by the civil courts, al-
though the chief execution officer of the civil court may refuse to
enforce a judgment if it appears as if the religious court exceeded its
jurisdiction or acted contrary to natural justice."9
2. Iran
Unlike Israel, Iran does not claim to be a secular state. Instead, Iran
proclaims itself as unabashedly Muslim in both a practical and legal
sense, 198 and it has often been said that Iran is less a republic than a the-
ocracy.199
home countries. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 412; see generally EDELMAN, supra note 10, at
73-88 (discussing treatment of Israelis in Muslim courts). Muslim courts are split into sev-
eral denominations. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 414-15. The Christian religious courts are
spread among the recognized Christian communities and have exclusive jurisdiction over
marriage, divorce, and alimony for Christians. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 412; see also
EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 3 (describing Christian courts). Druze courts also have exclusive
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce, and over inheritance and personal status issues by
consent. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 413; see generally EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 89-99
(providing background on Druze courts). Qualifications for judges in the rabbinical and
Muslim courts are set by statute; Christian courts are free to organize themselves and appoint
judges without government interference. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 412.
194. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 413.
195. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 1.
196. See id. at 53; see also Treitel, supra note 63, at 415 (discussing application of law
in context of Muslim courts) (citing Aharon Layish, WOMEN AND ISLAMIC LAW IN A NON-
MUSLIM STATE: A STUDY BASED ON DECISIONS OF THE SHARI'A COURTS IN ISRAEL 4
(1975)).
197. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 413 (citing HENRY E. BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM
OF ISRAEL 209-10 (1968)).
198. See IRAN CONST. arts. 1-2; see, e.g., id. art. 4 ("All civil, penal[,] financial, eco-
nomic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other laws and regulations must be
based on Islamic criteria. This principle applies absolutely and generally to all articles of the
Constitution as well as to all other laws and regulations."). As in the 1906 Constitution,
Twelver Shi'ism is named the official sect of the country, although other schools of Islamic
thought are given equal dignity under the law. See id. art. 12; HIRO, supra note 74, at 148-
49.
199. See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1039. The actual form of gov-
ernment is called the vilayat-i-faqih or "guardianship of the theologian jurisconsult." Bahar,
supra note 117, at 147; see also RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 341 (discussing leadership of
the faqih).
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Despite the constitutional claim of creating a distinctively Islamic
state, however, the structure of the Iranian government actually incorpo-
rates a number of Western political norms.2m First, the preamble of the
Constitution claims to allow "participation by all members of society at
all stages of the political decision-making process."2 ' Although in prac-
tice the Iranian people have very little political power because the
clerics can overrule legislation based on the supremacy of religious law,
this provision sounds suspiciously similar to the Western doctrine of
universal suffrage, a concept alien to both traditional and contemporary
Muslim ideals. 2'
The Constitution also provides for the formal separation of the vari-
ous branches of government, another Western concept.)° However,
functional separation may not be accomplished due to Iran's unique
separation of powers. For example, the first branch of government, that
of the executive, is headed by the president, who is elected by an abso-
lute majority of the popular vote.' ° Although the president is given
extraordinary powers so that he (or, theoretically, she) may act
"efficiently and swiftly in the fulfilment of [his or her] administrative
commitments, 25 the position is not as independent as it may seem since
the Constitution requires that all candidates for the position be approved
by the Council of Guardians .2' Because the Council of Guardians will
not approve those whose religious or political views vary too widely
from its own, the president must, in actuality, be part of the inner circle
200. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 155 ("[T]he Constitution relies on the Western con-
cepts of constitutional government and popular elections to secure the expression of popular
will and the government of representative bodies."). For example, the Constitution is written
in a Western style and may have been based in part on the 1958 French Constitution. See
Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact, supra note 123, at 118.
201. IRAN CONST. preamble.
202. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 154-55 (discussing the doctrine ijma (consensus),
under which the views of the clerics rather than those of the people receive primacy; "ijma
[does] not imply democracy in any modern application of the term"). One commentator has
noted that Iran has transformed the Western notion of popular sovereignty into a new Islamic
doctrine, that of divine sovereignty. See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1036-
37.
203. See IRAN CONST. art. 57; David A.J. Richards, Comparative Revolutionary Con-
stitutionalism: A Research Agenda for Comparative Law, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 15
(1993).
204. See IRAN CONST. art. 117.
205. Id. preamble.
206. See id. arts. 99, 118; Robin Allen, Iran Votes Under Stern Gaze of Clerics, FIN.
TIMES, May 23, 1997, at 3 (noting 234 of 238 potential candidates, including all nine female
candidates, failed to pass this requirement in the 1997 election); see also MACKEY, supra
note 91, at 299-300 (stating president has little power in Islamic Republic).
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of Iranian power politics.'o The Constitution also implies a de facto, if
not a de jure, requirement that the president be Shi'a Muslim by insti-
tuting a presidential oath of office in which the president-elect promises
to "guard the official religion of the country," dedicate him or herself to
the "propagation of religion and morality," and "follo[w] the Prophet of
Islam and infallible Imams."2"
The legislature, which is called the Majlis or Consultative Assem-
bly, makes up the second branch of government.2°9 Again, those who
seek reform will find it difficult to do so from within the Majlis, since
its members must take an oath of office similar to that of the president.21°
However, unlike the presidential oath, the legislative oath specifically
recognizes the possibility that some members of the Majlis may not be
Muslim.21' Although this appears to be quite progressive in a nation that
prides itself on its adherence to Islamic law in all things, there is little
chance that persons of minority religions will ever gain significant in-
fluence in the Iranian legislature, both because they are such a small
minority in the nation and because it is doubtful that they will ever gain
more than the four seats that are reserved for Christians, Jews, and Zo-
212
roastrians.
Unlike in Israel, however, the legislature is not the predominant
branch of government in Iran. In fact, the Majlis' ability to act is se-
verely limited. First, the Majlis is restricted by virtue of the State's
foundation upon Islamic principles that are considered comprehensive .2 "
Under that approach, the Majlis' primary function is to interpret Islamic
principles that already exist and not to create new laws except on those
207. See IRAN CONST. art. 115 (requiring presidential candidates not only to be pious
but also possessed of a "convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran and the official madhhab [adopted policy; usually applied to fiqh
jurisprudence] of the country"). By requiring presidential candidates to support the "official
madhhab of the country," id., the Constitution ensures a continuation of the religio-political
status quo.
208. Id. art. 121; see Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1018 (discussing to
what extent Islamic leaders must be religious conformists); see also IRAN CONST. art. 115
(requiring president to follow official madhhab of country).
209. See IRAN CONST. art. 58.
210. See id. art. 67 (requiring members of the legislature to swear to protect the
"sanctity of Islam" and to "defend the Constitution").
211. See id. ("Members belonging to the religious minorities will swear by their own
sacred books while taking this oath.").
212. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 343.
213. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 149; see generally IRAN CONST. preamble.
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subjects upon which the Shari'a is silent.214 Second, as shall be seen, the
Majlis is subject to the oversight of the clerical elite."5
The third branch of conventional government, the judiciary, is
charged with the task of enforcing Islamic principles and ideological
conformity within the Islamic Republic.216 The courts of justice are op-
erated "in accordance with the criteria of Islam, and are vested with the
authority to examine and settle lawsuits, protect the rights of the public,
dispense and enact justice, and implement the Divine limits.'21 7 As Iran
supports a literal interpretation of Islamic law, judges have, in the past,
imposed certain Quranic sentences such as death by stoning for those
guilty of adultery."' Notably, there is no requirement that judges be
trained as lawyers; in fact, in the early days of the Republic, most judges
were clerics who adamantly supported Khomeini's policies."9 Since that
time, however, there has been some moderation in the system, and some
hardline judges have been quietly removed and replaced.
The most important aspect of Iranian government is its unique
fourth branch of government. According to the Constitution, all gov-
ernmental bodies are subject to the oversight of the Council of
Guardians,2 ° whose purpose is to "prevent any deviation by the various
organs of State from their essential Islamic duties.""2 ' This system of
214. This approach is consistent with the pre-modern approach to lawmaking, which
requires believers to interpret existing law, not create new law. See Mayer, Islam and the
State, supra note 80, at 1022.
215. See infra notes 220-33 and accompanying text.
216. See IRAN CONST. preamble.
217. Id. art. 61.
218. See Graves, supra note 105, at 57. Apostasy is also considered by some to be a
capital crime. See Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle
East and North Africa, 10 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 139, 149 (1996) [hereinafter Arzt, Religious
Human Rights]; Chase, supra note 165, at 396-99; Erlanger, supra note 5 (noting four
Baha'is are currently imprisoned for apostasy and have been given the death sentence).
219. See IRAN CONST. (noting judges must have "meticulous knowledge of the Islamic
laws").
220. See id. preamble (noting that "the exercise of meticulous and earnest supervision
by just, pious, and committed scholars of Islam ... is an absolute necessity"); id. art. 4
(stating that the Council of Guardians will ensure that all laws correspond with Islamic prin-
ciples); id. art. 57 (mandating other branches of government operate under the supervision of
the Council of Guardians and Supreme Jurisprudent). Six of the twelve members of the
Council of Guardians are selected from among the leadingfuqaha, or clerical elite; the other
six are composed of Muslim jurists elected by the Majlis. See id. art. 91; Bahar, supra note
117, at 157; MACKEY, supra note 91, at 292-93; see also Mayer, Islam and the State, supra
note 80, at 1040-41 (discussing changing role of the Council of Guardians vis-h-vis other
branches of government); RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 341 (discussing Khomeini's view of
the faqih).
221. IRAN CONST. preamble. For example, if any piece of legislation is not in accor-
dance with Islamic principles, the Council returns it to the Majlis for review. See id. arts. 58,
91,94, 98; Bahar, supra note 117, at 157.
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clerical oversight of secular government puts into effect the traditional
religious notion that the faqih is the proper interpreter and implementor
of the Shari'a and the rightful governor during the period of the hidden
imam."' However, Iran departs from past practices by extending the
claim' of the faqih beyond mere spiritual authority into a mandate to
rule, a move that breaks sharply with Shi'as' previous acceptance of po-
litical authority."3 Because the Council of Guardians is given the power
to veto any law it deems to contradict the laws of Islam,"' the clerics of
Iran are, in effect, running the country.
However, there is yet another layer of clerical review of state action
in Iran. According to Articles 5 and 57 of the Constitution, the Council
of Guardians is itself under the supervision of the single most respected
faqih, who is titled the Supreme Jurisprudent. ' The Constitution estab-
lishes the Supreme Jurisprudent as uniquely infallible and requires
Iranians to submit to his political authority as part of their religious ob-
ligation. 26 Unsurprisingly, Khomeini held the position of Supreme
Jurisprudent until his death in 1989.2'
In 1988, what was once a merely supervisory role became an abso-
lute guardianship by the clerical elite. At that time, Khomeini
transformed the system of vilayat-i-faqih to the vilayat-i-mutlaqa-yi-
faqih, claiming that the change was both due to and legitimated by ne-
cessity.226 The transformation was simple but extreme. During the first
nine years of the Republic, Iran was governed by two sources of law:
222. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 151-52.
223. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 341; see also MACKEY, supra note 91, at 264-66,
286 (discussing political philosophies that influenced this constitutional approach); Bahar,
supra note 117, at 151-52.
224. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 293.
225. See IRAN CONST. arts. 5, 57; MACKEY, supra note 91, at 293.
226. See IRAN CONST. preamble, art. 94; MACKEY, supra note 91, at 293.
227. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 293, 334. Although the Supreme Jurisprudent was
intended to be the primary source of emulation in the Islamic Republic, no one met the strin-
gent political requirements after Khomeini's death, and the standards were changed so that
the Supreme Jurisprudent now need only be "'potentially' qualified to become a source of
emulation." Id. at 354. This radically altered the theological basis for the Supreme Jurispru-
dent and essentially stripped religious legitimacy from the person who was supposed to act
as the supreme religious leader of the State. See id.
228. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 160. Islam recognizes "necessity" as a legitimate
theological reason for deviation from the literal requirements of the Shari'a. However, the
change was more likely due to Khomeini's impatience with the legislative delays caused by
very aggressive clerical review by the Council of Guardians and his desire to bypass some of
the problems inherent in the vilayat-i-faqih system. See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra
note 80, at 1039-40. The effect was to emasculate his system of governance by the religious
elite, since it gave the presumption of religious legitimacy to all government enactments
approved by the Supreme Jurisprudent, thereby skipping the Council of Guardians com-
pletely. See id.
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primary rules based on the Shari'a and secondary rules created by the
Majlis for the implementation of the Shari'a.229 After 1988, all govern-
mental ordinances were declared to be primary rules, and the legislature
could not only speak as to issues upon which the Shari'a was silent, but
could also temporarily suspend rules contained in the Shari'a if neces-
sary23 ° Even fundamental religious obligations such as the pilgrimage to
Mecca could be suspended under this system. 3' Essentially, this new
law reversed the priority of law in Iran: while originally the vilayat-i-
faqih was created to challenge the law of the State on the grounds of the
superiority of Islamic principles, the new approach essentially stated
that all laws passed by the legislature and approved by the Supreme Ju-
risprudent were the supreme law of the land, even if they conflicted with
the Quran 32 A number of religious scholars opposed this measure, ar-
guing that Khomeini's move was without religious precedent and
provided the opportunity for rampant abuse in the hands of fallible hu-
man beings, but the provision passed and has continued in force from
1988 to the present.233
B. Sovereignty and Constitutional Interpretation
The second area of comparative analysis concerns national sover-
eignty and general constitutional interpretation. It is important to
identify the theoretical bases that support a nation's concept of sover-
eignty because such bases will invariably influence what is considered
legislatively and judicially permissible. Similarly, before analyzing spe-
cific constitutional provisions, it is critical to know what general
constitutional principles affect judicial interpretation, since without un-
derstanding the larger legal infrastructure, it is impossible to understand
individual laws and judicial opinions.
1. Israel
Although Israel has always been closely associated with Judaism, it
is nominally a secular democratic state.3 For example, there is no es-
229. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 161.
230. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 349; Bahar, supra note 117, at 161; Mayer, Islam
and the State, supra note 80, at 1039-40. As long as the Supreme Jurisprudent supported the
legislature, the Council of Guardians could not oppose the measure. See Mayer, Fundamen-
talist Impact, supra note 123, at 120.
231. See Mayer, Fundamentalist Impact, supra note 123, at 120.
232. See Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at 1039-40.
233. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 160-61.
234. See ELAZAR & AVIAD, supra note 38, at 1; Erik Cohen, Citizenship, Nationality
and Religion in Israel and Thailand, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SocIETY 66, 69-70 (Baruch
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tablished religion, nor does the State allow discrimination on the basis
of religion or infringement on the freedom of religion. 35 Despite these
guarantees, however, Israel has incorporated many aspects of Judaism
into its legal and institutional make-up.236
For example, fundamental Israeli documents suggest that Israel has
adopted a unique approach to sovereignty. In establishing the new state,
the Proclamation of Independence recognized that the right to a sover-
eign Jewish nation was "the natural right of the Jewish people to be
masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign
State."2 7 By placing sovereignty in the hands of the people rather than
with God, Israel aligns itself with other secular nations; however, by
limiting the right to sovereignty to only Jewish people, the Proclamation
of Independence could be said to be creating a national identity that ad-
vances one trait at the cost of all others.238 In fact, this pattern is repeated
in other aspects of Israeli life, sometimes to the detriment of the na-
tion."9
This interpretation is supported by other portions of the Proclama-
tion of Independence, one of which states that the new nation will be
"based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of
Israel," thereby emphasizing the fundamental Jewish nature of the na-
tion.m In addition, the Proclamation of Independence explicitly
describes Israel as a "Jewish State," which can be read to exclude all
secular or non-Jewish perspectives from the public sphere.24' A number
Kimmerling ed., 1989); see also EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 50 (noting Israel has never
"adopted an official overall policy statement about the position of Judaism in the State").
235. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 407-08, citing H.C. 262/62, Peretz v. Chairman, Lo-
cal Council and Inhabitants of Kfar Shmaryahu, 16 P.D. 2101, 2116, translated in 4 Selected
Judgments 191, 207 (1961-1962) (stating the Proclamation of Independence guarantees
freedom of religion and worship to all citizens); see also Donna E. Arzt, Religious Freedom
in a Religious State: The Case of Israel in Comparative Constitutional Perspective, 9 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 1, 32 (1990) [hereinafter Arzt, Religious Freedom] (arguing that while there is no
formal establishment of religion in Israel, there is a legal "association" between religion and
the State).
236. See Cohen, supra note 234, at 70.
237. Proclamation of Independence, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948) (emphasis added).
238. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 226, 228-31.
239. See id. at 228-49.
240. See Proclamation of Independence, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
241. Id.; see Genut, supra note 60, at 2120 n.2, 2121 (noting Proclamation of Inde-
pendence does not define "Jewish state;" also commenting that Israeli citizens have differing
visions of what a Jewish state should be) (citing GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF
GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES 7 (1993); Norman L. Can-
tor, Religion and State in Israel and the United States, 8 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 185, 203
(1988); Quigley, supra note 70, at 227; see also LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND
POLITICS, supra note 62, at 17 (discussing that concept of a "Jewish state" requires Jews to
have a preferential status in the State); Cohen, supra note 234, at 72 (elucidating discrimi-
natory practices against non-Jews).
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of commentators have, however, argued that the Proclamation of Inde-
pendence's recognition of broad principles of freedom and justice has
opened the door not to restrictive practices in favor of Jews and Jewish
religious principles, but to expansive notions of human rights and dig-
nity that benefit all persons and lead to a more liberty-minded society.24'2
Because the case law of the Supreme Court indicates that individual
human rights are to be protected unless there is legislation to the con-
trary, this latter interpretation has merit.243 However, although Israel may
be generally libertarian, the relationship between religion and state has
been subject to certain legal constraints due, in part, to the provisions
found in the Status Quo Agreement and the sharp split in popular opin-
ion on the subject.244
In 1980, the State's reliance on Jewish law and principles was in-
creased when the Knesset passed a bill entitled the "Foundations of
Law."24' This legislation provides that "[w]here a court is required to
decide a legal question for which there is no answer in statutory law,
judicial precedent, or by analogy, the question shall be determined in the
light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity, and peace of the Jew-
ish heritage." This law was the first to establish an explicit connection
between Jewish law and Israeli secular law and could potentially be
used to impose uniquely Jewish obligations on the Israeli public.247
The passage of the Foundations of Law is particularly problematic
in that the Proclamation of Independence includes explicit language re-
garding the universality and equal protection of Israeli law. For
example, the Proclamation of Independence promises that the new state
"will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its in-
habitants irrespective of religion, race or sex," and that "it will guarantee
freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture."
2
"
However, the claims of universality in the Proclamation of Independ-
242. See, e.g., Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 316-17; Genut, supra note 60, at 2146-47
(collecting commentaries). On the other hand, others have argued that Israeli law is heavily
based on Jewish law and socialism, neither of which is oriented toward a libertarian-based
law of human rights. See Goldstein, supra note 178, at 607 (claiming Jewish law is
"primarily duty-oriented rather than rights-oriented" and that socialism is "primarily com-
munal rather than individualistically oriented").
243. See Goldstein, supra note 178, at 610.
244. See Shapira, supra note 64, at 287.
245. See Foundations of Law, 1980, 34 L.S.I. 181, S.H. 978.
246. Elon, supra note 18, at 240 (offering an alternate translation for Foundations of
Law, 1980, sect. 1, 34 L.S.I. 181, S.H. 978); see also Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 341 &
n. 152; Quigley, supra note 70, at 227.
247. See Elon, supra note 18, at 240.
248. Proclamation of Independence, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948).
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ence have never been completely implemented, either with respect to
the rights of non-Jews or non-Orthodox Jews. 49
Any infringement on the rights of minorities is a cause for concern,
but discrimination on the basis of religion is particularly troubling in a
State founded by persons fleeing from religious persecution. Israel has
attempted to protect the rights of religious minorities by granting them
the right to live in accordance with their own unique religious traditions
in the areas that are presumably most important to them, including mar-
riage, divorce, and other aspects of personal status."0 Even in these
highly personal areas, however, the Israeli courts and Knesset have
shown a willingness to impose Jewish values on non-Jews. For example,
polygamy is expressly permitted under Islamic law and was recognized
as a legitimate expression of religious belief by Muslims in Palestine
during British rule."' Nevertheless, in the early 1950s, the Knesset ex-
tended its prohibition on polygamy to cover not only Jewish men, but
non-Jewish men as well."2
In a precedent-setting case, a Muslim man argued that the law in-
fringed on the religious freedoms promised to him by the Proclamation
of Independence; however, the Supreme Court ruled that "[f]reedom of
religion is not to be interpreted as freedom to do what the religion per-
mits but freedom to fulfill what the religion commands. The plurality of
wives.., is not a commandment of the Moslem religion but is permit-
ted by it."'' Because "[p]olygamy of the Moslem does not constitute an
249. See Cohen, supra note 234, at 72; see also Erlanger, supra note 5 (noting harass-
ment of and attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses in Israel). Since the birth of the nation, the Arab
minority has experienced various types of overt and covert discrimination. See Cohen, supra
note 234, at 72; Quigley, supra note 70 passim.
250. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 121; Treitel, supra note 63, at 411-13.
251. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 423.
252. See id.
253. H.C. 49/54, Mulhem v. Qadi of Acco, 8 P.D. 910, quoted in Treitel, supra note 63,
at 423. Mulhem and the Knesset prohibition on multiple marriages of all persons apparently
overturned an earlier case, G.A. 112/50 Yosifof v. Attorney General, 5 PD. 481, translated in
1 Selected Judgments of the Supreme Court of Israel 174 (1948-1953), which held that
Muslim men could enter into multiple marriages, but Jews could not. See Genut, supra note
60, at 2150 (discussing Yosifof). Yosifof may still be of some importance, however, in that it
addresses the Israeli vision of equal protection.
In Yosifof, a Jewish man argued that he could not be convicted of bigamy because the
law at that time allowed Muslim men to marry more than one wife. See id. He argued that
Jews were discriminated against because they were treated differently than Muslims with
respect to marital law. See id. The Court disagreed, stating that the issue of discrimination
must be resolved in the context of the social realities of the State, including the different laws
and customs that mark the different religious communities. See id. In order to determine
whether differential treatment is discriminatory, the Court must focus on whether the law in
question discriminates against a community, not an individual. See id. This approach, which
focuses on discrimination against a group rather than an individual, is consistent with the
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integral part of Moslem belief or of its religious commandments," there
was "no incursion whatsoever upon the freedom of religion of the citi-
zen."' 5 The law was thus upheld despite the State's claim to support
freedom of religion.
Freedom of religion and judicial reliance on Jewish principles are
also at issue in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which is the
most explicit Basic Law in terms of its adherence to the principles of
Judaism. Passed in 1992 and amended in 1994, the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty states that its purpose is to "protect human dignity
and liberty, in order to anchor in a Basic Law the values of the State of
Israel as a Jewish and democratic state." 5 Although in some respects
this law supports the protection of the same basic human rights that are
found in many national and international instruments," it is qualified by
its intent to establish Jewish values in the State of Israel. Although it is
too early to predict how the Supreme Court will interpret this provision,
the law may solidify judicial and legislative pronouncements advancing
the Jewish nature of the State to the detriment of other more universal
values and further legitimize links between Jewish and Israeli law.
One alarming aspect of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty
is the absence of any mention of freedom of religion. This omission was
intentional and was brought about at the instigation of the religious par-
ties, who were concerned that if such a right were recognized it would
limit their control over matters involving personal status.2 7 Because the
argument that Israeli law is based on a theory of group rights rather than the individual rights
theory used in the United States. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 407 (noting Israel idealizes a
"separate but equal" legal system).
254. H.C. 49/54, Mulhem v. Qadi of Acco, 8 P.D. 910, quoted in Treitel, supra note 63,
at 423.
255. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, sect. 1, S.H. 1391; see also Barak-
Erez, supra note 64, at 323-24. For an interesting discussion as to what interpretive method
should be used with respect to this provision and what results will ensue, see id. at 342-44.
256. See, e.g., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 99,
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1/Doc. 65 (English), Rev. 1, Corr. 1 (1970); International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (and accompanying Protocol), Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc.
A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; see also Richards, supra note 203,
at 34 (comparing rights found in French and U.S. constitutions).
257. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 325. Interestingly, the Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation, which was also amended in 1994, see S.H. 1454, explicitly acknowledges the
principle of religious equality, again at the behest of the religious parties. See Hofnung, su-
pra note 64, at 597 & n.47. In fact, it is possible that the language regarding religious
equality in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation might be used against the very people
who argued for its inclusion and allow courts to strike preferences granted to Orthodox in-
stitutions. See id.
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Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty was enacted only recently, it is
difficult to determine what effect this omission will have on the interac-
tion between state and religion in Israel. However, the bluntness with
which this Basic Law embraces Jewish values suggests that Israel will
continue to support increasing levels of religio-political interaction.
In fact, it will likely become increasingly difficult for Israel to move
back to a more moderate stance. 58 This has been made even more true
since the passage of a 1985 law that limits the ability of those who disa-
gree with the current form of Israeli law and society to gain access to
the Knesset. 59 A similar law prohibits members of the Knesset from
considering any bill that "negates the existence of the State of Israel as
the state of the Jewish people.' '26
There may be several reasons why laws supporting Jewish values in
Israeli society are appearing more frequently. It may be that some poli-
ticians and jurists believe that the incorporation of community values
(be they religious or other) into the law of the State is one way to calm
social tensions and avoid violent conflicts.26' This seems unlikely, how-
ever, especially since many legal commentators believe that
incorporation of religious values into the law of the State actually in-
creases the potential for conflict and violence. 262 It is thus more probable
that the rise in religio-legal interaction is due to the increased power of
religious parties in the Knesset during the 1980s and 1990s. 263 These
recent advances by the religious parties have resulted in the reinforce-
ment of existing religious legislation and suggest the potential for
264massive change in the Israeli political system.
258. See, e.g., PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 99 (1965) ("[In mat-
ters of morals negative legislation is especially difficult, because relaxation is thought to
imply approval.").
259. In 1985, a law was passed prohibiting any candidate who "reject[ed] the existence
of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people" from participating in elections for the
Knesset. Basic Law: The Knesset (amend. No. 9), 1984, S.H. 1155, quoted in Quigley, supra
note 70, at 227. This provision effectively bars any person who wishes to minimize the re-
ligious nature of the State and maximize secular elements from participating in government.
It also tends to act disproportionately against Israeli Arabs who may oppose the Jewish na-
ture of the State. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 227.
260. 1986 Yalkut Hapirsumim 772 (amendment to Knesset Rules, sect. 134), translated
in Quigley, supra note 70, at 227.
261. See Sprinzak, supra note 19, at 486.
262. See Bruce, supra note 7, at 65; David C. Rapoport, Comparing Militant Funda-
mentalist Movements and Groups, in FUNDAMENTALISMS AND THE STATE, supra note 7, at
429,440.
263. See Liebman, supra note 69, at 68.
264. See id. at 75, 77, 84.
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However, the basic problem with these laws is that they give cre-
dence to only one aspect of Israeli citizenship (Jewishness) and limit the
ability of dissidents to change the legal landscape through legitimate
political means. In doing so, they may unwittingly strengthen the re-
solve of those minority groups who believe that political and cultural
change in Israel can only be effectuated through violence.'
2. Iran
Iran's 1979 Constitution states that "[tihe form of government of
Iran is that of an Islamic Republic, ' 2' and that it is based on the belief
in:
1. the One God...;
2. Divine revelation and its fundamental role in setting forth
the laws;
3. the return to God in the Hereafter...;
4. the justice of God in creation and legislation; [and]
5. continuous leadership and perpetual guidance. 67
In such an environment, it is not surprising that the primary interpretive
method used by the Iranian courts is to ensure consistency of the law
with Islamic principles.2' Since 1988, however, the judiciary has had
less need to exercise this prerogative, since under the vilayat-i-mutlaqa-
yi-faqih system all acts of the legislature that are approved by the Su-
preme Jurisprudent are presumptively legitimate under Islamic law.69
Legal sovereignty in Iran belongs exclusively to God, although hu-
mans are considered masters of their own destiny and therefore are
entitled to exercise their God-given rights in accordance with other con-
265. See S.I. Strong, Christian Constitutions: Do They Protect Internationally Recog-
nized Human Rights and Minimize the Potential for Violence Within a Society?, 29 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 64-65 (1997) [hereinafter Strong, Christian Constitutions]. Some believe
that the increased recognition of Jewish values in the Israeli legal system may eventually
change the nature of the Israeli-Arab struggle from a political conflict to a purely religious
war. See Liebman, supra note 69, at 75, 77, 84; see also Cohen, supra note 234, at 73 (noting
Israeli Arabs find it "difficult, if not impossible, to identify with the Jewish symbols of state-
hood").
266. IRAN CONST. art. 1.
267. Id. art. 2.
268. See id. preamble, art. 61.
269. See supra notes 225-33 and accompanying text.
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stitutional and religious principles"0 The purpose of the Constitution is
"to realize the ideological objectives of the [fundamentalist Islamic]
movement and to create conditions conducive to the development of
man in accordance with the noble and universal values of Islam. 27' The
formation of an Islamic nation is to be achieved through a variety of
measures, including "the creation of a favourable environment for the
growth of moral virtues based on faith and piety and the struggle against
all forms of vice and corruption."27'
Interestingly, the Iranian Constitution does not limit itself to con-
trolling acts within its territorial boundaries; instead it contemplates the
expansion of Islam throughout the world and the "defence of the rights
of all Muslims," no matter where they may be located." 3 This approach
to law and sovereignty is vaguely reminiscent of Marxist and commu-
nist philosophy in that it supports the proselytization of state ideology
beyond the State's borders. 274 It also hearkens back to the early days of
Islam, when religious ties were of ultimate importance and the globe
was broken into dar al Islam (the Islamic world) and dar al harb (the
non-Islamic world).275 However, this all-encompassing world view has
created problems for Iran because it disregards accepted norms regard-
ing both the political sovereignty of nations and traditional Islamic
theology. 6
Iran's domestic policy is, in some ways, just as militant as its for-
eign policy. "The official religion of Iran is Islam and the Twelver
Ja'fari school," although other schools of Islamic thought are also rec-
ognized with respect to matters of religious education, personal status,
and related litigation. 2" According to the Constitution, all non-Muslims
270. See IRAN CONST. art. 56. Because most followers of the Shari'a believe that all
sovereignty comes from God, a democratic political model granting unlimited sovereignty to
the people would have been in complete opposition to religious teachings. See Wright, Islam
Rising, supra note 166 (noting modem Islamic political theory attempts to reconcile Islam
and democracy).
271. IRAN CONST. preamble.
272. Id. art. 3(1). This is consistent with the creation of a "good society" in the Islamic
tradition. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
273. IRAN CONST. art. 152; see also id. preamble, arts. 3(16), 11 (referencing the com-
munity of all Muslims). These provisions have been used by some Iranians to justify the
exportation of the Islamic revolution to other nations. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 310,
344-46 (commenting on varying positions among political groups regarding exportation of
revolution).
274. See Chris Brown, Marxism and International Ethics, in TRADITIONS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL ETHIcs, supra note 1, at 225, 236, 240-42.
275. See Bahar, supra note 117, at 164-65.
276. See generally Chase, supra note 165 (discussing how the religiousfatwa issued by
Khomeini against author Salman Rushdie violated both religious and secular law).
277. IRAN CONST. art. 12.
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are to be treated with "justice and equity'" but only as long as those per-
sons do not conspire or act against Islam and the State." The
Constitution states that no one is to be persecuted for his or her religious
beliefs and in fact recognizes and protects three minority faiths: Zoro-
astrianism, Judaism, and Christianity.2 9 However, members of another
religious minority, the Baha'i, are not given any explicit constitutional
protection and are, in fact, widely persecuted despite the explicit provi-
sions of Article 23.' When it will even admit to such actions, Iran
justifies its behavior by claiming that it is not acting against Baha'is
based on their religious beliefs, but instead on their political beliefs,
which threaten the Islamic state."' However, this distinction is circular
since crimes against the faith can easily be defined as political crimes in
a theocracy. 2 It also seems anomalous to permit Iran to practice geno-
cide merely because it chooses to classify Baha'i as political criminals
rather than heretics.
However, it is not just religious minorities who are at risk under
Iran's religio-legal system; Shi'a Muslims are also put in considerable
danger due to the lack of religious protection in the Constitution. For
example, Article 23 of the Constitution states that no one is to be
"molested or taken to task simply for holding a certain [religious] be-
lief." 3 However, Muslims may be afraid to renounce Islam and choose
another religion because Iranian courts are empowered to penalize
Muslims found guilty of apostasy." Under this analysis, Article 23 has
278. Id. art. 14; see also id. art. 19 (providing for equal protection under the law based
on ethnicity, race, language, "and the like"). Despite this language, some commentators have
noted that non-Muslims in Iran are "afforded an officially unequal status under law." Arzt,
Religious Human Rights, supra note 218, at 154.
279. See IRAN CONST. arts. 13, 23.
280. See Arzt, Religious Human Rights, supra note 218, at 157-60; Louis Rene Beres,
Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 1 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 65, 70-72 (1996). Evangelical Christians are also persecuted regularly in Iran
due to their proselytizing efforts. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 373; Wright, Islam Rising,
supra note 166 (describing most States that codify the Shari'a as forbidding p rsons of other
religions to proselytize).
281. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 129-30; Arzt, Religious Human Rights, supra note
218, at 60; Terry Atlas, Iran's Leaders Push Baha'i Persecution, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1993,
§ 1, at 3; see also IRAN CONST. art. 14 (extending protection to persons of other religions
only insofar as they do not conspire or act "against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran").
The evidence appears to contradict the state position, however, as Baha'is are considered by
many people in Iran to be heretical Muslims rather than persons of a distinct religious mi-
nority. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 129-30; Atlas, supra.
282. See Arzt, Religious Human Rights, supra note 218, at 160; see also MACKEY, su-
pra note 91, at 130 (discussing Baha'i "heresy" against the Shi'a clergy).
283. IRAN CONST. art. 23.
284. See Chase, supra note 165, at 396-99, 403; see also AN-NA'IM, supra note 81, at
86-87 (indicating problems with adjudicating apostasy).
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little meaning in Iran, either for members of the religious majority or
religious minorities. Instead, it seems as if the only religious protection
available in Iran is reserved for those who already adhere to the official
definition of Islam.
Finally, in its attempt to create an enduring Islamic state, Iran has
unfortunately laid the groundwork for future religio-political violence
by forestalling peaceful methods of change. Under Article 9, the Con-
stitution states that "no authority has the right to abrogate legitimate
freedoms, not even by enacting laws and regulations for that purpose,
under the pretext of preserving the independence and territorial integrity
of the country."' " Although this provision probably exists as a result of
the perceived infringements on Iranian freedoms that were associated
with certain economic concessions granted to foreign companies and
governments by the shah in the pre-revolutionary period, it can also be
used by those who claim that their freedom to live under Islamic rule
would be violated by any secularizing law. Under these types of restric-
tions, opponents to the Islamic regime are left with no legitimate
recourse for political change and may find violence their only means of
effecting legal and social reform."
C. Personal Rights
1. Israel
The area that is most reflective of religious values in a society or le-
gal system is that of personal rights and related issues (often called
"family law"), and Israel is no exception. In fact, Israel has made special
provision for the inclusion of religious values in this area of law by
granting nearly exclusive jurisdiction over these matters to the religious
courts pursuant to the Status Quo Agreement. 7 Although Israel has four
different sets of religious courts, one for each of the officially recog-
nized religions, this article will focus only on the rabbinical courts, as
they are the guardians of the Jewish nature of the State and are, in some
commentators' minds, the "center of conflict between religious and
secular values."
Under the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce)
Law, rabbinical courts have exclusive jurisdiction over marriage and
285. IRAN CONST. art. 9.
286. See Rapoport, supra note 262, at 432, 446-47.
287. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 48; FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 43, 58.
288. Adam M. Dodek, Book Note, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 571, 573 (1995) (reviewing
EDELMAN, supra note 10).
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divorce proceedings of Jewish citizens and residents.f9 In these cases,
the rabbinical courts apply halachic law regardless of whether the per-
son practices or believes in Judaism; if he or she is legally a Jew, then
the Halacha applies.m The parties' consent is not necessary and is, in
289. See Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 1953, sect. 1, 7
L.S.I. 139 (1952-53); Treitel, supra note 63, at 411.
290. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 347. The question of "Who is a Jew?" is one of the
most troubling and long-standing jurisprudential questions in Israel. The legal principles
were first codified in 1950 in the Law of Return, which states that every diaspora Jew has the
right to immigrate to Israel and become an Israeli citizen merely by virtue of his or her re-
ligion. See Law of Return, 1950, sects. 1-2, 4 L.S.I. 114 (1949-50). The oleh (Jew
immigrating to Israel) may be Jewish by birth or by conversion. See Law of Return
(Amendment No. 2), 1970, sect. 4B, 24 L.S.I. 28 (1969-70).
For all practical purposes, conversion within Israel must be performed by Orthodox rites,
and the Knesset is considering a bill which would enshrine this practice in law. See Dempsey,
supra note 71; see also Israel Delays Bill Regulating Jewish Conversion, WASH. POST, June
23, 1997, at A20 (noting the Knesset has shelved the bill pending discussions between Or-
thodox and non-Orthodox leaders). The law would overturn a 1995 Supreme Court decision
that held that Reform and Conservative conversions within Israel are legitimate. See Israeli
Bill Would Invalidate Non-Orthodox Conversions to Judaism, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 2, 1997, § 1,
at 21 [hereinafter Israeli Bill] (stating that the Supreme Court ruling has never been imple-
mented). Conversion outside Israel may be performed by a rabbi of any denomination, see
Stephen Franklin, Conversion Rule in Israel is Widened, CHI. TRiB., July 25, 1989, at M5
(citing 1989 Supreme Court case), although religious parties within Israel would like to see
that law changed as well, see Israeli Bill, supra. However, despite the fact that the State con-
siders those who are converted outside Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis to be Jewish,
such persons cannot be married in Israel or buried in Jewish cemeteries in Israel, since those
functions are controlled by the religious courts, which utilize more stringent (i.e., halachic)
criteria for Jewishness than does the State.'See Marjorie Miller, 50 U.S. Rabbis Urge Israel
Not to Make Non-Orthodox Jews 'Second Class', L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1997, at A8.
The most famous case construing the Law of Return is known as the Brother Daniel
case. See H.C. 72/62, Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16(4) P.D. 2428, cited in Lubetski,
supra note 17, at 365; see also ELAZAR & AVIAD, supra note 38, at 21-22. In that case, a
man who was born to Jewish parents in Poland subsequently converted to Catholicism during
the Holocaust and became a monk. See id. at 21. Under strict construction of halachic law,
Brother Daniel was a Jew, since his mother was a Jew, but the Supreme Court distinguished
between halachic law and the secular law of the State, and denied his application for auto-
matic citizenship as an oleh. See id. at 22. The Court considered his conversion to
Christianity as a repudiation of his Jewish heritage and required him to go through normal
naturalization procedures (which he subsequently did) if he wished to become an Israeli
citizen. See id. Other cases concerning the Law of Return have also tested the boundaries of
secular and religious authority. In most of those cases, the Israeli courts have focused not on
subjective expressions of Jewishness, but on objective, often halachic, criteria. See id. at 22-
23.
In order to resolve some of these hard questions of law, the Knesset amended the Law of
Return so that a Jew, for purposes of citizenship, is a person born of a Jewish mother or who
converted to Judaism and is not an adherent of another religion. See Law of Return
(Amendment No. 2), 1970, sect. 4B, 24 L.S.I. 28 (1969-70); Lubetski, supra note 17, at 366;
see also Hofnung, supra note 64, at 593-94 (citing H.C. 230/86, Miller v. Minister of the
Interior, 40(4) P.D. 436, wherein the Supreme Court ordered the Minister of the Interior to
consider a woman who converted to Reform Judaism in the U.S. as a Jew). Spouses, chil-
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fact, irrelevant in these types of proceedings. In cases concerning
guardianship or administration of property, however, the parties must
consent to the jurisdiction of the court.2 91
There are a number of problems associated with a legal system that
varies its treatment of a person based not on personal consent or the ex-
istence of any relevant distinguishing characteristics but instead on that
person's religious heritage. 92 The most common manifestation of these
types of problems in Israel concerns marriage, which, according to the
rabbinical courts, must be performed in accordance with Orthodox rites,
whether or not the couple is Orthodox. 293 Because the Orthodox have
traditionally controlled the rabbinical courts, they have been able to im-
pose their version of Judaism on Israel almost uniformly, despite the
fact that Orthodox Judaism is not the majority Jewish denomination in
Israel. 29 Although Israeli Jews can avoid Orthodox rites by being mar-
dren, and grandchildren of Jews are given the same rights as a Jew. See Law of Return
(Amendment No. 2), 1970, sect. 4A(a), 24 L.S.I. 28 (1969-70).
Although most commentators focus on whether the Law of Return improperly favors
some Jews at the expense of others, the most discriminatory aspect of the Law of Return may
be its refusal to grant automatic citizenship to any non-Jews, including those Palestinian
Arabs who were longtime residents in the area during the period of the British Mandate and
were forcibly expelled from the State in 1948. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 229-31. Again,
this is cause for some concern because it reinforces the Jewish nature of the State at the cost
of other, more unifying traits.
291. See Treitel, supra note 63, at 411-12 (citing BAKER, supra note 197, at 207-08).
292. The challenge raised by Israel's religious court system actually mirrors the classic
jurisprudential dilemma that arises when a society chooses to bind itself voluntarily to a
highly restrictive legal-moral code and then discovers that various members of the second
generation wish to violate that code privately and discretely. See JOEL FEINBERG, THE
MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING 57-62 (1990); see also
Leslie Green, Internal Minorities and Their Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES
256, 261-70 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995). In Israel, many jurists similarly find that the impetus
for change comes not from persons who have immigrated to Israel and who ostensibly can be
said to have chosen to live under the millet system, but by their children and grandchildren
who did not make any such choice. See Liebman, supra note 69, at 74. But see LIEBMAN &
DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 122 (noting rise of neo-Orthodoxy
among the young in Israel). This problem is made more troubling by the recognition that
legal differentiations that are based on a person's parents' and grandparents' religious heri-
tage sounds very much like a status crime, wherein a legal burden is imposed not by virtue of
an individual's voluntary action but on account of his or her having involuntarily contracted
some disfavored characteristic. The fact that this system of religiously based distinctions was
created by the founding generation and memorialized in the Status Quo Agreement does not
immunize it from criticism since any attempt by one generation to limit future generations'
ability to change the law constitutes an improper limitation on the democratic process and is
as jurisprudentially unsound as the creation of status crimes.
293. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 25;
Storer H. Rowley, In Israel, Synagogue Versus State, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1995, § 2, at 1
[hereinafter Rowley, Synagogue Versus State].
294. See ELAZAR & AvIAD, supra note 38, at 23-24; Dempsey, supra note 71; Dodek,
supra note 288, at 573. However, in 1994 the Supreme Court held that Reform and Conser-
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ried outside Israel, this is extremely burdensome considering that the
right to found a family (which includes the ability to marry freely) is a
fundamental freedom.295 Notably, this law is not a mere inconvenience; it
can constitute an absolute bar to marriage in Israel because Orthodox
law forbids marriage between certain people.'
vative rabbis must be allowed to sit on the municipal religious councils that are responsible
for supervising religious services. See Non-Orthodox Rabbis Granted Status in Israel, CHI.
TRI., Jan. 27, 1994, § 1, at 10. In that landmark ruling, which for the first time granted Re-
form and Conservative rabbis official status in Israel, the Court stated that "[b]anning
candidates because of their world view constitutes discrimination and contradicts the princi-
ple of equality." Id.
295. See C.A. 450/70, Rogozinsky v. State of Israel, 26(2) P.D. 129 (refusing to recog-
nize the validity of civil marriage ceremonies performed within Israel because the Knesset
clearly intended that Jewish marriages in Israel are to be performed under Jewish law); H.C.
143/62, Funk Schlesinger v. Minister of the Interior, 17(1) P.D. 225 (holding marriages of
Israeli citizens performed outside Israel do not have to conform to Orthodox procedures),
cited in Genut, supra note 60, at 2155 & n.321; see also LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RE-
LIGION AND POLMCS, supra note 62, at 25 (describing tensions between permissible
marriages under Western law and Halacha); Lubetski, supra note 17, at 369-70 (describing
ways to circumvent halachic rules). Private ceremonies in Israel that accord with Orthodox
practices but that do not utilize the agency of the official rabbinate will be recognized as
valid; the couple may then be married publicly by Reform or Conservative rites. See H.C.
51/69, Rodnitsky v. Grand Rabbinical Court of Appeals, 24(1) P.D. 704, cited in Genut, su-
pra note 60, at 2155 (likening requirements of Orthodox marriage ceremony to requirements
of civil ceremonies in other nations); see also Miller, supra note 290 (discussing 1996 Su-
preme Court case concerning whether the Orthodox rabbinate could prohibit non-Orthodox
rabbis from performing marriages, burials, and conversions).
296. For example, a male kohen (a descendant of Aaron, the first high priest) cannot
marry a divorced woman. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 368 n.154. But cf. H.C. 51/69,
Rodnitsky v. Grand Rabbinical Court of Appeals, 24(1) P.D. 704 (ordering State to recognize
marriage between a kohen and widow; holding that law vesting exclusive jurisdiction over
marriage to rabbinical courts did not intend to apply full scope of Jewish law), cited in
Genut, supra note 60, at 2155-56 & n.322. Rodnitsky may provide a potential avenue for
change in that the Court held that enforcement of purely religious-based prohibitions on
marriage constituted coercion of conscience, which was contrary to the fundamental princi-
ples upon which the State was founded. See id, at 2155-56.
The other restriction on marriage concerns mamzerim (children born outside a legitimate
Jewish marriage), who can marry only other mamzerim. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 65.
Unfortunately, because issues of whether a person is a mamzer are decided by Orthodox
considerations, a couple who may be legally married in the eyes of the State through a non-
Orthodox ceremony conducted outside Israel may not be considered married under halachic
law; therefore, any children from that union would be mamzerim and forbidden to marry
anyone but another mamzer under current religio-legal principles. It is worth considering
whether the Supreme Court would consider restrictions on marriage between a mamzer and a
non-mamzer to be a religiously based restriction in violation of an individual's freedom of
conscience, and therefore violative of the principles discussed in Rodnitsky. Such a ruling
may become necessary in the near future, as the Religious Affairs Ministry has apparently
been keeping a secret blacklist of approximately ten thousand Israeli citizens who are pro-
hibited from marrying other Jews, based on halachic principles. See Walker, supra note 68
(noting that some of the persons on the list do not even know that they appear on it).
Proponents of the current system point to the problem of the mnamzerim as proof that any
relaxation of the present law will create additional tensions between Orthodox and non-
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The obvious intent of these laws is to impose halachic principles on
all Jews within the State of Israel, whether they personally believe in
Orthodox Judaism or not. The problem is that religious Jews do not
need secular laws to make sure that they conform with religious pre-
cepts; they will do so by choice. The only reason to require that all
marriages be performed in accordance with Orthodox rituals is to coerce
non-Orthodox Jews into behaving in accordance with the Halacha.2
The religious parties defend their position on the ground that they have a
religious responsibility to nonreligious Jews, 29s but that does not change
the fact that some people who want to marry are forbidden to do so un-
less they either (i) conform to religious rites in which they do not
believe or (ii) go outside the country to be married, something that may
not be economically feasible for them.
Divorce in Israel is nearly as problematic as marriage since it is also
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical courts. Unsurpris-
ingly, the courts require all Jewish divorces to conform to the
requirements set forth in Jewish law, regardless of whether the couple is
religious or not. Because there are no affirmative religious rituals that
are imposed on the parties, the issue is not quite the same as it is with
respect to marriage. Instead, the problem is primarily one of gender in-
Orthodox Jews, as the Orthodox would not know who they were permitted to marry under
halachic law. However, the problem already exists, since an estimated 150,000 Israeli Jews
are forbidden from marrying within their own nation. See Rowley, Synagogue Versus State,
supra note 293.
297. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 25-26.
This type of approach is theologically justifiable since, in Judaism, actions are more impor-
tant than belief. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 159.
298. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 26; see
also Miller, supra note 290. This motive is consistent with the understanding that Jews'
covenant with God is of a collective, rather than individual, nature. See ARIEL, supra note
13, at 113-14; see also Arzt, Religious Freedom, supra note 235, at 12 (noting "[t]he most
important characteristic of ultra-Orthodoxy is its belief that all Jews must follow Jewish law
in all spheres of life, both private and communal" and that "the Halakah is not opposed to
coercion in order to achieve the desired behaviour, even in the case of a person who denies
the principles of faith" (quoting Izhak Englard, The Relation Between Religion and State in
Israel, in JEWISH LAW IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 171 (H. Cohn ed., 1971)). A secon-
dary motive is to uphold the Jewish nature of the State. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 26.
299. Essentially, this law relegates principled atheists and non-Orthodox Jews to the
status of second-class citizens. See Lubetski, supra note 17, at 368-70 (discussing problems
arising from absence of civil marriage option in Israel); Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing The
Freedom of Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious
Intolerance and Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 518 (1988). This provision is espe-
cially hard on principled non-Orthodox Jews, who are least likely to want to submit to
religious rituals in which they do not believe, but who are most likely to feel bound by their
religious obligation to marry. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 68 (discussing Jewish belief in the
necessity of marriage).
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equity, since Halachic law requires that the man deliver a decree of di-
vorce, or a get, of his own free will.'0 Without a get, a woman cannot
legally remarry.3 'O If she does enter into another relationship and bears
any children, those children will be considered mamzerim and forbidden
to marry anyone but another mamzer . 2 Not only is this unfair to the
children, it is also unduly hard on women who wish to divorce but who
cannot convince their husbands to provide them with a get. Although the
State has attempted to assist these women by incarcerating recalcitrant
husbands, it cannot force a man to grant his wife a get, and some men
prefer to remain in prison for years rather than grant their wives a di-
vorce.3' Women are therefore required to remain in unhappy marriages
or grant their husbands' demands, including economic concessions, in
order to obtain a divorce'O4
Although there is no discussion among the commentators on this
point, it might be possible for women to avoid the law requiring a get by
going abroad to obtain a civil divorce; however, it is not clear whether
the State would recognize a foreign divorce the same way it does a for-
eign marriage. In addition, under Orthodox principles, any children
from a foreign marriage following a foreign divorce would be consid-
ered mamzerim, regardless of the fact that their parents were legally
married in the eyes of the State, since the second marriage is religiously
invalid without a get from the first husband. As in the case of marriage,
the rationales behind this obviously coercive law are the religious obli-
300. See Deuteronomy 24:1; see also Genut, supra note 60, at 2157 (discussing the get
requirement).
301. See ISAAC KLEIN, A GUIDE TO JEWISH RELIGIOUS PRACTICE 450-51 (1979). In
addition, Israel's rabbinical courts have occasionally been known to permit Jewish men to
take a second wife under a little-known loophole in Jewish law. See Divorce Court, Israeli
Style, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1985, § IA, at 44 (noting ninety-one men received rabbinical
approval to take a second wife between 1980 and 1985 under the doctrine of heter nissuim
(permission to marry), which "allows a [Jewish] man to take a second wife if his present one
is insane, legally incompetent or categorically opposed to divorce"). Women do not have
similar rights. See id.
302. See Deuteronomy 23:3; Genut, supra note 60, at 2156-57 (citing Shimon Shetreet,
Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Religion: A Dialogue, 4 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 194,
211 (1974)).
303. See, e.g., Israeli Who Refused to Give Wife Divorce Dies in Prison, CHI. TRIB.,
Dec. 6, 1994, § 1, at 20 (noting death of man who spent thirty-two years in prison rather than
grant his wife a divorce). The procedure of incarceration begins with a rabbinical court en-
tering a judgment of compulsory divorce and the appropriate district court utilizing its power
of enforcement to imprison a man until he complies with the order and grants the divorce.
See id. However, this procedure is not as useful as it sounds, not only because some men
prefer to remain imprisoned rather than grant a get, but because rabbinical courts very rarely
issue orders of compulsory divorce. See id.
304. See Genut, supra note 60, at 2157 (citing DAPHNA SHARFMAN, LIVING WITHOUT
A CONSTITUTION 79 (1993)).
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gation felt by the Orthodox toward the non-Orthodox and the protection
of the Jewish nature of the State.3
Although marriage and divorce in Israel are clearly controlled by
religious law, another area that is often highly influenced by religion is
the law concerning women's rights. Somewhat surprisingly given the
restrictions and inequalities inherent in the laws on marriage and di-
vorce, Israel is quite progressive with respect to gender equity in other
areas of society. The Women's Equal Rights Law, which was passed in
1951, grants women the same legal standing as men and permits women
to own property in their own right.' The law is binding on all courts,
including those of the religious communities, and appears to constitute a
major step forward in women's rights by reversing certain religious tra-
ditions that marginalize women's roles in society3O However, the law
has two major exceptions that limit its ability to effect full gender equity
in Israel.
First, all matters concerning divorce and marriage are still to be de-
cided by the laws of the religious communities. Second, the law will
not take effect if the parties are over eighteen years of age and consent
to be tried by the law of their religious community' 9 Although this pro-
vision appears to take into account the need to respect and accommodate
individual religious beliefs, and indeed may be quite appropriate in that
it requires affirmative consent from the parties before applying religious
laws that are admittedly inequitable, it ignores the possibility that social
and religious forces may pressure a woman into "choosing" to have her
case adjudicated under religious law against her better judgment."'
305. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION & POLITICS, supra note 62, at 26; see
also Miller, supra note 290 (indicating that Orthodox rabbinate believes itself to be
"caretaker of Jewish tradition").
306. Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sects. 1-2, 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51).
307. See id. sect. 7, 5 L.S.I. 171, 172; see also Treitel, supra note 63, at 422 n.127. For
example, modem Orthodox Judaism claims to honor women's roles as mothers and daugh-
ters, but continues a religious tradition that places them in secondary positions in society. See
CANTOR, supra note 11, at 47-48 (noting that an Orthodox male's morning prayer thanks
God for not making him gentile or female, and that architecture of modem Orthodox syna-
gogues perpetuates segregation of sexes).
308. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sect. 5, 5 L.S.I. 171, 172 (1950-51);
Treitel, supra note 63, at 422 n.127. However, at least one recent case has held that the
religious courts must consider civil laws giving equal property rights to women and men in
cases of divorce. See H.C. 1000/92, Bavli v. Grand Rabbinical Court, 48(2) P.D. 221, cited in
Hofnung, supra note 64, at 591.
309. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sect. 7, 5 L.S.I. 171, 172 (1950-51);
Treitel, supra note 63, at 422 n.127.
310. Cf JOHN STUART Mi"i, ON LmERTY 63 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin
Books 1985) (1859) (discussing how social coercion can be more powerful than legal coer-
cion).
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However, absent a patently paternalistic interference in women's
thought processes, the most the State can do in this situation is give
women the option of proceeding under civil or religious law, ensure full
disclosure as to the differences in treatment under the two systems, and
remove as many instruments of coercion as possible.
In addition to the two explicit exceptions to the application of the
Women's Equal Rights Law, the law provides that religious laws of in-
heritance that discriminate on the basis of gender will be upheld when
the decedent died testate!" However, in cases of intestacy, the Women's
Equal Rights Law will safeguard the female family members against
discriminatory treatment."'
The Knesset is not the only branch of government that protects
women's rights in Israel; case law indicates that the Supreme Court does
not tolerate certain types of gender discrimination either. For example,
the Court has ordered women to be included in municipal religious
councils, thus appearing to disregard certain religious traditions con-
cerning the proper role of women."' By giving women more of a voice
at the grassroots level, the Court may have opened the door to various
liberalizing effects in the interpretation of religious laws. In addition,
the Court has relied on the principles found in the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty to force the military to permit women to enroll in
training courses for combat pilots, overturning earlier administrative
regulations that permitted gender differentiation.1
Gender equality is also apparent in Israeli child custody laws. Un-
like some countries, Israel does not favor one parent in matters
concerning child rearing and custody; both are equal guardians."5 Nev-
ertheless, the State may intercede if it is in the best interest of the
child. "6 There is little evidence that children are given any rights of their
311. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sect. 4, 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51);
FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 61.
312. See FREUDENHEIM, supra note 54, at 61.
313. See H.C. 153/88, Shakdiel v. Minister of Religious Affairs, 42(2) P.D. 221, cited in
Hofnung, supra note 64, at 594.
314. See Hofnung, supra note 64, at 596 (citing H.C. 4541/94, Miller v. Minister of De-
fense, 49(4) P.D. 94); Joel Greenberg, Pilot Program: Israeli Woman Hopes to Fly in the
Face of Military Tradition, CHIi. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1996, § 13, at 10 (noting that the "changing
role of women in the Israeli military seems certain to influence attitudes toward women in
Israeli society at large, in which the army plays a central role;" also noting that the combat
ban reflected "traditional attitudes toward women in Jewish society").
315. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sect. 3(a), 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51). This re-
flects the Jewish belief that childrearing is an obligation shared by both parents and God. See
ARIEL, supra note 13, at 71.
316. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, sect. 3(b), 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51).
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own, as is becoming the trend in countries such as the United States and
the United Kingdom."7
Although Israeli child custody laws seem ideal in terms of gender
equity, the State does discriminate on the basis of religion in its family
policies. For example, the State pays child support to parents in order to
encourage high birth rates but gives de facto preference to Jewish par-
ents over Arab parents."' This type of provision perpetuates the belief
that non-Jews are persona non grata in the eyes of the State and can
increase tension and strife between persons of different religions.
As would be expected in a nation that promotes women's equality,
abortion law in Israel is relatively liberal, permitting abortion in some
but not all cases.3" 9 This is in accordance with Jewish religious principles
that hold that life does not begin at conception. 20 Abortion does not
seem to have the same socially divisive effect in Israel as it does in the
United States, perhaps due to differences in underlying religious beliefs
about when life begins or because religio-political parties have other
concerns that are more important to them. However, the religious parties
do consider the prohibition of abortion for socio-economic reasons to be
one of their future goals. 21
There is no right to die in Israel, and assisted suicide remains ille-
gal, but doctors are given some discretion in how they are allowed to
treat terminally ill patients. 22 For example, one district court recently
ruled that a terminally ill man could can refuse medical treatment in
order to die with dignity.
323
Israeli law concerning homosexual rights is also relatively progres-
324sive. Unlike some nations that criminalize homosexual relationships,
317. Cf. James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine of Parents'Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1371 passim (1994).
318. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 248. For example, payments may be increased if
one parent is or was a soldier or if a child is a student at a Jewish seminary. See id. at 248-
49. Both measures tend to exclude non-Jews from qualifying for additional payments. See id.
319. See Dan Fisher, Israel Demographic War: It All Depends on Babies, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1988, pt. 1, at 6 (stating that approximately twenty thousand legal and forty thou-
sand illegal abortions in Israel in 1988).
320. See ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 172. But see ARIEL, supra note 13, at 71
(noting some scholars do hold that life begins at conception).
321. See Julian Ozanne, Israel Braces for Retreat from Secularization, FIN. TIMES, June
13, 1996, at 4.
322. See Judge to Rule on Israeli's Pleas to 'Die With Dignity,' THE INDEPENDENT
(London), Jan. 1, 1996, at 9.
323. See id. This is in accordance with the Jewish belief that a person cannot hasten his
or her death, but can refuse to prolong it by artificial means. See KLEIN, supra note 301, at
272-73.
324. See Michael Parks, Israeli Armed Forces Ban Discrimination Against Gay Rights,
L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1993, at A5 (quoting one homosexual rights activist as stating that,
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Israel grants certain equal protection-type rights to such unions. For ex-
ample, in 1994 the High Court ruled that the domestic partner of a
homosexual airline employee was entitled to the same type of free air-
line tickets that were given to married employees' spouses as part of the
employees' collective working agreement3 5 In a move that was perhaps
even more compelling, in 1993 the Israeli military reversed a 1986
standing order limiting homosexuals' ability to serve in the military,
recognizing that "homosexuals are as worthy of military service as oth-
ers," and announced it would induct homosexuals if they were "fit for
service according to the same criteria according to which all other can-
didates are inducted. 326
2. Iran
Islam has always valued and encouraged strict community norms
regarding the regulation of family life, and Iran gives full effect to that
tradition in its laws. 32 For example, the preamble of the Constitution
designates the family as "the fundamental unit of society" and states
that "[i]t is the duty of the Islamic government to provide the necessary
facilities" for the support of the family.32 The government is also re-
quired to establish "competent courts to protect and preserve the
family.' 3 In fact, "all laws, regulations, and pertinent programmes must
tend to facilitate the formation of a family, and to safeguard its sanctity
and the stability of family relations on the basis of the law and ethics of
Islam.' 3 ° In exchange for these privileges and guarantees, a reciprocal




"[t]his makes Israel one of the most advanced nations in the world with regard to homosex-
ual rights"). But cf. Israel's High Court Hands Gays Major Legal Triumph, CH. TRIB., Dec.
1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 6549421 [hereinafter Major Legal Triumph] (stating homo-
sexual rights activists consider Israel to be a "relatively conservative society" with respect to
homosexuality).
325. See H.C. 721/94, El Al v. Danilovich, 48(5) P.D. 749, cited in Hofnung, supra note
64, at 594; see also Major Legal Triumph, supra note 324.
326. Parks, supra note 324; see Israel Formalizes Policy of Drafting Gays, CHI. TRIB.,
June 12, 1993, § 1, at 17. Under this new approach, homosexuals are allowed to serve in all
parts of the military, including elite combat units and other positions requiring top security
clearance. See Parks, supra note 324. This move was particularly momentous in that the
Israeli military constitutes one of the nation's most important social institutions. See id.
327. Proponents of Islamic law tend to guard family law more closely than other areas
of law due to the strong textual basis in the Quran for many rules concerning the family and
the belief that families are responsible for teaching children their religious duty. See Cam-
mack et al., supra note 89, at 50-51.
328. IRAN CONST. preamble.
329. Id. art. 21(3).
330. Id. art. 10.
331. See generally id. preamble.
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Many religious traditions give special honor to the family, so Islam
is not unique in this regard. However, reverence for the family, when
placed in a constitutional setting and combined with an extremely con-
servative established religion, can tend to limit certain segments of the
population into strictly defined roles. 32 Such is the case of women in
Iran.
333
Prior to the 1979 revolution, Iranian women enjoyed a number of
Western-style rights under the Pahlavis' attempts to liberalize Iran. 34 For
example, women and men had equal rights to divorce, which was
granted through civil, rather than religious, courts.33' Abortion was le-
galized and men's right to practice polygamy, which is permitted under
Islamic religious law, was severely curtailed.336 Education became
widely available to women, and many obtained professional degrees and
332. See generally Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A
Clash of Cultures or a Clash with a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 331 (1994)
[hereinafter Mayer, Clash]. Usually the application of restrictive laws tends to fall most
heavily on marginalized or economically dependent subgroups. For example, laws against
"un-Islamic" dress require men to forego wearing ties or unconventional clothing, while
otherwise allowing Western fashion; Iranian women, on the other hand, are forced to wear a
chador, whether or not they are Muslim. See id. at 393 n.394; see also HIRO, supra note 74,
at 201; MACKEY, supra note 91, at 9-10 (noting female visitors to Iran must also comply
with restrictions on dress). But cf. Geneive Abdo, Seeking Respect, Liberation in Iran, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 18, 1994, § 6, at I (commenting that restrictions on women's dress have eased so
that extra-large raincoats and scarves may suffice). Some people believe the legal require-
ment to wear a chador is akin to torture, especially considering the health risks that
accompany the donning of the hot, heavy garb in a region where temperatures can rise to
115* Fahrenheit. See Graves, supra note 105, at 70-71, 88 n.262; see also Courtney W.
Howland, The Challenge of Religious Fundamentalism to the Liberty and Equality Rights of
Women: An Analysis under the United Nations Charter, 35 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271,
357 n.364 (1997) (discussing Fisher v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 37 F.3d 1371
(9th Cir. 1994), remanding to Immigration Board for consideration of Iranian woman's claim
that the requirement that women wear a chador is a type of persecution). Full hejab, or Is-
lamic dress, includes thick socks, pants to the ankles, a long, heavy coat, a large scarf
wrapped around the head, and the chador, which is a cloth laid over the shoulders, forehead,
and chin. See Graves, supra note 105, at 70 n.96. If the chador is not worn, or is not worn in
accordance with legal requirements (something that is nearly impossible to do), a woman is
given seventy-four lashes. See id. at 78. Each year, thousands of women are imprisoned or
otherwise penalized for not wearing full hejab. See id. at 57-58, 70-71. On the other hand, a
number of Iranian women claim that "Westerners put too much emphasis on Islamic dress,
which many women find liberating." Kim Murphy, Victims or Victors? Women in Iran Make
Gains but Must Endure Restraints Some Find Intolerable, L.A. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at El.
333. Cf Wing, supra note 126 passim (discussing women's role in other Islamic coun-
tries and methods of reform within the Islamic tradition).
334. The extent to which those rights were fully implemented is in some dispute. See
Miller, supra note 165, at 823 n.239.
335. See Graves, supra note 105, at 74 (citing Tamilla F. Ghodsi, Tying a Slipknot.:
Temporary Marriage in Iran, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 645, 658 (1994)).
336. See id. (citing Ghodsi, supra note 335, at 658).
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entered the legal system as judges and lawyers.3 After Khomeini came
into power, all of these rights and protections disappeared, except the
right to vote.33 Today, women in Iran are highly marginalized and op-
pressed by Western standards. 39
Although it is commonly known that women experience de facto
oppression under the law in Iran, the letter of the law is much more am-
biguous, especially in light of the large number of conflicting
constitutional provisions concerning the proper role of women in Iranian
society. For example, the preamble notes that the constitutional "view of
the family unit delivers woman from being regarded as an object or as
an instrument in the service of promoting consumerism and exploita-
tion."' At first glance this provision seems to indicate that women are
337. See id.
338. See id. at 58, 77-81 (citing AZAR TABARI & NAHID YEGANEH, IN THE SHADOW OF
ISLAM: THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN IRAN 26 (1982)); Miller, supra note 165, at 783. How-
ever, few women today exercise their right to vote independently; it is more likely that a
woman votes for the candidate her husband or male guardian selects. See Graves, supra note
105, at 65.
339. This is not to say that there is not a significant number of women who support the
Iranian system. Many Iranian women believe that the State's restrictions are part of their
religious duty and that religiously based gender roles free both men and women to fulfill
their obligations to Allah properly. See Graves, supra note 105, at 83 n.214 (noting reasons
why women adopt fundamentalist Islamic beliefs).
Nevertheless, some do oppose current Iranian policy toward women, although there are
few active feminists in Iran since the laws restricting women's lives and actions effectively
prevent feminist discourse. See id. at 65. Those women in Iran who do consider themselves
feminists often have different goals than feminists in the West; rather than having gender
equality as one of their uppermost goals, Iranian feminists focus on the right to mahr (a bride
price similar to dowry) and rights regarding divorce, as these two issues contribute most to
women's disempowerment and low quality of life in Iranian society. See id. at 67-68.
340. IRAN CONST. preamble. In accordance with this interpretation of Islamic culture,
Iranian women have reportedly been prohibited from entering 62 of 124 scientific profes-
sions and from sitting on the bench. See Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 333 n.97 (citing
Final Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 37, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1993/41 (1993));
see also Graves, supra note 105, at 77 (stating that after Khomeini came into power, all fe-
male judges were fired and told to find clerical positions) (citing TABARI & YEGANEH, supra
note 338, at 15). As one of former President Rafsanjani's advisors stated, "we don't want
women to work in factories .... We want them to have a job that matches their personality,
like doctors, cultural work, or work in education." Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 333 &
n.97 (quoting Annika Savill, Sisters of the Veil, THE INDEPENDENT (London), June 7, 1992,
at 12).
Some people see certain liberalizing trends in Iran that give women hope that they will
again be able to find employment in their chosen fields. For example, the State is now en-
couraging women to attend universities and is lifting restrictions that had previously
prevented women from working in areas such as engineering. See Katayon Ghazi, Iran Woos
its Women with Reforms and Rights, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 3, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter Ghazi,
Iran Woos]. Women may even become assistant judges under the current regime. See id.;
Wright, Islam Rising, supra note 166. This may have less to do with an ideological shift than
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to be free to do what they wish with their lives, but it can also be con-
strued as excluding women from functioning in the workplace and as
reinforcing their roles as wives and mothers. 4 ' Indeed, although the
Constitution pays lip service to the notion that "[a]ll citizens of the
country, both men and women, equally enjoy the protection of the law
and enjoy all human, political, economic, social, and cultural rights,"
such rights are to be exercised "in conformity with Islamic criteria."'342 It
is this express limitation, "in conformity with Islamic criteria" that in-
validates much of the progressive language of the Constitution.'4
There are other constitutional provisions that include Islamic quali-
fiers permitting arbitrary and/or discriminatory treatment of dissenting
or minority groups. For example, "[e]veryone has the right to choose
any occupation he wishes, if it is not contrary to Islam and the public
interests, and does not infringe the rights of others."' " Similarly, "[n]o
one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way injurious to others or det-
rimental to public interests."' 5 Since equality for women under the law
can be, and often is, viewed by Iran's Islamic government as injurious to
individual men, individual women, and public (Islamic) interests,
with recent downturns in the Iranian economy that have required women to return to work to
help support their families, however. See Iran Women Challenging Their Status, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 24, 1992, § IA, at 22 [hereinafter Iran Women].
341. This attitude is similar to that taken by the United States Supreme Court early in
the twentieth century, when the Court adopted a protectionist stance towards women in the
workplace. See generally Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1916); Muller v. Oregon, 208
U.S. 412 (1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In some regards, this might be
termed Iran's first line of defense against modernism and industrialization, issues which the
West began to resolve much earlier in the century.
342. IRAN CONST. art. 20. Even with this constitutional protection ostensibly entitling
them to equal pay and benefits under the law, women must endure constant discrimination in
the workplace. See Katayon Ghazi, A Voice For Change: High-Ranking Official in Iran
Works to Break Gender Barriers, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1992, available in 1992 WL 4541951
[hereinafter Ghazi, Voice for Change] (noting reality of life for women in Iran does not live
up to state's guarantees for financial and professional independence for women); Iran
Women, supra note 340 (discussing that female employees can expect to receive twenty-five
percent less in annual bonuses than male colleagues).
343. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 81, at 87; Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 316.
344. IRAN CONST. art. 28 (emphasis added); see also id. art. 22 (noting the "occupation
of the individual [is] inviolate, except in cases sanctioned by law"). Statistics on the actual
number of women in the Iranian work force vary widely. For example, in April 1992, one
journalist reported that women's only real suitable environment was the home and that
women held only five percent of all professional jobs and only twelve percent of all jobs in
the civil service. See Iran Women, supra note 340. On the other hand, another journalist
reported a month later that women made up thirty-five percent of the workforce. See Murphy,
supra note 332. These reports demonstrate the difficulty in obtaining reliable data out of
country that has little reason to be truthful to Western media.
345. IRAN CONST. art. 40.
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women can easily be prohibited from a variety of occupations and ac-
tivities.o
"Islamic criteria""7 are dictated, in large part, by the religio-legal
edicts found in the Quran. Although the Quran was originally a progres-
sive document that expanded the rights of women, it has been
interpreted, over time, much more restrictively! 4 In addition, the Iranian
emphasis on a traditional, literal interpretation of religious law prevents
the introduction of any modem influences that might expand women's
opportunities.', 9
Therefore, when the State promises to "ensure the rights of women
in all respects" (albeit only to the extent that those rights conform with
"Islamic criteria"),35° it is not undertaking to provide those types of pro-
tections that are commonly recognized in the West. In fact, the
distinctiveness of the Iranian approach is most obvious in the provision
that requires the State to "create a favourable environment for the
growth of woman's personality and the restoration of her rights." 3 ' By
346. Some would argue that it is a form of cultural imperialism to impose Western val-
ues regarding women's rights on a non-Western society. See Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at
330. While respect for other nations' societal norms is certainly laudatory, cultural relativism
should not be used to justify discrimination and oppression. See id. at 331; see also Wing,
supra note 126, at 155, 164-98 (arguing that reforming existing legal structures to address
the situation of Palestinian women must account for cultural norms in Palestinian society).
To do so would preclude any reform anywhere, since change always alters the cultural status
quo. In addition, every right that is now commonly accepted in the West was once contrary to
prevailing societal norms, showing how people's attitudes can change over time. See Miller,
supra note 165, at 823.
347. IRAN CONST. art. 20.
348. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 164-67; Graves, supra note 105, at 73-77; Wing,
supra note 126, at 157-63 (discussing interpretations of the Quran by different schools of
Islamic thought).
349. For example, although it is not mentioned in the Constitution, women must still
obtain the consent of their husbands or other male guardians in order to undertake any form
of employment. See Graves, supra note 105, at 89 (quoting Fact Sheet, Status of Women in
Iran, COMMITrEE FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO IRANIAN REFUGEES QUARTERLY
REPORT (International Campaign in Defense of Iranian Women's Rights 1996); Howland,
supra note 332, at 310; Murphy, supra note 332. Women have not only been limited in their
ability to seek employment; Quranic injunctions regarding public decency and the role of
women has also led the State to prohibit Iranian women from participating in international
athletic events in order to avoid appearing in public with bare arms and legs. See MUNSON,
supra note 73, at 109; Abdo, supra note 332 (noting that because they must wear hejab,
Iranian women can compete only in chess, equestrian sports, skiing, shooting, and games for
the handicapped). However, despite these difficulties, a recent Majlis had seventeen women
members-approximately the same proportion as the U.K. House of Commons at about the
same time. See Edward Mortimer, The Satanic Dialogue, FIN. TIMES, May 21, 1997, at 28;
see also Murphy, supra note 332 (citing number of women candidates in Iran's 1992 election
and noting that the previous Majlis had sat more women than were in the U.S. Senate).
350. IRAN CONST. art. 21.
351. Id.
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all accounts, Iran believes that it has complied with this directive, even
though most outside observers would argue that women's rights have
been curtailed rather than restored in post-revolutionary Iran. Similarly,
by guaranteeing to protect "mothers, particularly during pregnancy and
childrearing" and glorifying women who fought in the revolution while
simultaneously emphasizing their roles as child-bearers and child-
rearers, 352 the Constitution demonstrates the Iranian perspective that
women's roles are different than men's, and what Westerners may see as
inequality and subservience is merely the natural, divinely ordained or-
dering of society.
53
Some people may find it odd that the drafters felt compelled to in-
clude protective language in the Constitution if they never intended to
protect women's rights, at least in the sense commonly accepted by the
international community, but the existence of these provisions may pro-
vide a useful insight into the Iranian mindset. Because women cannot
rely on these provisions to change their status within the State (at least
not yet), it can be assumed that Iran used this language either (i) to
practice taqiyeh, or (ii) to show that it was as progressive and human
rights-minded as any other civilized nation.'" This second theory sug-
gests that Iran may be more vulnerable to international opinion than
commonly suspected, and may give human rights workers cause to hope
that their efforts to cure rights violations in Iran will have some effect.
In addition to the above mentioned general provisions, women's
rights are also affected by the availability of divorce, and, as is to be
suspected, the law of divorce in Iran is heavily male-oriented. 355 Ac-
cording to the Quran, men can divorce their wives at will by simply
stating "I divorce you" three times. 5 ' Although men now must obtain
judicial decrees of divorce rather than simply relying on verbal declara-
352. Id.; see id. preamble.
353. IRAN CONST. art. 21. See id. preamble; HiRo, supra note 74, at 202; see also
Graves, supra note 105, at 77, 79-80 (discussing Khomeini's vision of Iranian women as
"Muslim housewives" and his belief that their ultimate goal and purpose should be to bear
sons who would carry out the goals of the revolution).
354. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 388 (stating that Iranians want to be recognized
and respected as an ancient, cultured civilization).
355. Although the shah's secular family courts were disbanded soon after the revolution
and replaced with shari'a courts headed by Islamic theologians rather than trained jurists,
see Graves, supra note 105, at 78, the Majlis passed a law in 1992 requiring divorces to be
governed by civil, rather than purely religious, law and insisting that divorces be formalized
through civil courts. See Wright, Islam Rising, supra note 166 (noting that statute was
adapted from European law, not the shari'a).
356. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 169-70.
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tions, divorce is still relatively easy for a man to obtain.57 Women, on
the other hand, find it much more difficult to extricate themselves from
a troubled marriage and can obtain a divorce only with their husband's
consent or, in limited circumstances, through a court order 8 Following
a divorce, a woman must wait three to twelve months before remarrying,
but a man may remarry immediately.359
It is just not the difficulties and inequities inherent in obtaining a di-
vorce that create hardships for women; it is also the economic
vulnerability that follows a divorce.W If a bride is entitled to mahr, a
type of bride price or dowry, she can recoup that sum upon divorce."'
However, not every woman is entitled to mahr, and those who are not
have no bargaining chips in the marriage and can be easily evicted from
their homes by their husbands, with no rights to any marital assets or to
custody of their children above a certain age.362 Although divorced
women have apparently gained the right to recover the value of their
labor during their marriage, it is not clear whether a nation that values
its women for their roles as homemakers and mothers will reward those
roles with large monetary sums in cases of divorce.363 Without an ade-
357. See generally Wright, Islam Rising, supra note 166 (discussing new divorce laws
in Iran).
358. See AN-NA'IM, supra note 81, at 90; Graves, supra note 105, at 69; see also
Ghazi, Voice for Change, supra note 342 (describing conditions in which courts will grant a
woman's request for divorce); Iranian Law Gives Women Property Rights in Divorce, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 20, 1994, § 1, at 35 [hereinafter Iranian Law] (noting divorce is husband's right
under Iranian law). However, the State has apparently begun to encourage the use of prenup-
tial contracts that allow women to initiate divorce proceedings. See Ghazi, Iran Woos, supra
note 340. These prenuptial contracts are also intended to guarantee women some financial
security in case of divorce, although very few successfully do so. See Ghazi, Voice for
Change, supra note 342.
359. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 169-70. This double standard has been justified
by the need to establish paternity. See id.
360. See id. at 170.
361. See Graves, supra note 105, at 67-68 (citing Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Women, Marriage
and the Law in Post-Revolutionary Iran, in WOMEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST: PERCEPTIONS,
REALITIES AND STRUGGLES FOR LIBERATION, 59, 68-80 (Haleh Afshar ed., 1993)). Some-
times the threat of a wife claiming her mahr is enough to make a husband think twice before
pursuing a divorce, since the mahr is often more than a man can easily raise. See id. (citing
Mir-Hosseini, supra). Alternatively, if a woman wants out of an unhappy marriage, she can
release her husband from his obligation to pay her mahr as the "price" of divorce. See id. at
68 (citing Mir-Hosseini, supra).
362. See id. at 69 (citing Mir-Hosseini, supra note 361, at 67). Fathers in Iran have the
right to absolute custody of their sons above the age of two and daughters above the age of
seven. See id. (citing Mir-Hosseini, supra note 361, at 67). Women may only retain custody
if the husband has no living male relatives old enough to assume custody. See id. at 69 n.87
(citing Mir-Hosseini, supra note 361, at 67).
363. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 368; Wright, Islam Rising, supra note 166
(reporting that the judiciary has upheld the law compensating women for labor during mar-
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quate education and barred from a number of occupations, many di-
vorced women must resort to becoming temporary wives under the
Islamic doctrine of mut'a.3"
As is to be expected in a nation where women have little control
over their own lives, abortion in Iran is illegal, although some sources
say that illegal abortions are easily obtained." Contraception, on the
other hand, is legal, though not always widely available, and is encour-
aged by a government that must deal with the strain from the high birth
rates of the 1980s .
Children's rights in Iran are also heavily influenced by Islamic law
and tradition. As in Israel, children themselves appear to have no legally
recognized rights. Instead, the Quran and the State devolve the ultimate
responsibility for childrearing on the father by giving him absolute cus-
tody of children over a certain age.3 67 The State will only award
"guardianship of children to worthy mothers, in order to protect the in-
terests of the children.' '68 In practice, mothers are never given custody of
their children. 69
Finally, homosexuals in Iran are not given any protections by the
State and, in fact, can be executed under Islamic law. 70 Some homo-
sexuals have sought asylum in other countries in order to avoid
persecution at the hands of Iranian authorities.37'
riage); see also Iranian Law, supra note 358 (noting that although monetary awards will be
decided on a case-by-case basis, women could be given up to half the property gained during
marriage).
364. See Graves, supra note 105, at 69 & n.86 (citing Mir-Hosseini, supra note 361, at
67), 81-82; Iran Women, supra note 340.
365. See Murphy, supra note 332. State officials also claim that an abortion can be ob-
tained if the life of the mother is at risk. See Robert Fisk, Iran Surprises the West with
Liberal Line on Birth Control, THE INDEPENDENT (London), Sept. 14, 1994, at 11.
366. See Murphy, supra note 332; see also Ed Blanche, Despite Radicals' Grumblings,
Iran Intensifies Birth-Control Program, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1990, at A5 (stating Khameni
declared that "birth control is not un-Islamic"). But see Howland, supra note 332, at 313
n.187 (indicating that at least in some Islamic countries, husbands may enjoin a wife's use of
contraception).
367. See RUTHvEN, supra note 73, at 165-72; supra note 362.
368. IRAN CONST. art. 21(5) (emphasis added).
369. See Ghazi, Voice for Change, supra note 342; Iran Women, supra note 340.




Law and Religion in Israel and Iran
D. Education
1. Israel
Many devout persons feel that one of the most important contribu-
tors to the success and survival of their religion is the ability to educate
their children in the way they feel is best. 72 In Israel, that sentiment is
reflected in the Status Quo Agreement, which guarantees the continua-
tion of the religious educational system as it existed during the time of
the British mandate.373 In accordance with that agreement, the new state
set up a dual educational system in 1948 that included both secular and
religious schools. 74
Currently, all schools in Israel receive state funding, regardless of
religious affiliation."5 There is little opposition to this practice; instead,
most of the controversy concerning education in Israel centers on the
level of state involvement in religious schools, i.e., whether and to what
extent the State should have some supervisory power over religious
schools.7
As in other areas of Israeli life, discrimination in the schools is
much more likely to be leveled against non-religious or non-Orthodox
Jews than against other religious groups, again due to the disproportion-
ate power of the Orthodox in government and their determination to
shape the culture of the Jewish community in Israel.377 Even the secular
schools are not completely secular, since religion is taught as part of the
regular curriculum. 7 ' Although this approach may sound novel to U.S.
citizens who are more familiar with battles being over whether religion
is permitted in state-run schools at all, the Israeli approach is consistent
372. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 21; see
also McNulty, supra note 62 (discussing different educational priorities of religious and
secular Israelis).
373. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 32.
374. See id. at 32-36.
375. See id. at 21-22 (defining lack of discrimination between Jewish, Muslim, and
Christian schools as "institutionalized pluralism").
376. See id. at 22; Genut, supra note 60, at 2154 (highlighting the controversy as de-
lineated in LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLrICS, supra note 62, at 22, and
Norman L. Cantor, Religion and State in Israel and the United States, 8 TEL AvIv U. STUD.
L. 185, 207, 217 (1988)).
377. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62, at 19.
However, in a blow to the powerful Orthodox minority, Jewish schools have been ordered by
the Education Minister to teach Conservative and Reform Judaism in addition to Orthodox
Judaism. See Israeli Schools Deal Orthodox a Setback, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1994, § 1, at 14.
378. See LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, RELIGION AND POLmCS, supra note 62, at 21. But
see McNulty, supra note 62 (describing religious parties' goal is to have secular schools
teach Jewish philosophy).
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with that of some other countries. 79 However, segregation of students by
religious affiliation often alienates the groups even further and increases
the probability of animosity and violence between them. °
Although "separate but equal" may prevail in Israel's primary and
secondary schools, things are very different at the university level. De-
spite the fact that all universities in Israel are private, they are forbidden
by law from discriminating in the admissions process on the basis of
"race, sex, religion, national origin or social status."3 ' Nevertheless, Ar-
abs are regularly excluded from certain faculties based on concerns
about national security.8 2 Although this may appear to be a race-based
distinction, it is also a religious distinction since virtually all Arabs are
non-Jews. In addition, financial aid for Arab university students is se-
verely limited, since non-Jews are ineligible for scholarships granted by
the Office of Absorption of the Jewish Agency (a pseudo-governmental
agency) and for most private scholarships, which usually require prior
service in the Israel Defense Force. 3 Although loans and grants are
available to veterans or residents of "development towns" or "renewal
neighborhoods," these definitions exclude virtually all non-Jews from
qualifying for student funding. s' This type of approach perpetuates the
marginalization of non-Jews in Israel, since, without a higher education,
it becomes increasingly difficult for persons of minority religions to
move into positions of power that would allow them to peacefully
change discriminatory practices.
2. Iran
As in Israel, religion in Iran is part and parcel of the state-controlled
schools. 5 However, unlike the Israeli system, the Iranian education
379. See, e.g., Strong, Christian Constitutions, supra note 265, at 42-43 (discussing
sectarian educational system in Ireland).
380. See id. at 53-54; James F. Clarity, At Lunch, Belfast Women Talk of a Hunger for
Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1996, at A10 (highlighting that nonsectarian schools might
create a more cohesive society in Northern Ireland). This dynamic was also evidenced in the
U.S. and South African school systems prior to racial desegregation. See Strong, Christian
Constitutions, supra note 265, at 54; Suzanne Daley, South African School Battle Now a War
of Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at A10 (noting how integrated education has been
hailed in South Africa as the key to achieving racial equality).
381. Quigley, supra note 70, at 247 (quoting Council for Higher Education




385. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 336. Private schools are banned in Iran, but par-
ents have launched alternative "non-profit" schools that now provide ten percent of primary
education in the State. See Wright, Revolution Unravels, supra note 167.
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system considers devotion to the state religion to be perhaps the highest
job qualification possible and requires teachers to demonstrate their pi-
ety in order to obtain employment."" Despite this bias toward Islamic
education, however, officially recognized religious minorities are free to
educate their children in accordance with their religious beliefs . 7
The Constitution grants all children the right to an education
through high school, but the fact that schools are segregated by gender
leads to serious questions about whether the schools are, in fact, sepa-
rate but equal.8 This concern is increased by virtue of the fact that
married women have no right to an education above primary school, a
legal quirk that can severely hinder a girl's ability to become educated,
since the average age of marriage for females in Iran is twelve to thir-
teen. 89 Even if a woman can obtain her father's or husband's permission
to obtain an education, she is often reviled by a society that equates
higher learning in a woman with the secular West and considers such
learning both unneeded and unwanted in an Islamic regime.,9 However,
the recent easing of restrictions on the types of education available to
women has increased women's freedom slightly.91
Although many Iranian universities were closed immediately after
the revolution, they have reopened and are experiencing rising atten-
dance, although they are not quite what they used to be.392 For example,
the curriculum of the schools at both the lower and university levels has
been revised to give predominance to religion and the revolution,393
and it has taken a number of years for women's attendance to reach
386. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 336.
387. See IRAN CONST. arts. 12-13.
388. See id. art. 30. Some commentators have noted that the enrollment of girls is
nearly as high as that of boys, at least in primary school. See Scheherazade Daneshkhu,
Birth-Rate Successes Moderate Iran's Stance, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at 4.
389. See Graves, supra note 105, at 65 n.49 (citing Jacquiline Rudolph Touba, Effects
of the Islamic Revolution on Women and the Family in Iran, in WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN
IRAN 131, 142 (1985)); Howland, supra note 332, at 307 n.158. Still, commentators have
recognized that literacy rates for both males and females have increased, even in the post-
revolutionary era. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 368; Daneshkhu, supra note 388 (quoting
literacy rate as seventy-four percent).
390. See Graves, supra note 105, at 65 & n.50 (citing Steven E. Coleman, Survey of Re-
cent Developments in Third Circuit Law: Immigration Law, in 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1722,
1726 (1994)).
391. See Ghazi, Iran Woos, supra note 340.
392. See FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, IRAN: A COUNTRY
STuDY 131-32 (Helen Chapin Metz ed., 1989); Wright, Revolution Unravels, supra note
167.
393. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 336.
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pre-revolutionary levels.3' In addition, academic freedoms have de-
creased greatly, with government informants on the lookout to root out
and punish un-Islamic thoughts among students and faculty.3" Profes-
sors must demonstrate the proper ideological outlook, namely
dedication to Islam, in order to retain their positions,3" and applicants to
the universities must pass a character test to be sure that they support
government ideology' 9'
III. THE EFFECTS OF INSERTING RELIGIOUS PRINCIPLES
INTO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The Effect of Religio-Legal Unity on Human Rights
As discussed above, both Israel and Iran expressly incorporate re-
ligion and religious principles into their constitutional and fundamental
laws. Although this approach may seem problematic to those who are
used to strict separation of church and state, religio-legal unity was once
the political norm throughout the civilized world and has been sup-
ported by many esteemed philosophers throughout the centuries. 98 The
close identification of law and religion was especially common in the
Middle East prior to the colonization of the region by European powers
and the concomitant imposition of post-Enlightenment values and po-
litical theory on previously Islamic states.
The apparent simplicity of a unified religio-legal system is decep-
tively attractive, particularly in a world that is increasingly complex and
in a region where religion has traditionally been linked with the State.
Typically, those who support the unification of religion and state believe
it is the only logical solution to the political and religious problems cre-
ated by a secular system in which both the State and God demand
394. In 1978, Tehran University was forty-three percent women. See Graves, supra note
105, at 75. In 1995, women reportedly constituted forty percent of university students. See
Ghazi, Iran Woos, supra note 340; see also Murphy, supra note 332 (claiming women out-
number men in Iranian universities).
395. See Miller, supra note 165, at 819-20.
396. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 336-37. This "outlook" is demonstrated through
several years' cooperation with the government prior to being granted tenure. See Miller,
supra note 165, at 820.
397. See Miller, supra note 165, at 820.
398. See, e.g., THOMAS AQUINAS, The Summa of Theology, in ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
ON POLITICS AND ETmICS 61 (Paul E. Sigmund trans. & ed., 1988); THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 230, 268, 332-34, 366, 371-72, 399 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1985); ST.
AUGUSTINE, THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 192-93, 196-99, 202-04 (Henry Paolucci ed., 1962).
399. See RUTHVEN, supra note 73, at 292; Mayer, Islam and the State, supra note 80, at
1025-26.
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perfect and total allegiance.40 For example, these people claim that be-
cause religions such as Judaism and Islam do not differentiate between
matters of spiritual and temporal concern, there will be times when it is
impossible to be fully obedient to a State that does not incorporate re-
ligious values into its laws.4' Therefore, they conclude that classical
liberalism is wrong to separate religion from the affairs of the State.40
Nevertheless, despite the problems inherent in a secular political
model, separation of religion and state has become the norm for many
Western nations and has its supporters in other regions of the world.4
3
Separatism's popularity is largely due to an increased recognition of
various human rights, including the right to religious liberty. Although
some commentators see no logical inconsistency between the establish-
ment of religion and freedom of religion,4 others believe complete
separation is the only method by which religious freedom can be fully
enjoyed.4 Despite differences in the way various nations approach re-
ligious rights, however, virtually every culture views those rights as
important in some way.4O6
400. See, e.g., Rousseau, supra note 191, at 169. Cf. John F Wilson, Church and State
in America, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, 97, 102-03 (Robert S. Alley ed.,
1985) (defining three models of church-state relations). Many people fail to recognize, how-
ever, that combining spiritual and temporal authority in a single entity does not eliminate all
disputes about what religio-moral code should be imposed on society; even theocratic or
theonomous States must resolve the differences of opinion raised by divergent theological
approaches to law and religion.
401. See Schwarzschild, supra note 12, at 909 (arguing that the Enlightenment could
only occur in a Christian state). This argument ignores the fact that both Judaism and Islam
have created theologically acceptable systems for living under secular rule.
402. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION passim (1993); RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS,
THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA passim (1986); Laura
Underkuffler-Freund, The Separation of the Religious and the Secular: A Foundational
Challenge to First Amendment Theory, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 837, 839-40 (1995).
403. See, e.g., MACKEY, supra note 91, at 376 (discussing work of Abdul Karim
Soroush); Arzt, Religious Freedom, supra note 235, at 61 (noting "Halakah is not incom-
patible with liberalism").
404. See G.W. Hogan, Law and Religion: Church-State Relations in Ireland From Inde-
pendence to the Present Day, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 47, 73-74 (1987); see also Steven D.
Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 308 (1990) (discussing tolerance
in liberal and pre-liberal societies). This approach often relies on toleration of the non-
established faiths, which both Israel and Iran claim they do.
405. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 4, at 197-98.
406. For a discussion of the dispute as to whether human rights, including religious
rights, are universal or merely culturally relevant, see Michael C. Davis, Chinese Perspec-
tives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 2, at 3, 7-8;
Eliza Lee, Human Rights and Non-Western Values, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE
VALUES, supra note 2, at 72, 74-76; Loh, supra note 2, at 155 (noting that if cultural rela-
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One way of gauging the importance of religious rights is to look at
the increased attention given to such rights by the international commu-
nity. While a State's religio-political regime was once considered a
subject of solely domestic concern,' today there are numerous interna-
tional conventions that address the subject of religious liberties, and
various States, including the United States, are beginning to look at re-
ligious persecution as an area of growing international concern.'
Within the context of the current discussion, international conven-
tions on religious and other rights are important in two ways. First,
States are expressly bound to uphold the provisions of any convention or
declaration that they have ratified. Second, whether or not they are
binding on any one particular country, international human rights in-
struments identify principles that the international community believes
worthy of protection. Since one purpose of this article is to discover
whether and to what extent violations of religious rights lead to violence
within and between societies, it will be helpful to discuss certain inter-
national instruments that Israel and Iran have not signed or ratified, not
to argue that either of the two nations is bound by the principles con-
tained in those documents, but to see the extent to which their domestic
practices deviate from accepted norms and what effect that has on vio-
lence in each society.
Most current formulations of international human rights are based
on an individual system of rights.' However, because both Israel and
Iran have adopted a group rights theory of government, it will also be
important to analyze whether group rights theory is consistent with or
contrary to the existing religious rights regimes. If the two approaches
conflict, there may be problems with domestic enforcement of conven-
tion obligations.
1. International Human Rights Law
The concept of international human rights as a protectible interest
was not recognized until the twentieth century, when the United Nations
(UN) became the primary catalyst for official recognition of these
tivism is to be taken to its logical extreme, then even the most "despicable acts" must be
condoned); Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 309-20.
407. See Eric Kolodner, Comment, Religious Rights in China: A Comparison of Inter-
national Human Rights Law and Chinese Domestic Legislation, 12 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J.
407,407-09 (1994).
408. See id. at 409-14; see also Erlanger, supra note 5 (examining report commis-
sioned by congress to study the incidence of religious persecution in various nations).
409. See Vincent, supra note 1, at 253-61 (commenting on claims to rights made by in-
dividuals and by entities other than individuals).
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rights.4 ' 0 Although religious freedom had been supported by political
theorists since the eighteenth century, it was very difficult for individu-
als living under an oppressive regime to enforce their rights, and
dissidents had few options other than emigration. Today, internationally
binding instruments provide for individual relief as well as international
sanctions upon countries that violate those provisions.1 ' Smaller blocs
• 411
of nations have also created regional human rights conventions.
a. Rights under the International Bill of Rights
One of the first instruments promulgated by the UN after its crea-
tion was the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration). 43 The Universal Declaration is a comprehensive document
that enumerates a variety of rights and protections, including an explicit
protection of the freedom of religious belief.414 Many of these rights are
protected under similar language in two other fundamental UN docu-
ments, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
410. Because both Israel and Iran are members of the United Nations, they must com-
ply with the human rights provisions of the UN Charter. See Loh, supra note 2, at 149; see
also Proclamation of Independence, 1948, 1 L.S.I. 3, 4 (1948) (declaring Israel will comply
with principles in UN Charter).
411. See Kolodner, supra note 407, at 410-14.
412. See, e.g., Bangkok Declaration (1993), reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE
VALUES, supra note 2, at 205; The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.157/PC135 (1992), reprinted in TWENTY-FOUR HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENTS 180
(Center for the Study of Human Rights, Columbia University ed., 1992); Banjul Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982); The
1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(and accompanying protocols), Nov. 4, 1950, reprinted in MARK W. JANIS Er AL., EUROPEAN
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS, apps. A-B. The Cairo Declaration, which has
met with little support outside of Iran and Saudi Arabia, is not considered binding law, but is
indicative of the Iranian approach toward human rights. See Arzt, Religious Human Rights,
supra note 218, at 143.
413. See Universal Declaration, supra note 256. Some have argued that Iran must com-
ply with the principles set forth in the Universal Declaration by virtue of the fact that
portions of the Universal Declaration have become customary law. See Loh, supra note 2, at
149; Miller, supra note 165, at 780 n.6, 791-92; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT];
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, art. 38. Others argue that Iran is bound
by the Universal Declaration by virtue of its voting in favor of the Universal Declaration in
the General Assembly in 1948. See Miller, supra note 165, at 791. As a party, Israel is bound
by the provisions of the Universal Declaration.
414. Interestingly, the preamble itself notes that the violation of these rights can lead,
"as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny" thus recognizing the causal link between hu-
man rights violations and violence within or between societies. Universal Declaration, supra
note 256, preamble.
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Rights (ICESCR) 4' and the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (ICCPR).1 6 Together these three instruments constitute the
International Bill of Rights;17 because both Israel and Iran have ratified
the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the Universal Declaration, they are bound
by the principles contained within those intruments.
The first mention of religion in the Universal Declaration appears in
Article 2, which states: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such
as ... religion. '41' This basic concept, which is also protected by the two
convenants419 and is known as the principle of nondiscrimination, has
been described in equal protection terms. Interestingly, these provisions
do not explicitly state whether the signatory nation only needs to avoid
discrimination by public institutions or whether the State must also
eliminate private discrimination.4 '20 However, neither Israel nor Iran has
effectively complied with the principle on nondiscrimination on either
the public or private level, despite the fact that their fundamental or con-
stitutional laws contain language prohibiting discrimination based on
religion.
An example of Israel and Iran's failure to comply with the nondis-
crimination principle is that in both countries access to higher education
is dependent on a student's religion. In Israel, the discriminatory action
is disguised as a national security issue in order to bar entry to certain
faculties; it may also be disguised as financial support of Jewish settlers
415. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A, U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6136 (1966) [hereinafter
ICESCRI.
416. See ICCPR, supra note 256.
417. See 31 I.L.M. 997 (1992) (noting Israel's ratification of the ICESCR and ICCPR
on October 3, 1991); Graves, supra note 105, at 87-88 (noting Iran's ratification of ICESCR
and ICCPR) (citing Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, The Rights of Women and International
Law in the Muslim Context, 9 WHrrrIER L. REv. 491, 503-04 (1994)). These are nearly the
only international human rights instruments acceded to by Iran. See id.
418. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 2; see also id. art. 7 (entitling all peo-
ple "to equal protection of the law"). This echoes one of the express purposes of the United
Nations, as stated in the Charter: to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to ... religion." UN
CHARTER art. 55; see also id. art. 1 (declaring the United Nations' purpose is to promote
"fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to ... religion"); Howland, supra note
332, at 327-28 (describing States' human rights obligations under the Charter).
419. See ICCPR, supra note 256, arts. 2(1), 4(1), 18; ICESCR, supra note 415, art.
2(2). Notably, Islamic alternatives to existing human rights conventions generally do not
provide for either religious freedom or equal protection under the law for women and relig-
ious minorities. See Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 329-35 (discussing, inter alia, the
Cairo Declaration).
420. The applicability of international law to private action has recently become a topic
of scholarly discussion. See CLAPHAM, supra note 2, at 89-133.
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or veterans. In Iran, discrimination in education is somewhat more sub-
tle, as the State obstructs entrance to higher education only if the
applicant has an improper ideological outlook; however, since "deviant"
religious beliefs such as Baha'ism or atheism would, in all likelihood,
be considered ideologically improper, Iran also violates the principle of
religious nondiscrimination.
The most specific provision regarding religion in the Universal
Declaration provides:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
teaching, practice, worship and observance.42'
Both Israel and Iran claim to comply with this aspect of the Universal
Declaration in that they protect freedom of conscience and religion, but
both have certain problems in the implementation of that right. Israel is
certainly the more compliant of the two nations, in that people are not
persecuted for their religious beliefs and are, for the most part, free to
practice their religion openly. This is even true of Reform or Conserva-
tive Jews, who are generally not forbidden to perform their religious
rites.4' However, the State does impose certain purely religious obliga-
tions on non-believers, as in the case of Jewish marriage and divorce.
This problem of affirmatively requiring non-believers to undertake re-
ligious acts is not explicitly addressed in any of the three instruments,
421. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 18; see ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 18
(providing the same rights); Sullivan, supra note 299, at 493-94 (discussing types of coer-
cion prohibited under Article 18(2) of the ICCPR).
422. Although the requirement that Conservative and Reform Jews comply with Ortho-
dox rituals regarding marriage and divorce might be considered a violation of Article 18 of
the Universal Declaration, it might pass muster if one considers Orthodox marriage require-
ments to be akin to civil marriage requirements. This second interpretation is bolstered by
the fact that the State does not prohibit Conservative and Reform Jews from undergoing
marriage rituals that accord with their own religious rites.
One exception to the general rule of free exercise of religion in Israel concerns women
who want to sing or pray publicly at the Western Wall. Orthodox Jews oppose this practice
strenuously and sometimes attack women who engage in this sort of religiously objection-
able behavior. The State is currently trying to find ways to protect Reform Jews' free exercise
of religion while respecting Orthodox Jews' claim that they are religiously offended by hav-
ing to witness such practices. This raises serious questions of whose rights should prevail:
those of the person whose sensibilities are offended by witnessing the sinfulness of others or
those of the person whose religious rights would be curtailed by limiting the practice. This
problem also exemplifies the classic dilemma of identifying what actions are public versus
what actions are private. See S.I. Strong, Romer v. Evans and the Permissibility of Morality
Legislation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) [hereinafter Strong, Morality Legislation].
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but arguably falls within the ambit of Article 18 of the Universal Decla-
ration, since one can seldom freely practice one religion while being
forced to comply with another faith's religious obligations. 23 Another
potential problem is raised by the Israeli Supreme Court's protecting
religious minorities' right to do that which is religiously required but
restricting that which is religiously permitted,24 which could be consid-
ered a violation of a person's right to exercise fully all aspects of his or
her religion.
As discussed above, Iranians do not have the right to practice relig-
ion freely, notwithstanding explicit constitutional protections to that
effect.42' For example, Baha'is are openly persecuted for holding certain
religious beliefs, and Muslims can be executed or otherwise penalized
for renouncing their faith. Obviously, both of these practices violate the
Universal Declaration.
It is unclear whether the protection of belief in the Universal Decla-
ration includes non-belief as well, as it does in U.S. law.26 In Israel, one
is permitted to choose one's religion or even to repudiate all religions,
although this right is somewhat limited in practice since all persons,
including professed atheists, must have at least a nominal religious af-
filiation in order to fully exercise certain fundamental freedoms such as
the right to marry and found a family.4" In Iran, the issue of whether the
State will protect non-belief is rather interesting, since it seems as if
religious minorities can reject all religions while those within the relig-
ious majority cannot. For example, under Articles 14, 23, and 137 of the
Iranian Constitution, religious minorities are apparently free to renounce
423. However, Israel has never claimed that requiring non-Orthodox Jews to comply
with the Halacha is intended to coerce religious belief, which may save the law requiring all
marriages to comply with Orthodox religious rituals from violating the Universal Declara-
tion. See H.C. 72/62, Rufeisen v. Minister of the Interior, 16(4) P.D. 2428 ("Our State is
based upon freedom of conscience and therefore no Jew may be compelled to declare him-
self an adherent of the doctrines of the Jewish faith when he is a non-believer."), quoted in
Arzt, Religious Freedom, supra note 235, at 56; cf. West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943) ("It is also to be noted that the compulsory flag salute
and pledge requires affirmation of belief and an attitude of mind. It is not clear whether the
regulation contemplates that pupils forego any contrary convictions of their own and become
unwilling converts to the prescribed ceremony or whether it will be acceptable if they simu-
late assent by words without belief and by a gesture barren of meaning.").
424. See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing prohibitions on polyg-
amy).
425. See supra notes 277-84 and accompanying text.
426. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985) ("[T]he Court has unambigu-
ously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected by the First Amendment
embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all."); Howland, supra note 332, at
342 (suggesting the right to non-belief is of equal status with the right to religious belief).
427. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 320; supra note 299.
(Vol. 19:109
Law and Religion in Israel and Iran
their faith and take up another religion or none at all; Muslims, on the
other hand, cannot rely on these provisions, since in rejecting Islam they
would be guilty of apostasy.
Together, Articles 2 and 18 of the Universal Declaration demon-
strate those concepts that have most concerned religious rights activists
over the years: (i) the principle of nondiscrimination on the basis of re-
ligion; (ii) the protection of religious belief (i.e., thought or conscience);
and (iii) the protection of specific external practices directly related to
religion (i.e., teaching, practice, or worship)."' Although neither Israel
nor Iran fully complies with these three principles at present, that is not
to say that they cannot do so within the context of a religiously estab-
lished State.42 The goal of religio-legal reformers, therefore, need not
necessarily be to advocate the complete elimination of religion and re-
ligious principles in the laws of Israel and Iran, since that appears to be
both jurisprudentially unnecessary and practically impossible given the
history and culture of the two nations. Instead, the aim should be to find
ways to work within the existing system to (i) adequately protect the
rights of all citizens, be they members of the majority religion, a minor-
ity religion, ' or secularist; and (ii) limit religiously inspired violence
within and between societies.
However, perhaps the biggest problem in Israel and Iran is not their
lack of compliance with the three basic tenets of religious rights; it is
the danger that by incorporating religious values into the law of the
State, the two nations may violate certain fundamental non-religious
rights in addition to religious rights. International instruments have at-
tempted to protect these other types of rights through specific
guarantees such as the Universal Declaration's and ICCPR's provisions
concerning the rights of the family, including the right "to marry and to
found a family."431 In language reminiscent of the Iranian Constitution,
both documents state in essence that "[t]he family is the natural and
428. There has traditionally been a difference between freedom of belief, which is
given absolute protection, and the freedom to exercise or practice a religion, which can be
restricted to give effect to other societal concerns. See Sullivan, supra note 299, at 492-93.
429. Great Britain, for example, is generally considered to comply with these three
fundamental principles, despite its being an established state. See generally Howland, supra
note 332, at 330 n.259 (citing a 1960 study indicating form of church-state relations has no
causal relation to violations of religious rights); Sullivan, supra note 299, at 490.
430. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 179 (noting minority religious groups are
concerned about two potential problems: that the majority religious group will engage in
preferential treatment of persons of the majority faith, and that the majority religious group
will force minorities to submit to religiously based laws).
431. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 16(1); see ICCPR, supra note 256, art.
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fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by soci-
ety and the State."'432 While these provisions may seem innocuous on
their face, in practice they can be more harmful than helpful. For exam-
ple, Iran has used similar language to define "family" in accordance
with majority religious principles, 33 which has effectively barred the
formation of anything other than patriarchal family units and has given
credence to the notion that women's proper place is in the home, not the
workplace.
While Israel's approach to founding a family is not as explicit as
that of Iran because of the absence of a written constitution, Israel also
violates the fundamental right to marry and found a family by allowing
religious principles to dictate proper procedure in the State. Because
religious communities are given exclusive jurisdiction over marriage
and divorce in Israel, one cannot marry without complying with some
type of religious law; this violates the right of non-believers and unrec-
ognized religious minorities to marry without submitting to religious
rites in which they do not believe. Israelis' right to found a family is also
limited, at least within the Jewish community, by virtue of the fact that
any children from a marriage not conducted in accordance with Ortho-
dox rites (be it performed in Israel or abroad) are considered mamzerim
and are prejudiced in who they will later be allowed to marry.
Protection of the family is a laudatory goal of any society; however,
a narrow definition may transform a provision that is meant to be pro-
tective into one that is, in effect, punitive. Without the incorporation of a
more expansive definition of "family," it is perhaps better to delete all
references to the family in a constitutional or international human rights
document. It is particularly dangerous to tie protection of the family to a
religious ideal, since those ideals are, by definition, immutable and un-
able to be adapted to suit the needs of the present era. If references to
the family must be made, better language is found in the ICESCR,
which grants "[t]he widest possible protection and assistance ... to the
family."40 This language would protect families formed not only in ac-
cordance with majority religious principles, but those that met similar
but less stringent standards. 33
432. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 16(3); see IRAN CONST. preamble, art.
21(3); ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 23.
433. See IRAN CONsr. art. 10 (noting State is to safeguard family "on the basis of the
law and the ethics of Islam").
434. ICESCR, supra note 415, art. 10(1).
435. For example, a "family" could consist of a legally recognized homosexual union,
an interfaith couple, or a single parent. Israel is more progressive in this respect than is Iran,
in that Israel has begun to grant some protection to homosexual unions and recognizes that
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The Universal Declaration also states that "[m]otherhood and child-
hood are entitled to special care and assistance."'36 Although a
seemingly innocent provision, this can be interpreted in a paternalistic
manner and limit choices available to women. This has been the case in
Iran, which has a similar provision in its Constitution.37 In many ways,
it seems odd to establish a distinct right to protect mothers and children
and, to a Westerner, somewhat limiting in that it pigeonholes women
into reproductive roles. This has certainly been the case in Iran. The
need for basic protection, however, may exist in those parts of the world
where women are held in such universal disregard that recognition of
their importance as mothers is actually a step forward. Nevertheless, a
better formulation is one that encourages similar protections while rec-
ognizing that "working mothers should be accorded paid leave or leave
with adequate social security benefits. '438 This type of provision ensures
protection of women as mothers, but also recognizes the need of most
women to work outside the home while simultaneously caring for their
families.439
Certainly women in Israel have need for this latter type of protection
since they are full (or nearly full) participants in both the Israeli
workplace and military. Although equality between the genders has not
been completely established, due more to cultural barriers than legal
ones, Israel is by most accounts extremely progressive in the area of
women's rights. Iran, on the other hand, is not, despite the fact that hard
economic conditions are forcing more women into the workplace to
women and men should have equal rights to custody of their children after divorce or the
death of one spouse.
The argument against state recognition of these sorts of non-traditional families is that it
defames and disrupts "normal" heterosexual marriages, thus destroying the moral fabric of
society. See Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homo-
sexuality, 106 YALE L.J. 2475, 2497-2501 (1997); Adam Clymer, Bitter Debate, Then A Vote
For Rejecting Same-Sex Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1996, at A18. However, there is no
proof to support the truth of such claims. See, e.g., West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641-42 (1943) (holding that the state cannot compel school children
to recite the Pledge of Allegiance on First Amendment grounds) ("[W]e apply the limitations
of the Constitution with no fear that the freedom to be intellectually and spiritually diverse or
even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.... [F]reedom to differ is not limited
to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.");
FEINBERG, supra note 292, at 136.
436. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 25(2).
437. See IRAN CONST. art. 21(2) (stating one goal of the nation is "the protection of
mothers, particularly during pregnancy and childrearing, and the protection of children with-
out guardians").
438. ICESCR, supra note 415, art. 10(2).
439. The only way to improve such a provision would be to grant similar protections to
fathers for paternity leave.
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help support their families. Providing these women with paid leave
and/or State benefits would actually support the Iranian goal of
preserving and protecting the family while simultaneously avoiding
undue hardship on working women and their families.
All three instruments reflect the importance of education. For ex-
ample, the Universal Declaration and the ICESCR both recognize a
personal right to education as well as a parental right to "ensure the re-
ligious and moral education of their children in conformity with their
own convictions." 0 Unfortunately, this second clause creates problems
for both Israel and Iran, despite the fact that both States explicitly rec-
ognize parents' right to give their children a religious education.4' The
difficulties arise as a result of both States' not officially recognizing and,
indeed, severely burdening certain minority religions.
For example, in Israel, Reform and Conservative Jews may find it
difficult to convince their children that their faith is religiously valid
when the State, as embodied by the rabbinical courts and municipal re-
ligious councils, only legitimizes Orthodox Judaism. Although dissident
parents are always concerned that state-supported belief patterns may
prove more forceful than their own teaching,442 the situation is height-
ened in Israel, since non-Orthodox Jews must face the reality that their
children will not be fully protected by the law when they grow up, espe-
cially with respect to marriage and divorce. In addition, non-Jewish
parents are also burdened by the knowledge that their children may not
be able to obtain a university education in Israel because of restrictions
on entry to certain faculties.
The situation in Iran is both more obvious and more dangerous.
Baha'i parents must be concerned about the effects of raising their chil-
dren in their faith, since they know that their children will be persecuted
and perhaps killed for their religious beliefs. While other non-Shi'a par-
ents do not face the same level of concern, they must worry about
whether their religious beliefs constitute some sort of ideological im-
propriety such that their children will be denied entry to a university.
The existence of these burdens, and in some cases threats, in Israeli
and Iranian law and society raises the question of whether parents
should be given the absolute right to raise their children in a minority
440. ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 18(4); ICESCR, supra note 393, art. 13(3); see Uni-
versal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 26(3).
441. In Iran, this protection is included in the Constitution, while in Israel it is con-
tained within the Status Quo Agreement.
442. For example, some parents in the United States argue that the allegedly strict
secularism of the State infringes on their religious beliefs and their ability to raise their chil-
dren as they wish.
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religion that can pose significant obstacles to the child's well-being or
whether children should, at some point, be permitted to choose their
own religion. The latter approach appears to make sense if one focuses
on the child's right to life, education, and religious belief. However, it
can also have the effect of encouraging States to increase the social and
economic burdens placed on minority religions as a way of convincing
children to reject their parents' teachings and join the majority religion.
This should obviously not be allowed, since parents within minority re-
ligious groups are precisely the ones who are most in need of state
protection. There is therefore an unresolved tension between a parental
right to instill children with the parent's religious values and a child's
right to choose his or her own religion.
The ICESCR attempts to address this problem in its provisions con-
cerning education by placing an affirmative burden on the State to
provide an "education [that] shall enable all persons to participate ef-
fectively in a free society, [and] promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all ... religious groups."" 3 The state-provided educa-
tion must also "strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms."4" At the same time, the ICESCR permits parents to "ensure
the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with
their own convictions.""' 5 This approach recognizes the legitimate con-
cerns of parents who practice a minority religion by not only giving
them the right to educate their children in accordance with their own
religious beliefs, but also by limiting the State's ability to indoctrinate
children in a public education system. Although there are some parents
whose religions oppose "understanding, tolerance and friendship among
all ... religious groups, '"6 as a matter of public policy it is unwise to
permit schools to espouse anything other than understanding and toler-
ance, especially in a religiously or racially pluralistic state. Although
some parents' religious rights could be somewhat curtailed under this
provision, at least to the extent that their religion advocated intolerance
of other religious groups, this approach is jurisprudentially acceptable in
the way it limits the State's ability either to promote interreligious
prejudice and discrimination through the school curricula or to dis-
criminate on the basis of religion by making higher education available
only to one religious group.
443. ICESCR, supra note 415, art. 13(1); see also ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 20(2)
("Any advocacy of... religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility
or violence shall be prohibited by law.").
444. ICESCR, supra note 415, art. 13(1).
445. Id. art. 13(3).
446. Id. art. 13(1).
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In looking at the two nations under review, it appears that Israel's
system of publicly supported sectarian schools allows parents virtually
free rein in educating their children in accordance with their religious
beliefs but creates a society in which religious differences are empha-
sized rather than minimized. Many believe that "understanding,
tolerance and friendship" 7 are better taught in an integrated educational
framework, and separating children into different groups, be they based
on race, religion, gender, or some other characteristic, only increases the
possibility of conflict between those groups. 8 Similarly, Israel's univer-
sity system violates the ICESCR by limiting non-Jews' ability to enroll
and study all subjects freely.
Although Iran also fails to provide equal access to higher education
and thereby violates the ICESCR, a more troubling aspect of the Iranian
educational system may be its emphasis on religion and the revolution
in the primary school curriculum. This sort of indoctrination is suspect
because it can very easily minimize understanding and tolerance of
other religious groups. In addition, to the extent that women's opportu-
nities for education are limited, Iran also fails to "enable all persons to
participate effectively in a free society."" 9
According to the above analysis, both Israel and Iran are having dif-
ficulties living up to their obligations under international law due, in
large part, to the manner in which they have chosen to incorporate re-
ligious principles into the law of the State. Nevertheless, both nations
may attempt to argue that they have complied with the provisions found
in the Universal Declaration, the ICESCR, and the ICCPR because none
of the above-mentioned rights is absolute; in fact, all of these rights are
expressly made conditional. For example, the Universal Declaration
states: "In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject ... [to] the just requirements of morality."450 Even the manifes-
tation of religion is subject under the ICCPR "to such limitations as...
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
447. Id.
448. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 59, 75; Clarity, supra note 380 (noting nonsec-
tarian schools might create a more cohesive society in Northern Ireland). For example, in the
United States, the segregation of races proved to perpetuate racial inequality and racial ten-
sion. Although integration in U.S. public schools has been difficult at times, it has
undoubtedly succeeded in creating a more equitable society. In South Africa, integrated
education has also been hailed as the key to achieving racial equality. See Daley, supra note
380.
449. ICESCR, supra note 415, art. 13(1).
450. Universal Declaration, supra note 256, art. 29(2).
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fundamental rights and freedoms of others."45' Although conditional
rights can be jurisprudentially troublesome because such rights are often
illusory and permit the State to justify otherwise illegitimate acts merely
to support the status quo,452 the language does exist in each of these
documents.
If Israel and Iran attempt to argue that they, need not change their
religio-legal regimes in order to comply with their international
obligations, they are most likely to do so under the public morality
exception. Essentially, the argument is that because both States are
founded on religious principles and traditions and both equate state or
public morality with the morality of their majority religions, they may
legitimately refuse to implement measures that limit the free and full
expression of majority religio-legal principles. If minority rights are
detrimentally affected by this approach, such infringements are
necessary to uphold public (i.e., religious) morality and are therefore
appropriate.
Despite the apparent rationality of this argument, it cannot with-
stand closer scrutiny. For example, if highly restrictive religio-legal
regimes such as Israel and Iran are allowed to insulate themselves from
compliance with their international obligations merely by claiming that
public morality is, in their eyes, the same as religious morality, then in-
ternational instruments protecting minority religions have no teeth
whatsoever. The practice of minority religions cannot be limited by the
morality of others, for to do so destroys the basic premise of religious
rights, which is that minority religions are most in need of protection
when they are most unlike majority practices.453 This is especially true in
regions where religion has political overtones, since in such cases there
451. ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 18(3); see also id. art. 19 (granting freedom of ex-
pression but limiting it under a "public health or morals" clause).
452. See Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 319. However, these limitations cannot be
exercised as freely as it may initially seem, at least under the ICCPR, since the Siracusa
Principles, which elucidate the ways in which the implementation of the ICCPR may be
limited, only allow limitations based on morals to be imposed if "the limitation in question is
essential to the maintenance of respect for fundamental values of the community." The Sira-
cusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/1985/4, Annex para. 27 [hereinafter Siracusa
Principles]; see Chase, supra note 165, at 416 & n.172 (stating Siracusa Principles permit
derogations only if they are "(1) in accordance with the law; (2) in the interest of a legitimate
objective of general interest; (3) strictly necessary in a democratic society; (4) imposed with-
out a less intrusive means available; and (5) not imposed arbitrarily"). Nevertheless, these
guidelines are problematic due to their subjectivity, especially since the Siracusa Principles
recognize that "public morality varies over time and from one culture to another." Siracusa
Principles, supra, para. 27.
453. See Strong, Christian Constitutions, supra note 265, at 54-55.
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is even more incentive for the State to suppress non-majority religions.!54
Although there are situations where limitations on free exercise of re-
ligion are warranted,55 such limitations should be carefully scrutinized
before they are implemented.
One aspect of the ICCPR that may benefit religious minorities is its
limitation on the manifestation of religion if and when such practices
infringe on the human rights or fundamental freedoms of others.45 This
provision is extremely important, as it provides a jurisprudentially le-
gitimate basis for restricting the majority's ability to impose religious or
religiously influenced laws on minority populations.57 For example, a
law that required one type of prayer in school would violate the rights of
atheist children or those who pray differently. Laws barring marriages
between certain persons on religious grounds would violate a person's
right to found a family. Laws "protecting" women from working in cer-
tain fields would violate economic freedoms requiring equal rights
between the genders.45' If one reads these instruments as requiring an
analysis of how the State's implementation of majority religious princi-
ples affects the fundamental freedoms of other persons, then both Israel
and Iran must reconsider how they approach law and religion, since both
currently curtail minorities' fundamental freedoms in order to give ef-
fect to the religious tenets of the party in power.
b. Rights under the Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief
The most recent UN resolution regarding religious rights is the
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief (Declaration on
Discrimination).45 Intended to complement, rather than usurp, earlier
454. See Mayer, Clash, supra note 332, at 334.
455. For example, some religious practices do, in fact, pose a threat to public safety, as
would be the case with involuntary human sacrifice.
456. ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 18(3). The prohibition on infringement of others' fun-
damental freedoms includes protection of the right to marry and found a family, to work, to
control one's body, etc. It is also possible to use this provision to regulate religio-political
hate groups that encourage violence between religious groups, since such practices violate,
inter alia, others' right to life. See Howland, supra note 332, at 332 (describing human rights
and fundamental rights and freedoms in context of UN Charter).
457. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 197 & n.9.
458. See ICCPR, supra note 256, arts. 16, 26; ICESCR, supra note 415, arts. 3, 6, 7.
459. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36155, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 171,
U.N. Doc. A/36/51 (1981) [hereinafter Declaration on Discrimination]; see Sullivan, supra
note 299, at 488 & n.4 (noting Declaration "lacks ... the nature of an international agree-
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conventions concerning religious liberties,6° the Declaration on Dis-
crimination reinforces common elements such as the freedom of
religion."'
However, the protections stated in the Declaration on Discrimina-
tion are more specific than they are elsewhere.4 For example,
discrimination based on religion is specifically prohibited and defined in
Article 2, and, like the ICCPR, focuses on the nullification of other per-
sons' human rights and fundamental freedoms.463 By focusing on effect
rather than intent, the Declaration on Discrimination addresses those
types of discrimination that are deeply ingrained in cultural or socio-
economic institutions."4 Unfortunately, these rights are subject to a
limitation based on public safety and morals, as they are in the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights."5 Nevertheless, all States are admonished to "take
effective measures to prevent and eliminate discrimination on the
grounds of religion or belief' and are instructed to "enact or rescind
legislation where necessary." '  This affirmative duty to act is unique
among the religious rights documents but has not resulted in widespread
change.
The Declaration states that parents have the right to raise their
children in accordance with their religious beliefs, although the
practices of that religion or belief "must not be injurious" to the child's
"physical or mental health." ' 7 However, nowhere in the Declaration on
ment" but is "regarded throughout the world as articulating the fundamental rights of free-
dom of religion and belief' and implies "obligations of conduct") (quoting U.N. Doc.
EICN.4119881441Add. 2, at 1; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/26, at 48-49).
460. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, art. 8.
461. See id. art. l.
462. See id. art. 6.
463. See id. art. 2(2) ("'[I]ntolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief'
means any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief and
having as its purpose or as its effect nullification or impairment of the recognition, enjoy-
ment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.").
464. See Sullivan, supra note 299, at 502.
465. See Declaration of Discrimination, supra note 459, art. 1(3). There is no provision
allowing derogation on the grounds of national security, precisely because such language
would allow restrictions of religious freedoms based on a classification of religious activity
as political activity. See Sullivan, supra note 299, at 499-500. However, the same effect may
be brought about under the public safety exception. See id.
466. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, art. 4; see also id. art. 7 ("The
rights and freedoms set forth in the present Declaration shall be accorded in national legisla-
tion in such a manner that everyone shall be able to avail himself of such rights and freedoms
in practice."). Although neither "religion" nor "belief' is defined, the travaux prdparatoires
indicate that non-theistic and atheistic beliefs are covered by the Declaration on Discrimina-
tion. See Sullivan, supra note 299, at 491.
467. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, art. 5. Interestingly, Baha'i parents
could be said to endanger their children's health and economic prospects by raising them as
Baha'i in. Iran. This argument would appear, at first glance, to support a claim that Baha'i
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Discrimination are children of any age given the right to choose their
own religion or reject that of their parents.4"
Some of the most interesting language in the Declaration on Dis-
crimination is found in the preamble, which explicitly links violations of
religious rights and societal violence. For example, the preamble notes
that "disregard and infringement of... the right to freedom of ... re-
ligion or whatever belief, have brought, directly or indirectly, wars and
great suffering to mankind."' Conversely, "freedom of religion or belief
should ... contribute to the attainment of the goals of world peace."470
The Declaration also notes that "manifestations of intolerance and ...
discrimination in matters of religion or belief [are] still in evidence in
some areas of the world," and considers it:
essential to promote understanding, tolerance and respect in
matters relating to freedom of religion or belief and to ensure
that the use of religion or belief for ends inconsistent with the
Charter, other relevant instruments of the United Nations and
the purposes and principles of the present Declaration is inad-
missible."
While both Israel and Iran claim to have complied with the more
technical aspects of the Declaration on Discrimination and other UN
documents in that both would argue that they provide equal protection
and treatment of all religions (albeit in the context of religiously estab-
lished states), neither nation has completely eliminated those provisions
which have "as [their] purpose or as [their] effect nullification or im-
pairment of the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of human rights and
fundamental freedoms on an equal basis.4 72 In fact, as has been dis-
cussed above, there is ample 'evidence that both nations have violated
the principles of the Declaration on Discrimination, but because the
parents should not be permitted full exercise of their right to raise their children in the Baha'i
faith. However, because it is the State's impermissible actions, i.e., religious persecution, that
constitute the danger to Baha'is, rather than some inherently dangerous religious practice,
the endangerment argument is unavailing.
468. See generally id.; Sullivan, supra note 299, at 513-14. Austria is apparently one of
the few nations that has expressly addressed the right of children to choose their own relig-
ion. See id. at 514 n. 119. For an interesting discussion of the rights of children in the context
of religion, see Dwyer, supra note 317 passim.
469. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, preamble; see also Universal
Declaration, supra note 256, preamble (stating violations of religious rights can lead, "as a
last resort, to rebellion against tyranny"). One commentator has noted that religious violence
occurs most often in those regions that have had the most difficult time accepting or defining
a secular nation-state. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 34.
470. Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, pmbl.
471. Id.
472. Id. art. 2.
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Declaration on Discrimination is not binding law, neither Israel nor Iran
can be penalized for non-compliance. However, if there is a causal link
between violations of religious rights and violence, as suggested by the
Declaration's preamble, one would expect that the two nations would be
experiencing a certain level of religiously inspired violence-something
that has, in fact, occurred, as shall be discussed below.
c. Rights under other International Instruments
In addition to the International Bill of Rights and the more specific
Declaration on Discrimination, there are other international documents
that suggest certain problems with Israel's and Iran's system of laws.
The most interesting of these is the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Apartheid
Convention).4 7
3
Although defining apartheid can be difficult, some commentators
classify it as a "set of practices of domination and subjection, intensely
hierarchized and sustained by the whole apparatus of the state, which
affects the distribution of all values.", 74 The Apartheid Convention itself
defines apartheid as consisting of any one of an enumerated list of
"inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintain-
ing domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial
group of persons and systematically oppressing them."4 ' Those acts in-
clude the murder of members of a racial group or the infliction of
serious bodily or mental harm upon them; arbitrary arrest or imprison-
ment; imposition of conditions intended to cause the complete or partial
physical destruction of a certain racial group or the inability of such
group to participate in the political, social, economic, or cultural life of
the State; measures that physically segregate a racial group; expropria-
tion of the land of a racial group; subjecting a racial group to forced
labor; and the persecution of persons who oppose apartheid.474 Case law
of the International Court of Justice indicates that apartheid cannot be
473. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243, 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974) [hereinafter Apartheid
Convention]. Although the Apartheid Convention has won wide approval, neither Israel nor
Iran is a party. See id.; Quigley, supra note 70, at 223 n.13.
474. MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY 523 (1980).
475. Apartheid Convention, supra note 473, art. 2.
476. See id.; Quigley, supra note 70, at 223-24.
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justified on the basis of religious beliefs, no matter how sincerely
held.4'n
Although the Apartheid Convention focuses on racial discrimina-
tion, it could be equally applicable to religious discrimination,
especially if race and religion are linked as they are in both Israel and
Iran. 78 For example, Jews are often considered to be a separate racial
group, 479 which has led some commentators to argue that Israel institu-
tionalizes apartheid by defining itself as the State of a single racial
group, thereby excluding all others by necessity.4° Because Israel has a
Jewish-Arab racial dichotomy that parallels, for the most part, the Jew-
ish-gentile dichotomy, laws favoring Jews or discriminating against non-
Jews may be in violation of the Apartheid Convention and other inter-
national instruments prohibiting racial discrimination..4 " For example,
Arabs, and, to a lesser extent, non-Orthodox Jews in Israel are unable to
participate fully in the political and/or cultural life of the State, which is
controlled almost exclusively by the Orthodox. This appears to be a
prohibited act under the Apartheid Convention and therefore raises the
question of whether Israel is practicing religious apartheid.
The case in Iran is less clear, but still appears problematic. Because
the modem nation of Iran lies within the boundaries of the ancient land
of Persia, most Iranians are of Persian rather than Arabic ancestry.4"2
This distinction is paralleled in the religious realm by the fact that virtu-
ally all Iranians are Shi'a Muslims, while the vast majority of Arabs are
477. See Howland, supra note 332, at 347-49 (discussing Afrikaners' religious argu-
ments in favor of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia).
478. See id. at 345 n.317; Sullivan, supra note 299, at 508 (describing instances when
race and religion overlap). Race and religion are treated virtually identically in such
authoritative texts as the UN Charter and the Restatement on Foreign Relations. See U.N.
CHARTER arts. 1, 13, 55; RESTATEMENT, supra note 413, § 702 cmt. j; Howland, supra note
332, at 335 n.275.
479. See Genut, supra note 60, 2126 n.42 (quoting Arthur Koestler, A Valedictory Mes-
sage to the Jewish People, reprinted in PAUL MENDES-FLOHR & JEHUDA REINHARZ, THE
JEW IN THE MODERN WORLD 243-45 (1980)). Others believe Jews are not so much a sepa-
rate race but a separate religious or cultural group. See CHARLES S. LIEBMAN & ELIEZER
DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION IN ISRAEL: TRADITIONAL JUDAISM AND POLITICAL CULTURE
IN THE JEWISH STATE 15 (1983) [hereinafter LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA, CIVIL RELIGION]. For
purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to note that many Arabs consider Israeli Jews to
be a racially distinct group, and that Israeli Jews consider themselves racially different than
Arabs. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 224-26.
480. See Quigley, supra note 70, at 228.
481. Compare id. passim (arguing that Israeli law constitutes a system of apartheid)
with Treitel, supra note 63, at 407 (stating "[t]here has been no attempt to ... alienate
[Israeli Arabs] from their nationality, or to deny them the right to develop their culture, re-
ligious practice or language"). But see id. at 416 (noting Israeli Arabs' "countrymen are not
their people; their people are not their countrymen").
482. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 2.
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Sunni Muslims.43 Therefore, laws that exclude non-Shi'as from Iranian
political or cultural life could be said to constitute religio-racial dis-
crimination that might rise to the level of religious apartheid.4
Certainly the genocide practiced on the Baha'i constitutes a prohibited
act under the Apartheid Convention, since it amounts to the systematic
oppression of a group based on a single trait.
2. Group Rights Theory
For the most part, the rights discussed above are based on an indi-
vidual rights framework that is consistent with the post-World War II
trend granting rights to individuals rather than groups.4 Recently, how-
ever, the UN has shifted its position and begun to recognize certain
rights regarding minority cultures, ' which may be more consistent with
the group rights system used in both Israel and Iran."7
Interestingly, minority groups do not appear to be the only ones
claiming collective rights at present; certain political majorities,
including religious nationalists, also support political models that
emphasize collective or group rights.4U Such is the case with both Israel
and Iran, neither of whom aspire to Western-style individualism and
instead rely on various group rights arguments to support their particular
type of religio-legal unity. For example, one way that these two nations
utilize group rights to justify the combination of law and religion is by
483. See id. at 2, 41, 53.
484. Although some provisions in the Iranian Constitution appear to favor Muslims in
general, thereby helping Iran avoid charges of religio-racial discrimination, these may be
implemented in an impermissible manner. For example, the requirement that the president be
possessed of a "convinced belief in the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic of
Iran" IRAN CONST. art. 115, effectively precludes Sunni Muslims from holding that office,
despite the fact other provisions merely require that the president "follo[w] the Prophet of
Islam." IRAN CONST. art. 121.
485. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3 (emphasizing rights "for all"); Will Kymlicka,
Introduction, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 292, at 1, 18. Prior to
World War II, rights theory focused on the protections owed by the State to minority groups
or cultures within the State. See Asbjern Eide, Minority Situations: In Search of Peaceful and
Constructive Solutions, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1311, 1319 (1991); Kolodner, supra note
407, at 409-10. But cf. Kymlicka, supra, at 4; see also Vernon Van Dyke, The Individual, the
State, and Ethnic Communities in Political Theory, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES,
supra note 292, at 31, 31-56.
486. See generally FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
BELONGING TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES, U.N. Sales
No. E.91.XIV.2 (1991); see also ICCPR, supra note 256, art. 27.
487. See Barak-Erez, supra note 64, at 348; Chase, supra note 165, at 389; Treitel, su-
pra note 63, at 407; see also Vincent, supra note 1, at 264-65 (describing Southern or
Islamic concept of rights, which emphasizes the collectivity over the individual).
488. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 197; Lee, supra note 406, at 80-84.
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arguing that concepts of religious liberty demand that people be allowed
to impose certain restrictions on society at large if their religion requires
them to do so. Because both Judaism and Islam ostensibly require
believers to be responsible not only for their own behavior but also for
the behavior of others,4 9 Israel and Iran can claim that their unified
approach to law and religion is necessary to give full effect to the
religious precepts of the party in power.
Notably, the right being claimed is the right to live in a community
that accords with religious principles. This is considered a group right
because it involves more than individual belief or action; it also takes
into account the relationships between people within the society and the
effect that one person's sinful actions has on others and on society as a
whole. Although this argument can be made in the context of an estab-
lished or disestablished State, it is obviously stronger in a society that
has based itself on theocratic or theonomous principles and is highly
compelling to those who recognize that religiously devout persons gen-
erally do not separate their religious obligations into the public and
private sphere.49
In addition to relying on the difficulties inherent in making a dis-
tinction between matters of public and matters of private concern,
advocates of a group rights based claim to unification of religion and
state also rely on the argument that no court, and indeed no entity, can
accurately differentiate between those religious claims that are true and
those that are not.49' Therefore, the State should not protect some relig-
489. In Judaism, believers are responsible for the behavior of other Jews, based on the
principle that the Jewish covenant with God is of a collective, rather than individual, nature.
Also, because redemption of individual Jews is delayed until the entire Jewish population is
redeemed, Jews as a group have an increased interest in other Jews' actions. The practice is
slightly different in Islamic societies, in that the obligation to create a good society has been
interpreted to require religious Muslims to compel both Muslims and non-Muslims to live in
accordance with Islamic criteria.
490. See Schwarzschild, supra note 12, at 909 (contending that the Enlightenment
could only have arisen in Christian states).
491. It is for this reason, among others, that some theorists have argued that matters of
religion must be removed from the political sphere. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE 212 (1971); Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Relig-
ious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011,
1012-20 (1986) (discussing theories of Rawls, Henkin, and Ackerman as proponents of a
separatist approach); David Hollenbach, Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil
Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877, 879 (1993); John Rawls, The Idea of an
Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1987). Not everyone views this
approach as universally necessary, however, or even as attainable in a practical sense. See
Greenawalt, supra, at 1060-64; Hollenbach, supra, at 880. Notably, the fact that a religion is
followed by a majority of a nation's population does not mean that it is correct; divine truth
exists completely separate of whether it is followed by one or one million.
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ious practices while denying protection to others. In order for the State
to truly respect religion, it must give effect to those principles that ad-
herents of the faith deem to be important, including the creation of a
religiously ordered society, or so the argument goes. The fact that the
Israeli Supreme Court claims to have been able to distinguish between
those religious practices that are fundamental to the faith and those that
are merely permissible492 is not persuasive to persons who have adopted
the above argument, both because it will not always be possible for the
courts to make such distinctions and because it is not seemly for the
State to involve itself in deciding religious dogma. Therefore, these re-
formers conclude, groups must be allowed to impose their religious
perspective on society.
Although this argument sounds persuasive, it only looks at the
problem from the majority viewpoint493 and fails to see the universality
of the claims it makes. For example, if these theorists are, in fact, cor-
rect that (i) a group's religious rights, including the right to create a
religiously ordered society, must be respected in toto, (ii) religiously
devout people should not be forced into making public-private distinc-
tions that are contrary to their world view, and (iii) no entity, including
the State, is able to differentiate between those religious claims that are
true and those that are false, then all religions, not just one, must be re-
spected and protected fully, equally, and simultaneously by the State.
There is no room in this scenario for selective enforcement of only one
set of religious principles; it must be all or nothing.
Setting aside the possibility that some religious precepts may be in
direct opposition to one another,44 the only way to fully respect all per-
sons' religious rights would be for the State to identify every religiously
492. See H.C. 49/54, Mulhem v. Qadi of Acco, 8 P.D. 910, cited in Treitel, supra note
63, at 423. Similarly, Israeli courts have also attempted to distinguish between different types
of violations of the Jewish Sabbath, which forbids work of all kinds. On the one hand, the
courts allow the state-run television to operate on Saturday, since religious Jews who object
to such practices cannot turn their televisions on to witness such sinfulness anyway. See Arzt,
Religious Freedom, supra note 235, at 30 (citing H.C. 287/69, Meron v. Minister of Labor,
24(1) P.D. 337). On the other hand, the State forbids non-Orthodox persons from driving on
streets adjacent to synagogues during times of prayer, since this intrudes upon Orthodox
Jews' ability to keep the Sabbath. See id. (citing H.C. 174/62, League for the Prevention of
Religious Coercion v. Jerusalem Council, 16(4) P.D. 2665). Some commentators claim that
in this line of cases the Supreme Court is "distinguishing between secular interference with
religious needs, which can be regulated, and mere secular offense to the religious, which
cannot." Id.
493. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 207 (discussing myopia of majority groups).
494. This would occur when religion A required its followers to undertake a certain
practice, while religion B required its followers to eliminate all instances of that practice in
society.
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mandated practice of every citizen within its borders and adopt a socio-
legal code that enforced the most stringent provisions possible among
these different choices. This would satisfy the person with the most re-
strictive religious tradition within the society and would presumably not
offend persons of other faiths, since their religious precepts would be
respected as lesser included restrictions within the greater restriction.4'"
Obviously, there are very few people who are willing to adopt this
sort of approach. Most would claim that being forced to live under
someone else's religio-moral code is a violation of their right, religious
or otherwise, to order their lives however they wish. In addition, such a
regime blatantly ignores the explicit limitations on religious practices
discussed above, i.e., that religious rights cannot be exercised in contra-
vention of others' fundamental freedoms.49 However, most people
(particularly those who are members of the majority religious group)
would argue that the above system gives too much weight to the opinion
of highly restrictive minority groups when, in a democratic state, any
religio-legal code should be structured in accordance with majority
rather than minority rule.497
Once this argument is made, however, the issue is no longer based
on purely religious concerns (i.e., all religious rights must be respected);
now the debate has imposed a balancing requirement and entered the
realm of political and legal theory. Under this approach, the majority is
given the right to decide what is socially appropriate for the nation and
to enact laws that will further those social ends.498 Obviously, in this
system some minorities will not be able to exercise fully their "right" to
impose their religious ideals on society. However, as long as the laws
495. Of course, this approach would violate secularists' right to live free from the re-
ligious obligations of others, but that would not be a problem to most religious activists,
according to one researcher who found that religious nationalists were willing to grant con-
cessions to persons of minority religious faiths but were not willing to grant the same
concessions to secularists, since they were considered "antireligion." JUERGENSMEYER, su-
pra note 5, at 186.
496. See Declaration on Discrimination, supra note 459, art. 1(3); ICCPR, supra note
256, art. 18(3); see also Sullivan, supra note 4, at 198 (discussing limits of religious rights).
497. Interestingly, this is precisely the argument that non-Orthodox Jews are making
with respect to the disproportionate power wielded in Israel by the Orthodox. Because Iran is
based on religious rather than political principles, there is less room to argue that democratic
ideals should prevail; however, the acceptance of pluralism within Islam and the simultane-
ous recognition of the importance of community consensus in matters of religion might
demonstrate an acceptance of majoritarian arguments in modem Iranian culture. In addition,
the Islamic Republic was established by referendum, the most democratic measure available
in a modem nation-state, thereby indicating that majoritarian demands played some role in
the creation of the Islamic state.
498. H.L.A. Hart called this concept "moral populism." H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND MORALrrY 79 (1963).
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created by the majority do not violate certain pre-established minority
rights (i.e., the right (i) to be free of any overt discrimination on the ba-
sis of religion; (ii) to hold any religious belief; and (iii) to practice
religion within certain boundaries created by the majority to protect
public health, safety, and morals), then proponents argue that the laws
are valid.
However, as has been discussed above, neither Israel nor Iran is able
to meet even these basic requirements under their existing religio-legal
regimes. Overt discrimination exists despite both nations' claims that
there can be separate but equal religio-legal systems within the State;
people are not permitted to hold any religious belief, at least not without
severe burdens being placed upon them; and certain minority religions
cannot practice their faith freely, since the party in power claims that
infringement is necessary to protect the morals of the State or the relig-
ious character of the nation.
Nevertheless, Israel and Iran both claim that the majoritarian ap-
proach to law and religion is necessary not only to give full effect to the
majority's right to practice its religion, but because the moral and relig-
ious sensibilities of their citizens are harmed by knowing that others are
acting in an immoral manner. Because the two nations are founded on
majority religious principles, they claim they have a special need and
obligation to protect these persons' right to be free from religious of-
fense.4'9 However, the States' argument makes no logical sense if it is
based on a general respect for religion qua religion, since they make no
attempt to ascertain whether the religion of the party in power is true or
better than other religions. If either State were to do so, it might justify
giving one religion full effect over all other faiths; as it stands, however,
the two States rely solely on a "might makes right" argument that can-
not prevail as a matter of religion or jurisprudence.5 ° In addition, by
only giving effect to the religious sensibilities and distress of followers
of one religion, Israel and Iran have created bifurcated societies in
which religious minorities are second-class citizens, unable to gain re-
spect for their beliefs and unable to dispute the religious or political
legitimacy of majority practices.
Those who support the majority's "right" to impose its religious
values on the nation attempt to bolster their position by pointing to mi-
499. In secular states, distress at the knowledge that others are acting immorally is not
actionable, since permitting such distress to provide the basis for the nation's laws would
negate the idea that individual liberty is a value to be protected. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra
note 292, at xix-xx; HART, supra note 498, at 4-5, 46-47.
500. See Strong, Morality Legislation, supra note 422 (arguing that morality cannot be
decided by mere political strength).
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nority groups that have been granted legal recognition for their religious
cultures as evidence that a religious culture is legally protectible. If mi-
nority groups are permitted to build and protect communities that
enforce their religious beliefs, majority religions should be allowed to
do the same, or so the argument goes. °'
However, this argument must also fail. Minority groups are given
special protection not because they are recognizable groups, but because
they are minority groups whose cultures and histories are distinct from
that of the majority. To grant the majority the right to create a religious
community would negate the minority's corresponding right to be free
of majority influence. In addition, minority rights theory states that in
order to have a legitimate subculture, dissenting members must be able
to escape the minority culture should they disagree with the prevailing
practices and beliefs.0 2 Because majorities cannot establish a realistic
opportunity for dissenters to exit the culture, majorities cannot rely on
minority group rights theory to create a homogenous religious society.
Even if the majority tried to provide dissenters with some method of
escape from the majority culture, such efforts would further divide the
nation by segregating it into discrete religious territories.' °' As proven
by the United States, South Africa, and Northern Ireland, segregated
societies are inherently unstable and invariably result in violence be-
tween groups.504
Under this analysis, there appears to be no jurisprudentially viable
approach based on group rights theory that will allow the State to im-
pose a single religious perspective on society. To some people, the only
alternative is secularism, which, as stated above, is not an option for
501. This argument points out a critical problem in minority rights theory. By accepting
the idea that a minority's religious culture should be sustained, society gives credence to
religious majorities' view that they can legitimately structure their society in accordance with
their religious beliefs. Similarly, allowing religious activists to incorporate some religious
principles into the law of the State may demonstrate that the State is not truly grounded on
religious principles, thus leading to a "more radical transformation of the political order or a
more than token intrusion of religion into public life." JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at
198.
502. See Sullivan, supra note 4, at 214 n.84; see also Green, supra note 292, at 264.
503. Some commentators believe that this has already happened in Israel, due to the
State's reinforcement of separate ethnic and religious identities rather than a single national
identity. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 122-23.
504. See also Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITY CULTURES, supra note 292, at 139, 148-53 (discussing problems with identifying
ethnic or other privileged groups).
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either Israel or Iran at this point. However, there may be another way to
protect minority rights without creating a purely secular state. °
As has been discussed above, it is jurisprudentially impermissible to
enforce only one group's religious principles, and it is impractical to
enforce fully all groups' religious rights simultaneously. However, it
might be possible to protect most persons' religious practices by en-
forcing only those religious edicts that are common to all or most
religions within the society. Notably, this approach does not attempt to
discern which religious practices are mandatory or which are true; the
only thing that matters is whether they are common to all (or virtually
all) groups in society. This approach recognizes the importance of all
religions equally, but realizes the impossibility of giving full effect to
any or all of them in a pluralist society. Instead, it recognizes and ac-
cepts the possibility of slight infringement on all persons' rights rather
than large infringements on the rights of some. Of course, this approach
would also have to make sure that the implementation of such laws did
not infringe on the fundamental freedoms or human rights of any per-
sons, as discussed above.
This approach can even take into account certain doctrinal elements
within the majority religion. For example, in Judaism, gentiles achieve
parity with Jews in God's eyes if they adhere to the seven laws of Noah;
these laws are common to all faiths that are offshoots of Judaism, in-
cluding Christianity, Islam, and probably the Druze religion, all of
which are recognized religions in Israel."" Therefore, Israel might im-
plement a system that only incorporated religion to the extent that it was
based on the seven laws of Noah.
A similar solution is possible in Islamic nations such as Iran. Ac-
cording to some Islamic commentators, there are two levels of Shari'a:
a generalized level of social mores that are incumbent on all persons,
regardless of their religious affiliation, and a more particularized level
that is only incumbent on Muslims.Y Like the seven laws of Noah, these
505. Some commentators argue that classical liberalism's support of strict secularism is
an impossible ideal and therefore advocate the return to a society in which the State protects
a single orthodox morality while tolerating dissenting or minority viewpoints. See Smith,
supra note 404, at 308. In this case, however, neither Israel nor Iran can rely on the principle
of toleration of minority groups as a way to avoid changing their religio-legal regime, since
minority faiths have not historically been tolerated by either State. Although it sounds like a
useful legal value, tolerance, without any legal protections to back it up, is virtually useless,
since it extends only as far as the party in power wishes.
506. See ARIEL, supra note 13, at 127-28. Very little is known about the Druze, as the
precepts of their faith are kept secret from virtually everyone, but as an offshoot of Islam it is
likely that they accept the teachings of Noah as valid. See EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 89.
507. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 182.
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more generalized laws are typical of what would be found in any civi-
lized nation.sca Under this sort of accommodationist approach, the State
could enforce only those principles that were common to most religions
within the State. Other, more stringent religious duties could be under-
taken as a matter of personal choice. If adopted, this approach might
resolve many of the problems associated with the imposition of relig-
ious law on minority groups.
Some people might argue that, while imposing the lower level of
obligation on minorities within the State might be appropriate, adher-
ents to the state religion should be held to the higher standard of
religious behavior. However, this approach would still result in unequal
protection of the laws based on religious affiliation. In addition, it
would, in all likelihood, require the State to impose duties on persons
who were nominally of the majority religion but who were non-
practicing or who were members of a minority denomination within the
faith. In creating a system that imposes only a single general level of
religiously based laws, the State is not prohibiting devout members of
society from following their own religious norms, at least to the extent
that those norms affect the behavior of the believer him or herself. The
only difference is that the religiously devout would not be permitted to
impose religiously coercive laws on those who would not otherwise live
in accordance with religious edicts.
A second alternative would be to create a system of law wherein
everyone was held to the same the generalized standard of behavior un-
less and until someone indicated a desire to be held to a more stringent
religious rule. This would be similar to the procedure under the Israeli
Women's Equal Rights Law, which allows women to choose whether to
proceed under civil or religious law with respect to certain matters."
However, such a system would have to institute the same protections
required under the Women's Equal Rights Law, namely giving people
the option of proceeding under civil or religious law, ensuring full dis-
closure as to the differences in treatment under the two systems, and
removing as many instruments of coercion, be they legal or social, as
possible.
508. See id. These rules may be similar to those precepts that H.L.A. Hart identified as
the "moral minimum" that was necessary to create a viable society. H.L.A. Hart, Social Soli-
darity and the Enforcement of Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 9 (1967); see also FEINBERO,
supra note 292, at 136 (noting people cannot live together without agreement, but arguing
that agreement on all things is not necessary).
509. See Women's Equal Rights Law, 1951, 5 L.S.I. 171 (1950-51).
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B. The Integration of Law and Religion and
Its Effect on Societal Violence
As the above discussion shows, religious rights are among the most
difficult types of rights to consider, even in theory; however, they are
even more troublesome in practice, especially when one considers the
possible correlation between violations of religious rights and inter- and
intra-societal violence. Although wars over what is the one true religion
are, for the most part, a thing of the past, people are still willing to fight
to protect their ability to live in accordance with the precepts of their
faith. The question for modem states is how to minimize the potential
for conflict while maximizing respect for individuals' religious rights.
Traditionally, religious violence took the form of repressed minori-
ties rebelling against state oppression,"' but today just as many religious
activists rebel against religio-political separatism as against religious
repression. 1' In these cases, violence occurs when religious activists
believe that it is their religious right and, indeed, their obligation to im-
pose their world view on society."' Although some conflicts can be
resolved through the political process, others cannot, especially when
activists view the State as promoting anti-religious ideals. 13
Religious rebels or reformers can have a variety of goals, ranging
from the complete overthrow of their own government, as was the case
in Iran in 1979,'1 to the imposition of retribution on dissidents in an ef-
fort both to penalize them and to teach them to mend their ways, as is
the case with certain religious vigilante groups in both Israel and Iran .
51
510. This was the concern of many Enlightenment philosophers. See Schwarzschild,
supra note 12, at 904-05.
511. See Underkuffier-Freund, supra note 402, at 839; see generally JUERGENSMEYER,
supra note 5.
512. See Rapoport, supra note 262, at 432. Activists often claim to be restoring social
harmony, but that is seldom the result. See id. at 440.
513. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 558-63; see also JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at
174 (noting irrelevance of usual means of political discourse in a religious state).
514. This has been called the "paradigmatic religious revolution," JUERGENSMEYER,
supra note 5, at 50. But cf. id. at 171 (noting that not all religious revolutionaries wish to
follow the Iranian model of government). The seeds of a similar revolutionary passion burn
in some Israelis who follow the views of Rabbi Meir Kahane, who advocated the creation of
a "truly" Jewish nation through the use of violence. See id. at 62-69.
515. For example, some ultra-Orthodox Jews will throw stones at cars passing through
their neighborhoods on the Sabbath or attack women who are praying in public. See Arzt,
Religious Freedom, supra note 235, at 10; Sprinzak, supra note 19, at 465 (indicating haredi
violence against individuals whom the Haredim consider non-observant). In Iran, much of
the violence is (or at least was) state-sponsored and includes executions as well as intermit-
tent and violent enforcement of codes of morality, especially against women and certain
religious minorities. See Graves, supra note 105, at 78 (collecting accounts of violence);
Keddie & Monian, supra note 141, at 523.
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Alternatively, the activists may be calling attention or attempting to in-
fluence state policy on certain discrete issues, as is the case of anti-
abortion terrorists in the U.S., or inciting religious revolution or reform
outside the activists' national borders, as is the case with Iranian support
of certain terrorist groups in Lebanon."' The violence can be offensive
or defensive, private or state-sponsored, and can involve violence
against members of other religions or against persons of the same
faith.5
17
The common perception is that including religious values in the law
of the State leads to a legitimization, express or implied, of religiously
based violence.518 It is certainly true that when politics adopt a religious
tone people become willing to die or kill over issues which in other so-
cieties would be accepted as mere political differences.519 In addition, by
inserting religion into the debate, compromise becomes impossible, as
any change of policy is equated with a change of religious doctrine, and
difficult political questions are swept away as something that must be
accepted on faith.
There are, however, a large number of nations that are not faced
with the problem of inserting religion into the public arena; it is already
there, and has been for decades or, in some cases, centuries. Such is the
case in both Israel and Iran, which have existed as either established or
semi-established states. In this type of situation, violence can occur if
the State moves too quickly to limit the amount of religion in the public
sphere, since religious activists see themselves as losing their "right" to
live in a religiously ordered society and react accordingly. The activists'
demands are often not based on any recognized interpretation of inter-
national law or group rights theory, since neither recognizes a "right" to
live in a religiously ordered society and/or impose one group's religious
standards on others. Nevertheless, in order to establish the legitimacy of
their actions and gain the support of others, religious rebels or reformers
must find some source of moral and/or legal authority.
Oddly enough, moral authority is relatively easy to establish. Ex-
perts in the area of peace and security have argued that violence is
perhaps one of the most compelling forces that a nonlegal entity can
possess and that religion can give moral legitimacy to violence.520 There-
516. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 560; Keddie & Monian, supra note 141, at 527.
517. See Rapoport, supra note 262 passim.
518. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 198.
519. See id. at 156; Rapoport, supra note 262, at 446 (stating that "[w]hen a religious
justification is offered for a cause which might otherwise be justified in political or economic
terms, the struggle is intensified and complicated enormously").
520. See JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 5, at 163, 167.
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fore, attaching religious values to what may primarily be a political
movement can actually increase the likelihood that violence will be
used.
Religious activists often find it more difficult to find acceptable le-
gal bases upon which to base their movements, both because the most
obvious source of legitimization (international or domestic law) is not
available and because the use of violence tends to suggest that the action
being taken is per se indefensible as a matter of law. However, religious
rights activists usually claim that their actions are based on one of three
rationales, two based on purely legal principles and one based on extra-
legal principles that allegedly supersede temporal law.
The first type of rationale used by religious activists to justify the
use of violence claims that the activists are only pursing those rights that
are already established under international law or some type of political
theory. If, for example, the Baha'i in Iran rebelled against the State, they
might claim that they were being denied several rights, including the
right to life (a non-religious right) and the right to nondiscrimination on
the basis of religion (one of the three fundamental religious rights). The
Baha'i would argue that all means of peaceful discourse had failed and
that violence was being used either in self-defense or to convince the
State to reconsider its policies toward them.
The second type of rationale used by violent activists claims that the
activists are pursuing rights that are not currently recognized in law or
theory but are a logical extension thereof and that violence is necessary
to force the State to recognize these new types of rights. For example,
this category of violence would include acts undertaken by religious
reformers who wanted to convince the State to permit religious human
sacrifice in cases where the victim was willing. As the law currently
stands, human sacrifice is prohibited, even if religiously motivated;
however, this claim is a logical extension of the existing right to nondis-
crimination and free exercise of religion.
The third type of rationale used by religious reformers who act vio-
lently is extra-legal in that it does not attempt to justify violence on any
legal or political basis; instead, it relies on the supremacy of religious
obligations over temporal law to justify violent and illegal actions. For
example, millinarianists who believed that God required them to blow
up the White House on December 31, 1999, as a catalyst to the apoca-
lypse would be acting on a purely religious basis; both the acts and
anticipated results are motivated by religious sentiments alone.
If these three categories encompass the universe of religiously in-
spired violence, the question that politicians and practitioners must ask
is how and whether each type of violence can be minimized or elimi-
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nated by any sort of state action. The first category of violence is easily
addressed, at least in theory, since States need only recognize the le-
gitimacy of the activists' claims and create de jure and de facto
protections for the rights at issue in order to eliminate the need for re-
ligious activists to resort to violence. The problem, of course, arises
when, for whatever reason, the State either refuses to recognize the le-
gitimacy of the rights claimed or argues that it is already protecting
those rights adequately and in accordance with the State's religious, le-
gal, and cultural history.
Iran already has experienced this type of violence several times in
the last century, with the most obvious example occurring in 1979. At
that time, the religious segment of Iranian society believed that the shah
had infringed on Muslims' free exercise of religion by imposing various
secularizing policies that failed to accommodate the needs of the relig-
iously devout. Although the rebels did not enunciate their claims in
formal rights-speak, the religious backlash against the shah's policies
was a major impetus for the Islamic Revolution. Although the activists
eventually created a religio-legal regime that included certain "rights"
not recognized under international law, the revolution was initially a
response to legitimate religious concerns. Had the shahs recognized the
need to accommodate the rights of both the religious and the secular
segments of society, the revolution might have been avoided.
Israel is currently facing certain types of violence that fall into this
first category, primarily at the hands of Palestinian Arabs. Notably, the
Palestinians are, for the most part, not attempting to claim that Judaism
is wrong and Islam is right as a matter of religious truth; rather, they are
opposed to living in a Jewish state that (i) refuses to recognize their re-
ligious beliefs and principles as equally valid as Jewish religious beliefs
and (ii) marginalizes them politically, culturally, and socially. In Israel,
the situation is the opposite of that found in Iran in the 1970s in that re-
ligious minorities are protesting excessive religiosity in the law and
national culture, not excessive secularism.
Interestingly, another oppressed minority, non-Orthodox Jews, have
not resorted to violence despite being subjected to discriminatory state
practices that are similar in many ways to those applicable to the Pales-
tinians. After looking at the examples of Israel and Iran, it appears that
religious activists only resort to violence if violations of religious rights
(including the nullification of the fundamental freedoms of a minority
group due to the creation of a majority religious culture) are extreme,
absolute, and long-lasting. In this definition, "extreme" means the vio-
lations must be more than de minimis; "absolute" means there must be
no opportunity for peaceful political discourse and change nor any op-
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portunity to escape the offensive laws; and "long-lasting" means the
violations must endure for several political cycles (i.e., several mon-
archs' reigns or several seatings of the legislature).
It is the second element, that of absolutism, that differentiates non-
Orthodox Jews from Palestinian Arabs in Israel. For example, Jews have
hope that they can eventually effectuate political change, while Arabs
generally do not. In addition, non-Orthodox Jews are able to escape the
most oppressive laws (those concerning marriage and divorce) by leav-
ing the country temporarily, while Arabs have no such relief. Even the
level of extremism is different, for non-Orthodox Jews generally benefit
from and support the concept of a Jewish state, although they may disa-
gree with the current level of interaction between law and religion. 12'
Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, receive no benefits from increasing the
Jewish aspects of Israeli law and culture and have no reason to wish the
continuation of the current religio-legal regime. Therefore, if Israel
wishes to decrease the level of violence practiced by Palestinian Arabs,
it must address those violations of rights that are extreme, absolute, and
long-lasting. The longer it delays, the less likely it is that the Palestini-
ans will ever be able to identify with the State and support its continued
existence.
The second type of religious violence occurs when individuals or
groups claim certain rights or privileges that are not currently recog-
nized but are arguable extensions of existing rights. At first, this appears
to be logically inconsistent in that violence is the antithesis of legal or
political legitimacy, but the key to understanding this second category of
violent behavior is recognizing that these religious activists are using
violence as a form of religio-political communication 2 ' and that they do
not justify their actions on purely religious grounds. They may in some
ways see their goals as religiously required, but those goals are to be
attained on the temporal, earthly level, and violence is merely a means
521. Non-Orthodox Jews do not wish the destruction of the State or the total reforma-
tion of the society (as do the Palestinian Arabs); nor do they believe that violence is the only
means of communication left open to them (as do a number of Arabs and ultra-Orthodox
Jews); therefore, violence is unnecessary and, indeed, counterproductive to achieving their
goals. See Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 574 (quoting historian Thomas Rose as saying
"violence is a political resource when the bargaining process provides no other alternatives,
or at least when some groups perceive no other alternatives").
522. See Rapoport, supra note 262, at 446 (noting that "[iun a secular world, violence is
normally understood as a means to an end whereby participants strive to increase efficiency
wherever possible by discarding less productive structures and methods;" arguing the same
dynamic appears in fundamentalist movements). The first category of acts also uses violence
as a form of communication, but there the message is often much easier to interpret, since it
involves previously recognized rights.
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of convincing individuals and/or secular political institutions to respect
or implement their proposed reforms.
This second category covers most forms of religious terrorism and
ad hoc outbursts of violent confrontation. For example, in Israel, some
ultra-Orthodox Jews will spontaneously attack passers-by who are vio-
lating certain halachic norms, such as women who pray publicly and
people who work on the Sabbath. Although these acts originate from a
sense of religious indignation and outrage that the victims are ignoring
their religious obligations, the violence is essentially an attempt to
communicate with the offending parties and persuade, coerce, frighten,
or force them into changing their behavior. The attackers may also hope
that by demonstrating the level of their discontent with current laws and
policies and their willingness to use whatever means necessary to op-
pose current state practices, the State will acquiesce to their demand to
enforce certain religious norms on a wider scale in order to keep the
peace. Such acts may also be undertaken in an attempt to convince the
State to uphold the religio-legal status quo. This second type of commu-
nication, which is directed at state bodies even though it is practiced on
individuals, can be classified as religious terrorism.523
Much of the violence aimed at the State of Israel by those who de-
sire the destruction of Israel, be they international terrorist groups or
neighboring states, can also be categorized within this second type of
religious violence since it is both communicative and seeks to extend
existing legal rights. In this case, the neighboring states and terrorist
non-state entities each have certain rights, none of which includes inter-
ference in the internal affairs of another sovereign body.52' However,
Israel's opponents are using violence to assert their "right" to determine
the course of Israel's policies. Their justification for doing so may rely
on a belief that (i) they have the right and duty to protect the rights of
Israeli Muslims, which may be an extension of a State's right to act to
protect its nationals who are resident in another country and being
abused by that other sovereign; or (ii) they have the right and duty to
protect themselves and their constituencies from the religious offense
given by the Jewish state to those who are not Jewish. In many ways,
this latter argument is similar to that raised by Orthodox Jews who are
offended by the behavior of non-Orthodox Jews, but is more dangerous
523. Religious terrorism can also be practiced directly on the State and may sometimes
attempt to minimize the risk of harm to innocent individuals, as in the Irish Republican
Army's technique of tipping police off to the existence of bombs in public places so that the
explosions damage only property.
524. See Vincent, supra note 1, at 257-61 (discussing rights of states and non-state en-
tities under international law).
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in that it carries the possibility that opposition to Israel is based solely
on claims about the religious truth of Islam versus Judaism.
5 2
At this point, however, the violence aimed at the State of Israel'26
has as its goal the diminution or destruction of the Jewish state in either
a territorial or cultural sense rather than the extermination of Jews per
se. Although the violence and the desired results are on a larger scale
than those previously discussed, they still reflect an underlying belief
that such acts will bring about a change in a temporal political entity.
This belief may be disguised by the claim that such acts are being taken
out of respect for and in obedience to a religious authority that is higher
than of the State, but the determinative factor is that the violence is in-
tended to bring about a change in others on an individual or state level.
Similar examples exist in Iran. For example, attacks on women not
wearing hejab and on Baha'is may initially seem to be acts of religious
retribution, but they are really intended to coerce behavior and extend
the religious rights of attackers from the negative right to themselves be
free of religious coercion to the positive right to impose their religious
values on others. 27 The fact that in Iran the violence is either perpetrated
or condoned by the State is irrelevant to this analysis. Instead, the focus
should be on the fact that violence in Iran, as in Israel, is used as an ex-
treme form of communication: conform with the religious norms of the
religious activists (in this case, the State) or face the consequences. In
both cases, the violent actors are trying to extend their rights from rec-
ognized legal protections of their own beliefs and practices to the as yet
unrecognized "right" to impose one person's or one party's religious
values on others.
Because this second category of religious violence involves people
who are unwilling to respect existing boundaries of the law, it may ap-
pear to be beyond the control of non-participants, but, strangely enough,
can be minimized through proper legal measures. However, the ap-
proach varies between Israel and Iran, since in one case the State wishes
to minimize violence while in the other the State practices it.
525. If that should happen, the violence would fall under category three, discussed
infra.
526. See Beres, supra note 280, at 65-72 (noting current Iranian position is that Israel
is a "cancerous growth in the Middle East" and must cease to exist, simply because it is a
Jewish state). A number of commentators believe that a state of war already exists between
Iran and Israel, based on Iran's unilateral intent to destroy Israel and irrespective of the ab-
sence of formal hostilities or declarations. See id. at 72 & n.25; see also MACKEY, supra note
91, at 385 (commenting that Iran is unwilling to "end its role as the leader of the opposition
to the Middle East peace process").
527. See Strong, Christian Constitutions, supra note 265, at 63 (discussing whether re-
ligious rights are positive or negative).
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In all instances of communicative violence, the first step is to iden-
tify what the demands of the various speakers are. The problem in Israel
is that the messages diverge between each of the groups who utilize
violence. In the case of violence practiced by Jews against Jews, it is the
religiously devout protesting increased secularization in their communi-
ties and nation. In the case of non-Jews against the State, it is a
religiously marginalized minority (or a neighboring state or non-state
entity that feels compelled to protect that minority) protesting the ex-
isting levels of religio-legal interaction and opposing any increases
thereof. Therefore, it would seem that any attempt to conciliate one
group would inflame the other. While this is a risk, Israel faces violence
every day as a result of the current system and change must be consid-
ered.
The second step in analyzing and addressing communicative vio-
lence is to take into account the underlying validity of the various
claims to see which, if any, can be fulfilled. Although the conviction of
the actors might initially seem important, in that more devoted activists
might be more willing to use extreme measures to win their point, such
considerations cannot figure into the analysis since to do so would en-
courage more groups to adopt violence as a means of effectuating
political change. Instead, the claims for change must be proven legiti-
mate on their own merits, for implementing laws that impose a different
set of inequities will not lead to lasting peace but will only create a new
group of disgruntled citizens.
In considering the competing claims of violent actors in Israel, one
must first recognize that, as discussed in connection with the first type
of violence, non-Jews in Israel have a legitimate complaint that their
religious and other rights are being infringed upon by the State. To some
extent, the violence aimed at Israel by outside entities is a response to
the inequitable treatment of Muslim Arabs within the State. Although
the outrage felt by these neighboring nations and non-state organizations
is largely unactionable at law, it is based on state acts that are legally
impermissible. Therefore, it is unnecessary at this juncture to address
the novel aspects of the claims made by surrounding states and terrorist
groups against Israel, since by eliminating the first level problems (i.e.,
the violation of resident non-Jews' legitimate rights), Israel may elimi-
nate some or all of its second-level problems as well. In addressing the
territorial claims of the Palestinian Arabs through the Middle Eastern
peace process, Israel has begun to implement this plan, but by ignoring
the cultural issues that affect the everyday lives of non-Jews within the
State, Israel may find the peace incomplete and temporary.
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Although territorial concessions to the Palestinians inflame certain
portions of the Israeli population (particularly the Orthodox),5  much of
the violence undertaken at the hands of the Orthodox has less to do with
disputes over land and more to do with disputes over culture. These acts
are basically a response to the State's allowing others to act in ways that
offend the Orthodox and their conception of what a Jewish state should
be. This complaint obviously falls outside the three basic religious
rights and-even outside the "fundamental freedoms" analysis, since the
Orthodox are not claiming that their right to life, found a family, work,
or any other recognized freedom is being infringed upon; it is their re-
ligious sensibilities that are at issue. While this is obviously distressing
and should be accommodated to the extent possible, it cannot form the
primary basis of law in a nation that claims to protect all citizens' rights,
religious and otherwise. In fact, this problem occurs not only with re-
spect to restrictions put on non-Jews but also on obstacles to non-
Orthodox Jews' practicing their faith freely and openly. Despite the fact
that non-Orthodox Jews are not violent at present, they still suffer from
the current formulation of the State as a Jewish Orthodox institution.
Although restrictions on non-Jews' rights should obviously be reevalu-
ated, Israel should also reconsider the limitations placed on the rights of
non-Orthodox Jews. By relaxing the restrictions on non-Orthodox Jews
(something which is sure to receive significant media attention), the
State will send a message to non-Jews that religious pluralism is ac-
cepted and protected within the nation and that alternate conceptions of
Israeli culture are as valid as those based on Jewish (Orthodox) criteria.
Persuading the violent factions within the Jewish community that
territorial and cultural concessions should be made to non-Jewish and
non-Orthodox Israelis will be difficult, however, especially considering
the general acceptance of violence by religious activists as a means of
political discourse in Israel. The likelihood of legislative change is also
diminished by the fact that the religious parties currently hold a great
deal of power in the Knesset and may be loath to implement changes
they feel are contrary to their religious obligations. However, they may
be persuaded to do so if they become convinced that it will decrease
violence within society. In general, reforms in Israel should focus on
accommodating the rights of all religious groups by giving non-Jews
and non-Orthodox Jews more of a voice in Israeli politics and culture
528. The Orthodox tend to oppose returning land to the Palestinians based on a relig-
ious conception of what Israel should be, while non-religious Jews often view territorial
concessions as unwise as a matter of national security. Although the latter is a political mat-
ter outside the scope of this article, the former is obviously relevant to the current discussion.
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and more equal rights, while at the same time limiting the ability of the
Orthodox to control all aspects of Israeli culture. This is not to say that
Orthodox Jews must give up all of their rights and privileges to appease
Arab and secular interests; rather, both sides must compromise. How-
ever, it should be noted that the reason why it may appear that the
Orthodox are receiving the brunt of the reforms is because the Orthodox
have enjoyed a disproportionate ability to shape the values of the coun-
try. If the religio-legal culture more closely matched the actual
demographic makeup of the nation, there would be fewer adjustments to
be made and the Orthodox would perceive the burden to be less.5 9 Be-
cause the balance of power has been skewed, the sting of reform will be
equally unbalanced.
Although the situation in Israel provides certain helpful insights, re-
ligio-legal violence in Iran is of a different nature and therefore requires
a different approach. Practiced by the State against non-conformists of
all religions, Iranian violence constitutes an attempt to persuade, coerce,
and/or force the population to adhere to the State's definition of Islam, if
not in mind, at least in practice. Although the State has reportedly de-
creased its use of violence, this might merely reflect the success of
earlier violent acts in eliminating the opposition. Alternatively, the State
may recognize that the downturn in the Iranian economy has caused
widespread discontent that has made violent social reform inappropriate
and dangerous to the stability of the current regime.53 Nevertheless, a
number of those in power still believe violence is a legitimate tool of
state, which makes it unlikely that the impetus for change will come
from the state itself, since it sees little wrong with its actions. 3 '
Although it is difficult, there are ways to encourage a nation to
change its internal approach to law, with domestic human rights groups
often standing the best chance of success.532 The international commu-
529. See Genut, supra note 60, at 2151-52; see also LIEBMAN & DON-YEHIYA,
RELIGION AND POLITICS, supra note 62 (reporting that forty percent of Israeli Jews identify
themselves as secular, forty percent as traditional, and twenty percent as religious);
EDELMAN, supra note 10, at 40 (noting eighteen percent of Israeli population is Arab).
530. Another more theoretical possibility is that violence is usually a tool of the most
oppressed faction in society; in Iran, that group is women, who, as a group, generally do not
rely on violence to achieve their ends. Additionally, violence is easier to legitimize if it is
being used in the name of religion rather than against religion. Because the Iranian state is
considered more religious than the dissidents, reformers cannot use religious justifications
for violence, at least at the present time. However, should corruption in government continue
to spread, religion may be used as a means of deposing the current regime.
531. See MACKEY, supra note 91, at 308.
532. See Graves, supra note 105, at 85-86 (discussing theoretical solution of Professor
An-Na'im, set forth in Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Toward a Cross-Cultural Approach to
Defining International Standards of Human Rights: The Meaning of Cruel, Inhuman or De-
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nity might also contribute to Iran's religio-legal reformation through
measures designed to indicate its disapproval of the State's use of re-
ligio-political intimidation. In addition, other States and international
non-governmental organizations can stress that a system that violates all
three basic tenets of religious rights will eventually be exposed to vio-
lence at the hands of oppressed dissenters who view the violations of
rights as extreme, absolute, and long-standing. By emphasizing the need
for moderation as a way of ensuring the State's own survival, the inter-
national community may make the message of reform more palatable
and less threatening to the Iranian government and increase the chance
that it will eventually be acted upon. In the past, international commen-
tary has been universally negative, which has only made Iran more
defensive and less likely to adopt new methods of dealing with dissi-
dents. By demonstrating how less oppressive measures help stabilize the
current regime, the international community gains some respect in the
eyes of the Iranian government. This approach may result in both parties
getting what they want: respect and non-interference for the Iranian
government and a more rights-oriented society for the international hu-
man rights community.
Although Iran has typically resisted interference in its domestic af-
fairs by outsiders, these techniques may be more effective than they at
first appear, since Iran is evidently embarrassed533 enough by its own
actions that it has attempted to hide them from or justify them to the
outside world.4 Therefore, because Iran may be vulnerable to interna-
tional opinion, measures should be taken to open constructive dialogue
with the State about its use of violence in furthering the goals of the Is-
lamic Republic and to discourage violent acts in the future.35
The third and final type of violence is utilized by persons who be-
lieve that the principles of their faith require them to use violence to
bring about certain religious ends, such as the mass destruction of non-
grading Treatment or Punishment, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 19
(1992)); Loh, supra note 2, at 162; Miller, supra note 165, at 818-19.
533. See also MACKEY, supra note 91, at 388 (noting Iranians' desire to be respected
by and recognized in the international community).
534. First, Iran has attempted to deny any incidents of religious repression, such as at-
tacks against Baha'i, although this may simply be an example of taqiyeh. See Atlas, supra
note 281. Second, Iran claims that it is respecting religious and other rights through its Con-
stitution, which contains various provisions protective of minority rights. Third, it claims that
it is implementing religious rights in accordance with its own unique Islamic (i.e., non-
Western) culture.
535. Because Americans tend to perceive Iran as highly militant (a move that in itself
may help to fuel the flames of anti-American passion in Iran), this course of action may be
more likely to be undertaken by nations other than the U.S. See Peter Waldman, Iranian
Revolution Takes Another Turn, But Where Is It Going?, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1995, at Al.
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believers or a cataclysmic event heralding the return of the Messiah.536
The difference between people in this category and those in the other
two categories is that people in this group are not attempting to commu-
nicate, nor are they attempting to bring about any change in the
temporal political realm; they are utilizing violence as a means of
bringing about a purely religious end. As discussed above, it is possible
for the State to minimize the first and second types of violence, since
the desired outcome lies within the State's power. However, there is
nothing the State may affirmatively do to eliminate or minimize this
third type of violence, since it has nothing to do with the State as a po-
litical body. This sort of pure religious violence, which is inherent in all
religions,537 can only be controlled through the State's criminal justice
system, as any other act of violence would be regardless of its motiva-
tion.
CONCLUSION
As Israel and Iran move into the twenty-first century, they each face
the challenges associated with reconciling, on the one hand, the needs
and demands of a devout population with a history of religio-legal unifi-
cation with, on the other hand, the need to respect and protect the
religious rights of minority populations. If these two nations fail to do
so, they face the possibility of increased domestic violence, as various
groups struggle to create a nation that reflects their own values. In fact,
the longer Israel and Iran fail to address their problems and deny the
legitimate human rights claims of their citizens, the more extreme the
fallout will be when change is finally implemented.
At this point, the two countries are taking somewhat divergent
paths, with Iran moving toward increased secularization and Israel
moving toward increased integration of religious principles in law. De-
spite the existence of strong secular elements in both societies, neither
nation is a candidate for complete separation of religion and state, due
to their political, legal, cultural, and religious histories and to their both
having created certain political institutions that perpetuate the inclusion
of religion and religious principles in the law of the State.
Because this article has proceeded under the assumption that crea-
tion of a secular state is not a possibility for either Israel or Iran at the
present time, there has been no discussion about the merits of separation
536. See Rapoport, supra note 262, at 447-50 (discussing violence based on "founding
myth[s]" and millenarian or messianic beliefs).
537. See id. at 446.
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versus unification of law and religion. Instead, this article has assumed
that, for these two nations, religion must be reflected in the law of the
State; the only question has been to what extent. A system that incorpo-
rates all persons' religious obligations fully, equally, and simultaneously
cannot stand, as most people would protest being forced to live under
another group's highly restrictive religious law and would oppose hav-
ing society controlled by a single, highly devout minority. Similarly, a
system that gives full or nearly full effect to the obligations arising un-
der one religion while curtailing the rights of persons of other religions
cannot last long, since such an approach leads to divisiveness, aliena-
tion, and violence. Instead, if religion must be included in the law of the
State, it is best to create a system in which all religions are given as
much respect as possible through a "lowest common denominator" ap-
proach to enforcement of religious obligations that only incorporates
those religious elements that are common to all religions within the
State. This approach can be strengthened by utilizing theologically per-
missible techniques that allow the imposition of a lower standard of
behavior on nonbelievers and/or by establishing a consent provision that
would allow for judicial enforcement of more stringent aspects of re-
ligious law only in cases where the parties consented to the application
of such principles.
As Israel and Iran begin to reform their legal systems, they should
first consider the three basic tenets of religious rights law
(nondiscrimination, freedom of religious belief, and freedom of the ex-
ercise of religion), while also being aware of the extent to which the
incorporation of one group's religious principles in law may nullify the
fundamental freedoms of non-believers. It is this last provision that has
created the most problems for States that include majority religious
principles in the law of the State and has inspired the most conflict be-
tween different segments of society. 3 Although opponents to existing
religio-legal regimes may not enunciate their objections in precise legal
terms, they may use violence as a means of communicating their dis-
content with the status quo.
One type of communicative violence arises out of violations of es-
tablished religious rights. This type of conflict is often the easiest to
cure, since, by respecting internationally recognized religious rights, the
538. Historically, incorporation of religious principles in law has only been successful
in States that are highly homogeneous and that are geographically and/or culturally isolated
from the rest of the world. The problem is that most nations are becoming more pluralistic
due to the increased movement of persons across state boundaries and the easy accessibility
of foreign ideas through improved communications technology.
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State eliminates all claims and acts of violence based on infringement of
those rights. As a matter of political expediency, if not legal principle,
States should respect and protect these rights in order to foster peace
and stability within their borders. Notably, the problem of universality
versus relativity of human rights does not arise in this situation, as it is
not external actors who are attempting to impose non-native values on
the nation in question; it is the citizens of the State who are demanding
recognition of certain rights.
The second type of communicative violence is more difficult to ad-
dress, in that it claims as rights certain principles that have not yet been
recognized under international law or political theory. States faced with
this type of violence must first identify the demands advanced by the
activists and then balance those demands against the existing rights re-
gime. Since the field of human rights is constantly evolving, States
cannot assume that actors who fall into this second category of religious
violence will never advance a legitimate claim; conversely, however,
States should not assume that everyone who falls into this class has
claims that should be upheld.
The third type of religiously inspired violence is not communicative
in that it does not attempt to influence individual action or state policy.
Since it focuses solely on religious goals, it is beyond any sort of pro-
ductive dialogue with the State and should be addressed through the
criminal law, as any other violent act would be.
As the two countries think about whether and to what extent they
wish to reform their existing religio-legal regimes, they should consider
several concepts. For example, most commentators agree that Israel's
most glaring structural problem is its use of separate religious courts for
every religious community. Should Israel continue its use of the relig-
ious court system, it will likely find itself increasingly at odds with its
Arab population, due to the religious courts' tendency to perpetuate and
highlight religious differences within society. One way to minimize the
conflicts and inequities created by the millet system might be to con-
solidate the various religious courts into a single system staffed with
jurists from the existing courts. The new court would initially utilize the
different lines of precedent that have grown out of the independent re-
ligious courts, but would, over time, begin to develop a single approach
to religio-legal concerns in Israel. This type of institution would empha-
size the common elements among the various groups in Israel rather
than their differences and could successfully reconcile the diverse
groups within the nation. The success of this approach would depend on
the court's ability to avoid using an overwhelmingly Jewish perspective
and interpretive style, since that would be counterproductive to any uni-
[Vol. 19:109
Law and Religion in Israel and Iran
fying efforts. Because the Supreme Court has already been recognized
as the protector of the rule of law in Israel and commands a high degree
of trust and respect from the population, it seems logical to vest the ju-
diciary with the task of harmonizing the different religio-legal
approaches into a universal system of Israeli jurisprudence.
In addition to renovating the structure of the judiciary, Israel needs
to take a hard look at the substance of its laws. For example, the
Knesset's direction to the judiciary to use Jewish principles and values
as a default mechanism to fill in any gaps in legal precedent is not with-
out risk, since it sends a message to religious minorities that their values
and cultures are of secondary importance. By minimizing minority
groups' contributions to the nation, the Knesset fails to inspire dedica-
tion and loyalty to the State and increases the possibility that dissenters
will perceive violence as the only way to effectuate change in society.
Activists are also more likely to turn to violence now that the Knesset
has prohibited certain persons and certain viewpoints from entering into
the public sphere. Although this is obviously an attempt to protect the
Jewish nature of the State, it may decrease the possibility that Israel will
be able to unify the diverse components of its culture and find a national
vision that includes, rather than excludes, minority populations.
This need for respect of other religious perspectives is also apparent
in the area of personal law. Although much of what Israel has accom-
plished is good, there is a problem, at least for the Jewish community,
with respect to restrictions on marriage and divorce. Interestingly, if the
government were to ease up on those restrictions, it might help improve
Jewish-Arab relations and minimize violence in society, since Arabs
would begin to believe that the Jewish Orthodoxy was beginning to
loosen its monopoly on Israeli culture and that there was hope that they,
too, might one day find their voices heard by the State.
There are similar concerns with respect to education, in that current
restrictions on entry to universities only affirm non-Jews' belief that
they are second-class citizens in their own country. If such restrictions
are lifted, these minorities might see themselves as equal participants in
the future of Israel and be less likely to utilize violence as a means of
political opposition.
Although Iran's institutional problems are more severe than Israel's,
the society has offered less resistance to the current regime. 39 Because
539. One explanation for this phenomenon might be the creation of a one-party state
and the banning of the leading secular liberal party. See Elaine Sciolino, Fear, Inflation and
Graft Feed Disillusion Among Iranians, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1995, at Al (reporting that due
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there are so few explicit challenges to the Iranian system, there is some
question as to the source of the next wave of religio-social reform. Tra-
ditionally, clerics have acted as the watchdogs of the State, but because
they now hold much of the power in Iran, it is unlikely that change will
be initiated from that sector.'4 Instead, reform and moderate seculariza-
tion may occur as a result of the economic problems that currently face
that nation, since the government may find it impossible to impose re-
pressive social strictures on an already discontented public.
Obviously the most difficult problem for Iran to overcome, should it
decide to cure the numerous rights violations practiced by the State, is
the institutionalization of the vilayat-i-mutlaqa-yi-faqih. As long as the
Supreme Jurisprudent has the sole authority to decide which laws are
permissible in the Islamic Republic, there is danger that people's rights
will be abused. Although a more moderate Supreme Jurisprudent could
permit or require certain distinctions to be made between religious and
secular law, that decision could easily be changed by the next Supreme
Jurisprudent since there is apparently no requirement that one Jurispru-
dent follow the precedents of his predecessors. Therefore, until
fundamental changes are made to the Iranian structure of government,
there will be danger of state infringements on religious rights.
With respect to the substantive law, Iran's approach to sovereignty
and judicial interpretation makes it difficult for any sort of liberalization
to occur. However, there are signs that the Majlis and the courts are
softening their views on how much religion to incorporate into the laws
of the State. For example, women are now given the right to monetary
compensation after divorce and are permitted to sit as assistant judges.
Since the post-revolutionary restrictions on un-Islamic behavior fell dis-
proportionately hard on women, it is encouraging to see some
improvements in this area and is in a way predictable, since women's
rights have often constituted the first and most extreme battleground in
the war between secular and religious forces in Iran. Although there has
not been any liberalizing movements in other aspects of personal law,
including laws regarding disfavored religious minorities, it is possible
that this initial foray toward more equitable treatment of women is a
to government repression, there is "no serious challenge to the theocracy that has ruled for
more than 16 years").
540. See Chase, supra note 165, at 406-07 (discussing possibility of an opposition
movement in Iran and the current position of the ulama in Iranian society). However, it is
possible that those lower level clerics who are not currently in positions of power may even-
tually begin an opposition movement if and when the corruption in the ranks of the clerical
elite becomes impossible to bear. See generally Sciolino, supra note 539 (reporting govern-
ment corruption in Iran).
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sign that the Islamic Republic will become more moderate in coming
years.
As is true of Israel, Iran has had some difficulties in implementing
an equitable system of education, with the most significant problems
arising when minority or dissenting members of society wish to obtain a
university education. Women, however, have made great strides in this
area in recent years and may be able to utilize their learning to better
their position in Iran.
As has been demonstrated throughout this article, any debate over
the proper role of religion in law is extremely complex. However, the
only way to progress in this area is to recognize what the purpose and
effect of religiously influenced laws are and to decide whether those
laws are permissible as a matter of law and theory. Even this approach is
further complicated by the problem of ascertaining whether and to what
extent each proposed change will affect the level of violence within and
between societies, but the fact that a task is difficult does not mean it is
not worth undertaking; in fact, quite the opposite is true.
After weighing the different approaches and their effect on society,
this article suggests that it is preferable as a matter of law and safer as a
matter of national and international security to create legal systems in
which all persons' rights are respected to the fullest extent possible,
limited only when the exercise of one person's or one group's religious
rights begins to infringe on another person's legitimate rights. By doing
so, the State creates an atmosphere in which all persons feel free to ex-
ercise their religious rights and increases the loyalty felt by all groups
toward the State, thus decreasing the likelihood of violence within and
between nations. If the goal is to create more peaceful and rights-
oriented societies, one group cannot have total control over the defini-
tion of culture and the amount of religio-legal integration in the State; to
do so will inspire permanent divisions in society and perpetuate violent
power struggles between groups, as repressed minorities attempt to find
a way to gain the respect they need and deserve.
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